THE THOMIST

A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS: THE DOMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JOSEPH

Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.

VOL. XI OCTOBER, 1948 No. 4

THEOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF CONVERSION

THERE exists a rather curious discrepancy between the very lively interest taken nowadays in apologetical, oecumenical, and other works which by their very nature tend to result in conversions to the Catholic Church, and the almost complete lack of reflection among Catholics on the problems connected with these conversions. This lively interest hardly needs demonstration. It can be measured, for example, by the numerous stories of converts which are being published and read and which furnish the principal material for psychological studies of conversion (Starbuck, James, De Sanctis, Th. Mainage, O. P.) The lack of theological reflection is shown, among other instances, from the fact that the *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique* does not even mention the word conversion; the *Dictionnaire Apologétique de la Foi Catholique* and the *Lexicon Für Theologie und Kirche* have only very short articles on the subject and they are more historical than theological. In this study, we intend only to examine some of the theological problems related to conversion and indicate certain solutions; all of these problems could not be studied in one article.

It must be noted immediately that the word "conversion" can have several different meanings, all of these meanings having some connection between them. The different uses of the same word have been the cause of much confusion in the psychological study of conversion as we understand it. Conversion can mean (and it is in this sense that we write of it) a change of religious conviction, and notably the acceptance of the Catholic faith. It indicates a motion to something new from something old; therefore it has a counterpart in apostasy, and if we attend to the fact that as an old conviction is given up a new one is acquired we note that every conversion can be called an apostasy. Conversion in this first sense, however, implies something more than a merely intellectual act, for whoever accepts the Catholic faith enters the Catholic Church and intends to live a Catholic life.

In another sense, conversion may mean the *justificatio impii*, the change from a bad life to a good one. In this sense, conversion has been the object of numerous theological studies, and has been considered by St. Thomas [1] and the modern authors. The latin term, *conversus*, has been used to designate a lay-brother in the same sense. It should be noted that a conversion to the Catholic faith always implies some change from a bad to a good life, in this respect at least that the Catholic standards of good and bad must be accepted with the faith; therefore, almost every convert, even if he could be called a good Christian before his conversion, has to make some changes in his manner of life. Still, one can be a bad Catholic and a sinner at the same time, and such a one needs the *justificatio impii* without needing any change of faith. On the other hand, many non-Catholics are already in a state of grace before they are converted to the Catholic faith. Hence a connection between these two kinds of conversion is not only possible, but necessary.

In a third sense, conversion may mean a change in religious life without any change of faith. This kind of conversion is studied by ascetical and mystical theologians.[2] We call it a

[1] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 113.

[2] *Cf.* Garrigou-Lagrange, *The Three Ways of the Spiritual Life*, London, 1942.

conversion when a man changes from a humdrum religious life to a more serious one, from carelessness about venial sin to a systematical endeavor to reach perfection. Although this kind of conversion implies no change in religious conviction and is thus very different from the first kind, it should be noted that the acceptance of the Catholic faith, which is the fullness of revelation and grace, must bring about in the life of good Christians who are in a state of grace before conversion a growth in the intensity of religious life.

Finally, Protestants have a special notion of conversion which can not be fully treated here. We can call it an offspring of Luther's teaching on the *fides salvifica*; it means no change in religious conviction but is the beginning of a more consciously religious life. Professor Starbuck has studied these conversions in his famous book *The Psychology of Religion*. He notes carefully that such conversions ". . . are true of a specialised class, chiefly Protestant, American members of professedly Christian communities. They are not necessarily true of savages or statesmen or Catholics or persons living in a different historical epoch." Notwithstanding his caution, his conclusions on the age of conversion and the influence of puberty are often applied to conversions to the Catholic faith.

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In this study, we are interested only in conversions to the Catholic faith, and from the theological, not the psychological, approach. The theologian has to look to the theological cause of conversion, the grace of God. He is the only person who has a right to speak of this grace. Further, he is the only person who can define exactly what a conversion to the Catholic faith is, for every motion is known from its goal and only the theologian can say what the faith truly is. Too, he alone can speak of a right and a wrong way to come to the faith. The doctrine on the nature of faith and especially the treatise on the genesis of faith must be used in the study of conversions.

The historian can tell the story of conversions and, by comparison, he can find some general laws about the way in which

they usually happen. The psychologist can study conversions as facts of conscious human life and he can look for the influence of subconscious processes. Neither of these, however can claim the right to judge extrapsychic, superhuman causes. On the other hand, the theologian needs the help of both historian and psychologist if he wishes to do more than give only abstract speculations on faith and conversions. From revelation he can deduce what faith is and the relation of faith to the grace of God, but if he wishes to speak of different kinds of conversions, the different ways by which God brings His children to the truth and the Church, he must turn to actual facts. Working in *a priori* fashion, he can only suggest possibilities.

Before discussing the use of these facts, we must point out an important conclusion: the theologian alone can judge when to speak of true and when to speak of false conversions; he must therefore sort out the facts according to his own standards. This conclusion may seem rather arrogant especially to psychologists. We do not mean to deny that psychologists too can judge about true and false conversions, but they can judge only according to a psychological pattern and this does not coincide with the theological pattern. We have said that a conversion always has its counterpart in an apostasy in that when a man accepts the Catholic faith he, at the same time, casts off his former convictions. To a psychologist when a Protestant becomes a Catholic. abjuring his Protestantism, it may seem the same thing as when a Catholic becomes a Protestant, abjuring his Catholicism. He may call both facts conversions, study them side by side, and speak of them being true or false conversions in a psychological sense. To a theologian, however, the first is a work of grace and the second the work of sin; he will never call the second fact a conversion. Furthermore, the theologian must consider whether a man becomes a true Catholic in the right manner, whether he has the real faith and whether he came to it in the right way. For instance, George Tyrell, the Modernist leader, is always called a convert from Anglicanism to Catholicism. In view of his later life and evolution, the theologian must consider two possibilities: Tyrell

may have been a true convert and afterwards gave up his faith, or perhaps he never was a true convert and a good Catholic; he may never have believed in the true Catholic manner, or his motive in becoming a Catholic may have been false or unsound. In special cases, like Tyrell's, it may be impossible to come to a certain conclusion, but it is the theologian's exclusive right to judge.

When he has received the necessary facts from historians and psychologists, it is the theologian's task to analyse them and interpret them in the light of the workings of divine grace. Grace, of course, can not be experienced. We can only believe in it, but from theological analysis we can be sure that some of our actions, as, e. g., to believe, to love our enemies, can be done only with the help of grace. The theologian searches the stories of converts for actions of this kind; he may find that they have not been appreciated properly by the converts themselves and that they have been passed over by historians and psychologists to whom they had no meaning. The converts, even if they are making an effort to retail the entire truth, will tell their stories as they remember them. It often happens that facts which are of little importance to the theologian made the strongest impression upon the convert. The event which, to the theologian, marked the moment of the infusion of the faith is often forgotten and passed over. All this is so because grace is not experienced but is rather believed.

There are some conversions which are instantaneous, conversions such as those of St. Paul and St. Augustine, and in latter times of Alphonse Ratisbonne and Paul Claudel. In these cases, the converts themselves, the historian, psychologist, and theologian will consider the same moment decisive. But there are many other conversions, long drawn-out affairs with, apparently, no decisive crisis; of these the conversion of Cardinal Newman is outstanding. It can also be that a phase may appear important in the eyes of the convert without being, in the theologian's eyes, the real turning point. Such might be the moments in which a man realizes that his boyhood religion is false or when he hears that his closest friend is to become a

Catholic. The Dutch convert, Pieter van der Meer de Walcheren, a friend and follower of Leon Bloy, confesses that he can not tell the moment in which he first made the act of faith, but he best remembers the moment when for the first time he knelt down and made the sign of the cross. Father Bede Camm tells of a moment in Maredsous chapel when he almost heard the devil saying, " What kind of nonsense is this? Do not pray to the Virgin; go back to your work! " [3] These moments claim the attention, not only of the converts themselves, but of the historian and psychologist as well, because they are of chief importance to the conscious spiritual life. The theologian, while acknowledging their relative importance, will look elsewhere for the precise moment of conversion, the infusion of the faith.

St. Augustine's case furnishes another complication. His was a double conversion; the Manichee turned Catholic, the sinner became a saint. At the same time he had to face an intellectual and a moral conflict; this is not uncommon. In such cases, the moral conflict being more vivid and more emotional may often claim more attention; hence it will be better remembered afterwards, while the theologian concentrates not upon the conflict but upon the actual conversion.

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When studying the beginning and growth of faith in converts, the theologian needs to keep in mind the possibility that they may have had divine faith even before they had the thought of becoming Catholics. Catholic doctrine admits the possibility of being in a state of grace without belonging to the visible Catholic Church, and since sanctifying grace is always accompanied by the supernatural virtues one may have divine faith while yet outside the church. The formal object of divine faith, the reason why we believe is God's revelation; the proposition of this revelation by the Church is considered by theologians to be a necessary condition of faith, but it does not belong to its formal object. Hence, real faith is possible to non-Catholics.

[3] " De l'Anglicisme au Monachisme," *Collection Pax*, 1930, p. 98.

In such cases, conversion can not be called the acceptance of the Catholic faith in the most obvious sense, that is, in the sense that the convert had no divine faith at all before his conversion. Conversion consists in believing that the Catholic Church is God's work and has God's mandate to teach and propose His revelation with authority. It means beginning to believe through the Church. As it implies believing every article of faith the Church proposes, the convert will have to believe much more after his conversion than before; this, however is only a change in the material object of his faith and a secondary effect of his conversion.

These changes in the material object of the faith can be very different in different conversions. In the case of a liberal Protestant, it many mean that he, for the first time in his life, has to believe in the divinity of Jesus Christ, His redemptive mission, the Holy Eucharist; in the case of the Anglo-Catholic, it may mean fewer additional articles of belief. Therefore, it is possible that the question of the Church and of believing through the ministry of the Church will appear more or less important to the converts themselves. To find the real Jesus is more important than to find the real Church, but to find the true Church is more important than to acknowledge the Pope. It is, therefore, not only easily understood, but it is quite right that some converts will insist on the material, and others on the formal, change in their faith. But the theologian will always consider the acceptance of the faith through the Church as the essential feature of conversion.

Thus far, we have spoken of conversion chiefly as a fact of the intellectual order; believing is an act of the intellect, moved by the will. Conversion, however, entails more than this. A convert acquires a new religion and becomes a member of the Catholic Church. As a Catholic, he henceforth receives God's grace through the ministry of the Church and chiefly through the Sacraments. Previously he may have been in a state of grace and may have received abundant grace from God, but henceforth he will receive this grace in an entirely different manner. This, again, is something which is withdrawn from the

consciousness of the converts themselves; they will not note it and it will never be studied by psychologists. It is, of course, much more important that they receive God's grace than that they should know about it, but the theologian has to insist on this aspect of the convert's membership in the Church. A story like Msgr. Benson's that he was received into the Church without feeling or experiencing any special emotion has, therefore, very different meanings for psychologist or theologian.

For the same reason it is supremely important to the theologian whether or not the convert was validly baptized before conversion. Psychologically, this may be negligible, something of no consequence, and certainly less important for the conscious process of conversion than the actual beliefs one had before conversion. Practically, of course, it has to be decided whether the convert must be baptized conditionally. But to the theologian it means that the convert, even before his conversion, may already have been able to receive the sacraments and, through them, God's grace; radically, he may have already been a member of the Church and conversion may only be a claiming of native rights.

In Holland and elsewhere in Europe, there are some converts who strongly object to the use of the term conversion. They prefer not to be called converts; they say they are " reunited " and not " converted." Some priests agree with them, and we must concede that a term with four different meanings has its difficulties and may imply less pleasant and somewhat humiliating associations. If we should consider the possibility of a new and different term (which might prove hard to find) it would have to be applied to those who were validly baptized before conversion.

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In every study on conversion which is historical or psychological, there is an attempt to classify conversions in several species. It can be questioned whether the theologian can copy these classifications or whether he should make his own. Some distinctions are plainly psychological or historical. For example,

if the question of subconscious influences is taken as a norm, it is a purely psychological standard. If we ask whether a conversion concerned one individual soul or whether it entailed a group, the question becomes historical. The theologian, however, must take his norms of classification from the Catholic notion of faith and, more particularly, from the notion of faith through and in the Catholic Church (*fides divina et Catholica.*) We believe that special stress should be laid on the question as to how the divinity of the Catholic Church becomes evident to the convert.

Sudden converions make the story of one convert very different from other stories; they furnish one decisive, critical, often dramatic, moment as the obvious climax. They mean everything to the historian who at the same time is a good story-teller; they may give precious indications to the psychologist who wants to speak about the unconscious or the subconscious. The theologian, however, must note that every conversion has its own critical moment, even if it passes unobserved by the convert. It is imposible to grow gradually into the Catholic Church or to acquire the faith gradually; the influence of grace is instantaneous, but the moment need not be dramatic.

Further, the theologian is certainly interested in whether a conversion to the faith is accompanied by the *justificatio impii*, the conversion to a better life. This circumstance, too, makes a great difference in the story and the study of it. Though it makes conversion more difficult, inasmuch as the faith itself then clearly implies moral demands, it has no direct influence on the conversion to the faith itself; it only makes a man more open to the aspect of the sanctity of the Church.

A conversion must be studied and classified from the *terminus ad quem* and not from the *terminus a quo*. Therefore, it seems that the fact of one having been a heathen, or Mohametan, or a Communist, or an atheist before becoming a Catholic can not in itself be a norm of classification to the theologian. The *terminus a quo* has its influence on the story of the convert; the ways to the Church can be very different and principally by reason of their starting-points, but to the

fact of conversion itself the starting-point need not be of great importance. However, we must admit the real possibility that the *terminus a quo* may create a kind of predisposition to see the divinity of the faith and the Church under one certain aspect. For example, the fact that one has been a Communist may mean that he is attracted to the Church in her social teaching and activity.

On the other hand, it is of paramount importance to the theologian whether the convert actually had the faith before conversion; this fact, we believe, will give the first really theological norm for classification. Here we do not mean faith in any modern, vague sense; we mean faith in the true Catholic sense, that is the acceptance of mysteries on the authority of God. Obviously there is a great difference between the man who for the first time in his life has to accept something he does not understand, on God's authority, and the man who is already accustomed to bow his head to God's authority. This difference is psychological but is much more theological. The divine authority of the Church as seen in its various aspects can and must furnish the theological norm for further classification.

Here the theologian certainly does not mean that the divinity of the Church can be demonstrated by various apologetical arguments and that these arguments will be the norm of classification. These arguments can give only a natural preparation for the faith, but the faith itself is infused. The divine mystery of the Church, however, has many aspects which the light of the faith can show, and so the converts by their very faith will come to the Church in various ways. For instance, Sigrid Undset, the great novelist, writes about her conversion: "We want, above all, teachers who can teach us something; we need leaders who have the real power to command and prohibit; and we desire to look up to One to Whom we can pour out our confidence and admiration, and also our love." The Dutch politician, Dr. Henry P. Marchant, gave to his story the motto, *Veritas liberabit nos*, "The Truth will make us free." While Cardinal Newman was a man of too many sides and of too versatile an intellect to be easily classified, there is a signifi-

cant fact with regard to his classification. During his illness in Sicily he could protest, " I will not die because I have not sinned against the truth," but he did not become a Catholic before having solved for himself the intellectual difficulty as to how the Catholic Church of his own day could be the same as his beloved Church of the Fathers.

Most converts are, in some way, impressed by the sanctity of the Church, but in different forms. Sheila Kaye-Smith, the English novelist, was affected in her conversion by considering the Catholic Saints in the centuries after the Reformation. She was struck by the contrast between St. Francis de Sales, St. John Vianney, St. Ignatius Loyola, the two Saints Theresa and the foremost religious figures of her own Anglican Church who were no more than " worthies " and a source of acrimonious dispute in their own church. F. Vernon Johnson, England's famous missionary preacher, was first repelled and then singularly attracted by the story of St. Theresa of Lisieux; this forced him to ask himself about the value and truth of this Catholic faith which gave to the young Carmelite such strength and grace. Quite a different aspect of the sanctity of the Church made G. K. Chesterton write that he became a Catholic, " to get rid of my sins." [4] Again, very different are the many stories of converts who received their first real impression of the Catholic Church from nuns in hospitals.

The beauty and charm of the Catholic faith can also be shown to be superhuman and divine. Here, however, we have to be very careful; there are many things to be admired in Catholic life which are human and accidental. We should be very skeptical about conversions founded upon the splendor of the ceremonies in St. Peter's or on the quiet and intimate beauty of Christmas in a Benedictine monastery. But, on the other hand, the poet, Alfred Noyes, has shown how the masterpieces of the greatest poets, when compared with Catholic doctrine, receive a more abundant splendor. In this way we see really divine beauty, but we must not expect poets, painters, and other artists to be brought to the Catholic Church mainly

[4] *Autobiography*, London, 1937, p. 329.

in this way. The Dutch painter, Dom Willibrord Verkade, who afterwards found peace and happiness in Beuron's art and beauty, found truth and faith in a poor village church in Brittany. Professor Gerard Brom has noted that the Dutch poet, Joost van den Vondel, who loved splendor in the Renaissance style, never saw the pomp of Mass in a Cathedral; he went to Mass in little places.

Truth, sanctity, and beauty, then are three general aspects of the faith and the Church; through these can appear to converts the divinity of the Church. Next to these, we sometimes observe that a particular dogma or institution proves the decisive factor. Some converts are first convinced that God has taught or instituted one special thing; afterwards they find that one thing existing only in the Catholic Church. In this way the monks of Caldey can be said to have become Benedictine before they were Catholics; they found that Benedictine life in accordance with the authentic traditions is possible only in the Catholic Church.

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More species of conversion could be found but we believe those already described to be the principal varieties. There is, however, an element in the Catholic doctrine on faith which may give a different standard for classification. In Catholic theology the act of faith is always called an act of the intellect. To believe means to accept something as true, and an act of faith, for a Catholic, is never a vague feeling but has some proposition as its object. In Catholic theology there is another element; faith is an act of the intellect, but the intellect moved by the will. The proposition or truth accepted by faith is not seen in itself and hence it can not move the intellect by its own strength. The will must influence such an intellectual act; hence we may further distinguish species of conversions in relation to the motives of the will.

In the stories of some converts, we find that the sense of duty toward God is more apparent, while in others there is more consciousness of happiness accruing to the convert himself. We do not intend to stress or exaggerate this opposition. Catholic

theology will never acknowledge a conversion as true, if the sense of duty towards God is entirely lacking; on the other hand, no convert expects to find only unhappiness, misery, or disappointment in the Church. Catholic morals have their principles in something between pure eudaimonism and the categorical imperative of duty, and we must have towards God a love which at the same time is a love of friendship and a utilitarian love in the highest sense. Therefore, to become a Catholic is at the same time a sacred duty towards God and a real happiness to the convert. Yet, in one's conscious thinking, one of these two may dominate and become more apparent. We have, then, two different, but not absolutely opposed, kinds of conversion. St. Paul, who after seeing Christ's glory only asked, " Lord, what do You want me to do? " can be called an example of the first. The Duch convert, A. J. D. van Oosten, who after his conversion wrote a brochure entitled " The Joys of the Convert " may be called an example of the other.

This new classification intersects the other we have already enumerated. Truth, sanctity, and beauty can be viewed as something to which it is a man's duty to conform, but they are at the same time something very good to a man. To someone like St. Augustine, who was acutely unhappy in his sins and who was really desiring sanctity, or to a man who is troubled with questions on the meaning of life, Catholic sanctity by grace and Catholic truth are a glorious answer to difficulties. On the other hand, Cardinal Newman's sermon on " The Parting of Friends," his last sermon as an Anglican, clearly indicates that the truth meant to him a very stern call of duty.

While we are speaking of the motives of the will, we must mention the fact that often less idealistic and religious motives can play a part in conversion. The thought of conversion can cross one's mind for the first time in connection with love for one who is already a Catholic. In certain circumstances, to become a Catholic can mean better chances for one's career. And there can be other motives. The theologian has to insist that such motives can never bring about a conversion; they can only furnish an occasion, an accidental inducement. So, motives

like these, or motives of fear and compulsion can not be a standard for classification of true conversions.

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Every conversion is a story because it is something which takes some time in a man's life. Even if the conversion itself is sudden, the convert had a *terminus a quo*, a religious life before his conversion, which can throw a light on his conversion and must be told and studied, even when it is purely negative. In most cases, however, a conversion is a fact with a long preparation and it may be in process for several years. Conversions, too, have a sequel, less known to psychologists because seldom told by converts who usually close their narration with their entry into the Church. This sequel is really part of the story because it takes some time to realize all the consequences implied in conversion and to feel truly at home in the Catholic Church.

The theologian's first object of consideration is the grace of faith and, particularly, its infusion. The first thing, then, that he notes about conversion stories is that the sequel to a conversion presents a practical problem; it belongs to the confessor, the religious guide, rather than to the student of theological problems. The convert has received the grace of the faith, and he must face the consequences. These must be worked out by pastoral care; they do not present the theological problem presented by the beginning and preparation of a conversion.

Such problems have a negative and a positive side. Msgr. Kinsman, Episcopal Bishop of Delaware who became a Catholic, spoke afterwards of a " de-anglicanising " and a " romanising " process. This must be true of every convert; he has to cease being a Protestant, or a Jew, or an atheist, or whatever he was, and he has to become a Catholic. The second part must, of course, always be a work of grace; the first part, however, though meant by God's Providence to lead a person ultimately to the Church, can be brought about by purely natural causes.

In this respect, a conversion can happen in two ways. One can start doubting the truth of one's former religion because one is attracted to the Catholic Church. Here the theologian

judges if it be an immediate work of grace, provided one is attracted to the Church in the right way. But the former religion can be lost or, at least, doubts can be entertained about it for quite other reasons. In such a case, a person being at a loss might begin to look around and be attracted to Catholicism On the other hand, a person might drift; losing confidence in orthodox Protestantism, he might become skeptical and then turn to atheism, finally coming to the true Church. Then the grace of faith need not have a direct influence on the negative part, the ceasing to be a Protestant. So a heathen might lose his primitive religion by simple contact with civilisation. In Cardinal Newman's case we see that his confidence in Anglicanism suffered a bad jolt from the affair of the Jerusalem bishopric long before he began to think of becoming a Catholic.

In these cases it is the theologian's work to search for the moment when the positive work of grace began, though he may not be able to indicate it precisely. He can not trust the judgment of the converts themselves; to them it is one long story in which they thankfully see the finger of God's Providence. Nor can the historian or the psychologist help; this study is the realm of the theologian. At the end of the story there awaits a knotty problem of a special nature. A convert has to believe and then he has to be baptised. These two belong together. When he believes, he should be baptised in order to be a member of the Church in which he believes. Generally, before the Sacrament of Baptism there will come the Baptism of desire. A convert is not baptised immediately when he firmly and supernaturally believes.

Theologically speaking, conversion is a wide subject with many problems. Here we have only mentioned a few of them and pointed to possible solutions, but it seems to us that it is a very neglected field. Even the psychological study of conversion is done mostly by non-Catholics and with disastrous results. It is our hope that more theological reflection will be given to this important matter.

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ON ANALOGY

1. Introductory. The present paper is an attempt to clear up some of the problems involved in the traditional theory of analogy as presented by the Thomistic school. The two main ideas behind the formal developments offered here are: (1) analogy is an important discovery, worthy of a thorough examination and further development, (2) contemporary mathematical logic supplies excellent tools for such work. This paper is, as far as the author knows, the first of its kind; [1] it deals with a difficult subject in a sketchy way; what it contains is, therefore, not meant to be definitive truths, but rather proposals for discussion.

The approach to the problems of analogy used here is the semantic one. This is not the only method, but it would seem to be both the most convenient and the most traditional. As a matter of fact, it is difficult to see how equivocity, which is and must be treated as a relation of the same type as analogy, can be considered except by the semantic method. Also, St. Thomas Aquinas examined analogy in his question concerning divine names and the title of Cajetan's classical work is "*De Nominum Analogia.*"

It will be taken for granted that the reader has a good knowledge of classical texts of St. Thomas and Cajetan, and of the content of the *Principia Mathematica*; [2] no reference

[1] The author is, however, indebted to the late Fr. Jan Salamucha and to J. Fr. Drewnowski who were the first to apply recent Formal Logic to Thomistic problems. The present paper may be considered as an attempt to formalize some of the opinions expressed by them. Cf. *Myśl katolicka wobec Logiki współczesnej* (Polish = The Catholic Thought and Contemporary Logic), Poznan 1937 (with French abstracts) and J. Fr. Drewnowski, *Zarys programu filozoficznego* (Polish = A sketch of a Philosophic Programme), Przeglad Filozoficzny, 37, 1943, 3-38, 150-181, 262-292, especially pp. 95-98. (There is a French account of this important work in *Studia Philosophica* (Lwow) I, 1935, 451-454.

[2] A. N. Whitehead and B. Russell, *Principia Mathematica*, 2nd ed., Cambridge 1925-1927.

will be made to these works, except for some laws used in the proofs. Other more recent topics of mathematical logic needed for the theory, as, e. g., plural relations,[3] semantics,[4] etc., will be explained.

The main results of our inquiry are: (1) an exact definition of univocity, equivocity, and analogy of attribution; (2) proof of the principles of contradiction and of excluded middle for univocal and equivocal names; (3) a metalogical examination and exact translation of the formula " analogy itself is analogical "; (4) proof that a syllogism in *Barbara* with analogical middle terms, if analogy is defined according to the alternative theory, is a correct formula; (5) criticism of the alternative theory; (6) definition of analogy of proportionality by isomorphy; (7) proof that a syllogism in *Barbara* with analogical middle terms, if analogy is explained according to the isomorphic theory, is a correct formula; (8) a suggestion that contemporary Logic uses analogy.

Incidentally other results are reached, which may have a more general relevance: (1) the foundations of a semantic system, useful for Thomistic Logic, are sketched; (2) a generalised table of relevant semantic relations between two names is given; (3) the formal validity of a syllogism in *Barbara*, as opposed to its verbal correctness, is defined; (4) a rudimentary analysis of causality, as understood by Thomists, is supplied.

2. Meaning. The fundamental notion of our theory is that of meaning, described by the following formula: " the name a means in the language l the content f of the thing x " (symbolically: " $S(a, l, f, x)$.") The situation symbolized by " $S(a, l, f, x)$ " will be called a " semantic complex." In spite of its simpilicity the semanitic complex merits a detailed comment.

(1) By " name " we understand here a written word or other written symbol. It must be emphasized that a written

[3] Cf. R. Carnap, *Abriss der Logistik*, Wien 1929, pp. 43-45.

[4] Cf. A. Tarski, *Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen*, Studia Philosophica (Lwow), I, 1935, 261-405.

symbol is just a black mark (a spot of dry ink) on paper. As such (*materialiter sumptum*) it is a physical object which occupies a given position in space and time. It may happen, therefore, that two names, e. g., a and b have the same graphical form (symbolically $I(a, b)$, where "I" suggests "isomorphy") but we cannot speak correctly of "the same" name which occurs twice, e. g. as middle term in a syllogism. In that case we have always two different names of the same graphical form.

(2) Every relation of meaning implies a reference to a language. This is obvious, for the same name may mean one thing in one language and something quite different in another. Moreover, it may have no meaning at all in another language. If the mention of a language is omitted in classical definitions, it is because the authors writing during the Middle Age and the Renaissance thought of the only one language used at that time, Latin.

(3) What we call "content" is what classical Thomists called "*ratio*." This *ratio* is always conceived as something determining the thing whose content it is; even in case of substantial contents (as "substance" and similars) we conceive them as such and St. Thomas explicitly teaches that in this case we always have to do with a quality in a broader meaning (including "substantial quality").

(4) Finally, the "thing" means the same as the "*res*" of the Thomists, namely the subject to which the content connoted by the name belongs. This is, at least if the logical analysis is pushed sufficiently far, an individual.

The relation S gives rise to several partial relations and partial domains. We are not going to investigate them here, as they are not relevant to our theory. We shall note, however, that the relation S allows some elegant definitions of some important semantic terms. Let $D_n'R$ be the class of all x_n such that there is at least one x_1, one $x_2 \cdots x_{n-1}$, one x_{n+1}, one $x_{n+2} \cdots x_m$ (m being the number of terms of R) such that $R(x_1, x_2, \cdots, x_n, \cdots, x_m)$. We shall call $D_n'R$ "the n-th domain of R." We put now:

$$2.1. \quad \text{nom} =_{Df} D_1'S =_{Df} \hat{a}\{(\exists\, l, f, x)\, S(a, l, f, x)\}$$

$$2.2. \quad \text{lin} =_{Df} D_2'S =_{Df} \hat{l}\{(\exists\, a, f, x)\, S(a, l, f, x)\}$$

$$2.3. \quad \text{rat} =_{Df} D_3'S =_{Df} \hat{f}\{(\exists\, a, l, x)\, S(a, l, f, x)\}$$

$$2.4. \quad \text{res} =_{Df} D_4'S =_{Df} \hat{x}\{(\exists\, a, l, f)\, S(a, l, f, x)\}.$$

The above definitions define the classes of names (*2.1*), languages (*2.2*), contents (*2.3*) and things (*2.4*).

3. Analogy a relation involving two names. We contend that analogy, as well as univocity and equivocity, is not an absolute property of *one* name, but a relation involving *two* names at least. If this seems contrary to tradition, it is because of the use the classical authors made of the formula "the same name": they meant two names of the same form, but spoke, for the reason mentioned above (§ 2), of a single name. If, however, our considerations about the names are admitted, we are compelled to say that no single name is, strictly speaking, univocal, equivocal, or analogical. A single name may have a clear meaning or a confused meaning; but it has always *one* meaning only, and it is not possible to speak about identity or diversity of its meanings, which is required, if we have to define univocity, equivocity, or analogy.

4. The 16 relations between two semantic complexes. Now if our relations involve two meaning names, they must be relations between two semantic complexes; and as the nature of these relations depends on the relations holding between the terms of both complexes, they will be octadic relations, each complex being a tetradic relation. The general form of such relations will be consequently the following:

$$R(a, b, l, m, f, g, x, y),$$

where a and b are names, l and m languages, f and g contents, x and y things, while we have $S(a, l, f, x)$ and $S(b, m, g, y)$.

The question arises now, how many relevant relations are there of the above type. This depends, evidently, on the number of dyadic relations between the terms a-b, l-m, f-g and x-y. Such dyadic relations are very numerous, indeed,

infinite in number; but for each couple two relations only are relevant, namely, $I(a, b)$ and $\sim I(a, b)$ for names; $l = m$ and $l \neq m$ for languages; $f = g$ and $f \neq g$ for contents; $x = y$ and $x \neq y$ for things. Thus there are 16 and only 16 relevant relation between two semantic complexes. The following table enumerates them:

No.	a, b	l, m	f, g	x, y	*No.*	a, b	l, m	f, g	x, y
1.	I	$=$	$=$	$=$	*9.*	$\sim I$	$=$	$=$	$=$
2.	I	$=$	$=$	$\neq$	*10.*	$\sim I$	$=$	$=$	$\neq$
3.	I	$=$	$\neq$	$=$	*11.*	$\sim I$	$=$	$\neq$	$=$
4.	I	$=$	$\neq$	$\neq$	*12.*	$\sim I$	$=$	$\neq$	$\neq$
5.	I	$\neq$	$=$	$=$	*13.*	$\sim I$	$\neq$	$=$	$=$
6.	I	$\neq$	$=$	$\neq$	*14.*	$\sim I$	$\neq$	$=$	$\neq$
7.	I	$\neq$	$\neq$	$=$	*15.*	$\sim I$	$\neq$	$\neq$	$=$
8.	I	$\neq$	$\neq$	$\neq$	*16.*	$\sim I$	$\neq$	$\neq$	$\neq$

This table should replace the traditional division of names into univocal, equivocal, and synonyms. As we are, however, not interested in the establishment of a full semantic theory, we shall not define all 16 relations, but only the first four which are directly relevant to the theory of analogy.

5. Definition of univocity and equivocity. These four (octadic) relations, which we shall name "R_1," "R_2," "R_3," and "R_4," are defined as follows:

5.1. $R_1(a, b, l, m, f, g, x, y) \cdot$
$= {}_{Df.} S(a, l, f, x) \cdot S(b, m, g, y) \cdot I(a, b) \cdot l = m \cdot f = g \cdot x = y$

5.2. $R_2(a, b, l, m, f, g, x, y) \cdot$
$= {}_{Df.} S(a, l, f, x) \cdot S(b, m, g, y) \cdot I(a, b) \cdot l = m \cdot f = g \cdot x \neq y$

5.3. $R_3(a, b, l, m, f, g, x, y) \cdot$
$= {}_{Df.} S(a, l, f, x) \cdot S(b, m, g, y) \cdot I(a, b) \cdot l = m \cdot f \neq g \cdot x = y$

5.4. $R_4(a, b, l, m, f, g, x, y) \cdot$
$= {}_{Df.} S(a, l, f, x) \cdot S(b, m, g, y) \cdot I(a, b) \cdot l = m \cdot f \neq g \cdot x \neq y$

5.1. is the definition of names which are semantically identical in spite of being (physically) two names. We may call them "isosemantic" names. *5.2* is the definition of univocal names: *quorum* (x and y) *nomen est commune* [i. e. $I(a, b)$], *ratio autem significata* (f and g) *est simpliciter eadem* ($f = g$).

5.3 is again the definition of names which have the same denotation, but a different connotation; we may term them "heterologic" from λόγος = *ratio*. Finally *5.4* defines the equivocal names: *quorum* (x and y) *nomen est commune* [i. e. $I(a, b)$], *ratio autem significata simpliciter diversa* ($f \neq g$). In all cases $l = m$, i. e. both languages are identical. This being so, we may drop "$l = m$" and put "l" for "m" in the above definitions. The definitions of univocity and equivocity will now run as follows:

$$5.5. \quad Un(a, b, l, f, g, x, y) \cdot = {}_{Df.} S(a, l, f, x) \cdot S(b, l, g, y) \cdot I(a, b) \cdot x \neq y \cdot f = g$$

$$5.6. \quad Ae(a, b, l, f, g, x, y) \cdot = {}_{Df.} S(a, l, f, x) \cdot S(b, l, g, y) \cdot I(a, b) \cdot x \neq y \cdot f \neq g$$

We have used "*Un*" to suggest "*univoca*" and "*Ae*" to suggest "*aequivoca*"; we also changed, for technical reasons, the order of the two last factors.

The following laws, which are immediate consequences of *5.5*, will be needed in the latter parts of this paper:

$$5.7. \quad Un(a, b, l, f, g, x, y) \cdot \supset \cdot S(a, l, f, x)$$

$$5.8. \quad Un(a, b, l, f, g, x, y) \cdot \supset \cdot S(b, l, f, x).$$

6. Partial domains and relata. Each of our relations *Un* and *Ae* being heptadic, contains $\binom{7}{6} = 7$ hexadic, $\binom{7}{5} = 21$ pentadic, $\binom{7}{4} = 35$ tetradic, $\binom{7}{3} = 35$ triadic and $\binom{7}{2} = 21$ dyadic partial relations, together 119 (120 with the full relation). We may denote them by "*Un*" resp. "*Ae*" followed by two figures: one above, indicating the type of the partial relation (e. g. "Un^5" for a pentadic partial relation of *Un*), another below, meaning the place which it occupies among partial relations of the given type—the whole between parentheses. E. g. "$(Un\,{}^{5}_{2})$" will mean the second among the pentadic partial relations of *Un*.

Moreover, each of these partial relations gives rise, exactly as the whole relation does, to many partial domains and relata. The n-th domain of the relation R will be symbolized, as above (par. 2), by "$D_n'R$" and the n-th class of relata of R by

"$sg_n'R$." There are 120 such domains and 120 such classes of relata. We shall not define them all; the scope of the above remarks was only to show how ambiguous the common language is when we use it to speak about univocity or equivocity and, of course, about analogy.

We shall, however, use our notation in order to define the traditional terms "*univoca*" and "*aequivoca*." We need here first a definition of the following partial dyadic relations:

$$6.1. \quad (Un^2_{21}) = {}_{Df}.\hat{x}\hat{y}\{(\exists\, a, b, l, f, g)\, Un\,(a, b, l, f, g, x, y)\}$$

$$6.2. \quad (Ae^2_{21}) = {}_{Df}.\hat{x}\hat{y}\{(\exists\, a, b, l, f, g)\, Ae\,(a, b, l, f, g, x, y)\}.$$

We can now define the classes called "*univoca*" and "*aequivoca*" which we shall name "*uni*" or "*aeq*":

$$6.3. \quad \text{uni} = {}_{Df}.F'(Un^2_{21})$$

$$6.4. \quad \text{aeq} = {}_{Df}.F'(Ae^2_{21}).$$

If this would appear too generic, we may use triadic relations, including the language as a term:

$$6.5. \quad (Un^3_{31}) = {}_{Df}.\hat{l}\hat{x}\hat{y}\{(\exists\, a, b, f, g)\, Un\,(a, b, l, f, g, x, y)\}$$

$$6.6. \quad (Ae^3_{31}) = {}_{Df}.\hat{l}\hat{x}\hat{y}\{(\exists\, a, b, l, g)\, Ae\,(a, b, l, f, g, x, y)\}$$

and consequently:

$$6.7. \quad \text{unil} = {}_{Df}.D'_1(Un^3_{31}) \cup D'_2(Un^3_{31})$$

$$6.8. \quad \text{aeql} = {}_{Df}.D'_1(Ae^3_{31}) \cup D'_2(Ae^3_{31}).$$

7. THE PRINCIPLES OF CONTRADICTION AND EXCLUDED MIDDLE. Other important laws of our theory are two formulae which will be called, respectively, "the law of contradiction" and "the law of excluded middle for univocal and equivocal names." We mean by the first that no two names can be univocal and equivocal in respect to the same language, couples of contents and of things. By the second we mean that if such names are not univocal, they must be equivocal, and conversely. It should be clearly understood that this is true only in respect of some determined contents meant by the names, moreover that these

names must be of the same form and the things they mean must be not-identical. For nothing prevents two names from being univocal in respect of $f - g$ and, at the same time, equivocal in respect of $h - j$, if $f \neq h$ or $g \neq j$; also, if the names do not mean the contents involved, they are neither univocal nor equivocal in respect of them. The last two conditions follow from our table (in par. 4).

Consequently, we state our principles in the following form:

7.1. $(a, b, l, f, g, x, y) : S(a, l, f, x) \cdot S(b, l, g, y) \cdot I(a, b) \cdot x \neq y \cdot \supset$
$\supset \cdot \sim [Un(a, b, l, f, g, x, y) \cdot Ae(a, b, l, f, g, x, y)]$

7.2. $(a, b, l, f, g, x, y) : S(a, l, f, x) \cdot S(b, l, g, y) \cdot I(a, b) \cdot x \neq y \cdot \supset$
$\supset \cdot Un(a, b, l, f, g, x, y) \vee Ae(a, b, l, f, g, x, y)$.

Proofs: [5]

(1) $p \supset \sim (pq \cdot p \sim q)$ (axiom)

(2) $p \supset \cdot pq \vee p \sim q$ (axiom)

(3) $\sim (f = g) \cdot = _{Df.} \cdot f \neq g$ (definition)

(4) $S(a, l, f, x) \cdot S(b, l, g, y) \cdot I(a, b) \cdot x \neq y : \supset$
$\supset : \sim (S(a, l, f, x) \cdot S(b, l, g, y) \cdot I(a, b) \cdot x \neq y \cdot f = g) :$
$: S(a, l, f, x) \cdot S(b, l, g, y) \cdot I(a, b) \cdot x \neq y \cdot \sim (f = g) :$

by (1) putting $\frac{S(a, l, f, x) \cdot S(b, l, g, y) \cdot I(a, b) \cdot x \neq y}{p}, \frac{f = g}{q}$

(5) $= 7.1$

by (4), (3), *5.5* and *5.6* with the rule for adjunction of quantifiers.

(6) $S(a, l, f, x) \cdot S(b, l, g, y) \cdot I(a, b) \cdot x \neq y : \supset$
$\supset : S(a, l, f, x) \cdot S(b, l, g, y) \cdot I(a, b) \cdot x \neq y \cdot f = g \cdot \vee$
$\vee \cdot S(a, l, f, x) \cdot S(b, l, g, y) \cdot I(a, b) \cdot x \neq y \cdot \sim (f = g)$

by (2) with the same substitutions as for (4)

(7) $= 7.2$

[5] The method used is that of the *Principia Mathematica*; therefore what we call a "proof" is rather a sketch of a proof. Rigorous proof could be, however, easily built along the lines given here. (This applies to all proofs contained in the present paper.)

by (6), (3), *5.5* and *5.6* with the rule for adjunction of quantifiers.

The law of excluded middle shows that the classical Thomists were right when they named their *analoga* "*aequivoca a consilio,*" considering them as a subclass of the class of *aequivoca,* and that some modern Thomists are wrong when they put analogy as a third class coordinated to univocity and equivocity. Incidentally it may be remarked that the authors of the *Principia Mathematica* used an exact translation of the "*aequivocatio a consilio*" when they coined the expression "systematic ambiguity." As a matter of fact, they were treating of analogy.

8. On the generic notion of analogy. Analogy will be, according to the above analyses, a heptadic relation between two names, a language, two contents and two things (at least). The names will be of the same form; the things must be different. How the contents are related we must still investigate. If we suppose that the answer to that question is expressed by "F," the generic definition of analogy will be the following:

$$8.1. \quad An(a,b,l,f,g,x,y) \cdot = \\ = _{Df.} \cdot S(a,l,f,x) \cdot S(b,l,g,y) \cdot I(a,b) \cdot x \neq y \cdot F.$$

Moreover, using *7.2* we may say that analogy is either a kind of univocity or a kind of equivocity. According to the Tradition it is certainly not the first. Thus it must be the second. We may put therefore:

$$8.2. \quad An(a,b,l,f,g,x,y) \cdot = _{Df.} \cdot Ae(a,b,l,f,g,x,y) \cdot F.$$

The question arises now, if there is a factor G such that F would be identical with the product of G with another factor, say H_n, G being identical in all kinds of analogy, H_n different for each; the definitions of the successive kinds of analogy would be constructed by putting in *8.2* for "F" first "$G \cdot H_1$," then "$G \cdot H_2$" and so on. If it be so, we could say that the name "analogy" is univocal; if not, i. e. if there could be no common factor G, it would be equivocal.

As a matter of fact some well known Thomists asserted that the name " analogy " is an analogical name, i. e. (according to *8.2*) an equivocal one. We are not going to discuss this assertion, but limit ourselves to a correct formulation of it. This requires, however, some preliminary steps.

9. Expansion of the theory to higher levels. We must first note, that we are already dealing with a situation that is far more complex than that which is met in classical Formal Logic. As a matter of fact, all artificial symbols of any system of contemporary Formal Logic belong to the same semantic level, namely to the object language, i. e. each of them means some object, but none of them means a symbol of an object. But in the theory developed above we are using symbols belonging to a higher level, namely our symbols " *a* " and " *b*," which are names of names, i. e. symbols of symbols.

In order to supply the last sentence with a more definite meaning, let us introduce the following recursive definition: (1) the object language is the first level; (2) a language such that at least one term of it is a symbol of a symbol belonging to the n-th level, but none is a symbol of such term, is the $n+1$ level; (3) a relation holding between objects of which at least one is of the n-th level, and none is of the $n+1$ level, is of the n-th level.

It will appear that our *a*, *b* and also *S*, *Un*, *Ae* etc. are of the second level; consequently the *names* of these will belong to the third level. Now when we say that " analogy " is an analogical name, the word " analogy " is a *name* of *An*; thus it belongs to the third level. We have to investigate if and how are we allowed to extend our theory to that level, for everything we said until now was clearly situated on the second level.

Let us note first that the laws of the third level would be, as far as structure is concerned, exactly similar to these met on the second. For if we say that " analogy " is analogical, we mean that two names, say *A* and *B* mean in our new language (which is, by the way, the third level), the rela-

tions An_1 and An_2 of the objects $(a_1, b_1, l_1, f_1, g_1, x_1, y_1)$ and $(a_2, b_2, l_2, f_2, g_2, x_2, y_2)$. The last two may be considered as classes; but there is nothing to prevent us from considering them as objects, as the relations An_1 and An_2 are true contents of them. Let us put " X " for the first and " Y " for the second. We shall obtain the following exact formulation of the thesis " analogy is analogical ":

$$AN(A, B, L, An_1, An_2, X, Y).$$

Here all symbols (except the parentheses and comas) are different from those used in the former paragraphs; and yet the structure is not only similar, but strictly identical with the structure of

$$An(a, b, l, f, g, x, y).$$

It is also clear that the whole of our previous analyses might have been repeated on the third level. We would reach a theory, whose terms and meaning would be different from the theory we developed above, but whose structure would be completely identical.

This suggests an important remark. Analyses of such kind involve the use of the idea of structural identity, or isomorphy. Now, according to the theory we shall propose, this means analogy of proportionality. It seems, consequently, that we cannot treat adequately the problem of the generic notion of analogy without a previous examination of analogy of proportionality.

10. Analogy of one-one attribution. Among the several kinds of analogy there are only two that are really relevant: analogy of attribution and analogy of proportionality. Two names which are related by the first will be called " attributively analogous "; similarly, two names related by the latter will be called " proportionally analogous."

We are starting with the first kind. Here again there is one relation called " *analogia unius ad alterum* "—in our terminology " one-one analogy " (symbolically " At ")—and another

called " *analogia plurium ad unum*," here " many-one analogy " (symbolically " *Atm* "). Let us begin with the first, which is the more fundamental.

We have two things, x and y and two contents, f and g; the names a and b are equivocal in regard to them, but there is still another characteristic: x is the cause of y or y the cause of x. Writing " $C(x, y)$ " for " x is the cause of y " we shall have:

10.1. $$At(a, b, l, f, g, x, y) \cdot$$
$$= \text{Df.} \cdot Ae(a, b, l, f, g, x, y) \cdot C(x, y) \vee C(y, x).$$

This is, however, rather unsatisfactory, for the connection of f and g is not shown, the relation of causality being not analysed. We cannot, of course, give a complete analysis of this highly complex notion here. We shall note only that the relation of causality is a pentadic relation which holds between two things, two contents and a peculiar dyadic relation between the things; e. g. the food is the cause of the health of the animal, if and only if there is a content f (health) present in the food (x) such that, if a peculiar relation R (here: of being eaten) is established between x and the animal (y), another content g (the health of the animal) appears in y. Writing " $C(f, x, R, g, y)$ " for this relation we shall have:

10.2. $$At(a, b, l, f, g, x, y) \cdot$$
$$= \text{Df.} \cdot Ae(a, b, l, f, g, x, y) \cdot (\exists R) \cdot C(f, x, R, g, y) \vee$$
$$\vee C(g, y, R, f, x).$$

The alternative is necessary, according to the traditional doctrine, as there may be an analogy independently from the direction of causality.

11. Analogy of many-one attribution. The second kind of analogy of attribution is clearly derived from the first. The many-one analogy holds, namely, between two names a and b, if and only if there is a third name c, such that both a and b are attributively analogous (according to *10.2*) with c:

11.1. $$Atm(a, b, l, f, g, x, y) \cdot$$
$$= \text{Df.} \cdot (\exists c, h, z) \cdot At(a, c, l, f, h, x, z) \cdot$$
$$\cdot At(b, c, l, g, h, y, z).$$

Let x be food, y—urine, z—animal, f, g, h—the contents called "health" of, respectively, x, y, z, and a, b, c—the names of these contents. There will be a many-one analogy of a in respect of b.

We may still distinguish four further subclasses of this class of analogical names, for in *11.1* we may have either

(*1*) $C(f, x, R, h, z) \cdot C(g, y, R, h, y)$ —or

(*2*) $C(f, x, R, h, z) \cdot C(h, z, R, g, y)$ —or

(*3*) $C(h, z, R, f, x) \cdot C(g, y, R, h, z)$ —or

(*4*) $C(h, z, R, f, x) \cdot C(h, z, R, g, y)$.

12. Conditions of analogy of proportionality. There are, according to tradition, two conditions for this kind of analogy: the contents must be non-identical, i. e. we must have equivocity; still, the syllogism having as middle terms a couple of proportionally analogous names must be a correct formula. This is secured, according to classical writers, by the fact that these middle terms mean something "proportionally common" in both cases, or that there is an *analogatum commune* containing *in confuso* the contents meant by both names.

It seems at first, that these requirements are contradictory: for, if the meanings of the two names are quite different, one can hardly see how a syllogism with them as middle terms may be a correct formula. As a matter of fact, not only is there a logical theory capable of fulfilling both requirements without contradiction, but it seems even that there are *two* such theories. It seems, namely, that one theory is suggested by the "*proportionaliter commune*," the other by the "*confuse*." We shall call the former "isomorphic," the latter "alternative theory.' As far as is known to the writer, St. Thomas used the isomorphic theory, while the alternative seems to be originated by Cajetan.

13. The alternative theory. The central idea of the alternative theory may be explained as follows: we have to do with three names; one of them means the content f, the other the content g, f and g being the *analogata particularia*; the

third name means the *analogatum commune*, namely, the alternative of f and g, symolically $f \cup g$. We shall give to that expression a sufficiently clear meaning by putting

13.1. $[f \cup g]x \cdot = _{Df.} \cdot fx \vee gx.$

A rather complex situation arises here because of admission of three names: this makes an expansion of our previous formulae to three complexes necessary, and the basic formula for analogy of proportionality becomes a relation of 10 terms. Once a definition of this form is established, the (heptadic) relations analogous to *Un* and *Ae* will appear as partial relations of the general one, and the verbal formulae as elliptic. We shall not, however, define this general relation in that way, as, for several reasons, to be explained later (par. 16), the whole alternative theory appears as inadequate. But we are going to investigate the validity of a syllogism *in Barbara* with proportionally analogous middle terms. For the use in that inquiry we define the analogy of proportionality (*Anp*) according to the alternative theory as a heptadic relation in the following way:

13.2. $Anp(a, b, l, f, g, x, y) \cdot$
$= _{Df.} \cdot Ae(a, b, l, f, g, x, y) \cdot (\exists h) \cdot f = [g \cup h].$

This is a partial relation contained in the full relation of analogy described above.

14. On formal validity of syllogism. If we wish to investigate the validity of a syllogism with analogical middle terms we meet a serious difficulty unknown in current Formal Logic. For in current Formal Logic it is always supposed that a formula which is verbally valid is also formally valid; the reason of this supposition is that all terms used in current Formal Logic are univocal symbols. Here, however, the situation is different, as we have to deal with analogical names. We need, consequently, a distinction between the verbal and formal validity of a formula; moreover we need to know when a verbally valid formula is also formally valid. This is by no

means a universal rule, as the case of the syllogism with equivocal and non-analogical middle terms shows. We are not going to investigate the problem in its full generality, but we will limit ourselves to a single case, the syllogism *in Barbara*.

We shall first construct two languages:

(1) A first-level univocal language. This will be the language of the theory of classes, interpreted as a Logic of contents. In it the mode *Barbara* will run as follows:

$$f \subset g \cdot h \subset f \cdot \supset \cdot h \subset g.$$

(2) A second-level analogical language. This will contain all symbols used until now (small Latin letters being sometimes substituted by small Greek letters and indexes being added to them), with addition of the following: (i) "Π"; a formula composed of "Π" followed by "a," followed by "b" will be interpreted as meaning the formula "$a \subset b$"; (ii) "$+$"; a formula such as "$\Pi + a + b$" will be read: "a formula composed of Π followed by a, followed by b"; (iii) "εT"; "$F \varepsilon T$" will be read: "F is a true theorem."

The proofs will be developed in a second-level language, containing as subclasses the above two. We shall proceed as follows. Given the (second-level) premises A and B such that $A \varepsilon T \cdot B \varepsilon T$, we wish to prove that the (verbally correct) conclusion C (of the same level) is a true theorem, i. e. that $C \varepsilon T$. We translate A and B into the first-level language, apply to the result the laws of classical Formal Logic and obtain a conclusion, which we re-translate into the second-level language; if we are able to obtain $C \varepsilon T$ in that way, the formula "if $A \varepsilon T \cdot B \varepsilon T$, then $C \varepsilon T$" is clearly a valid formula and the formal validity of the mode, whose premises are A and B, and the conclusion is C, is proved.

We put as a law of translation the intuitively evident:

$$14.1. \quad S(a, l, f, x) \cdot S(b, l, g, y) : \supset : \Pi + a + b \varepsilon T \cdot \equiv \cdot f \subset g.$$

With the help of *14.1* we can easily prove that a syllogism *in Barbara* with univocal middle terms is a formally valid formula; but we cannot prove it if the middle terms are either

purely equivocal or attributively analogical. Alongside of *14.1* we shall need still another law of translation for cases where an existential quantifier is involved:

14.2. $(\exists h) \cdot S(a, l, [f \cup h], x) \cdot S(b, l, g, y) : \supset$
$\supset : (\exists h) \cdot [f \cup h] \subset g.$

This seems to be also intuitively evident.

15. THE VALIDITY OF THE SYLLOGISM IN BARBARA WITH ANALOGICAL MIDDLE TERMS ACCORDING TO THE ALTERNATIVE THEORY. In such a syllogism the middle term of the major premise is analogical with regard to the middle term in the minor premise, the situation being this, that the former means alternatively the content meant by the latter *and* some other content. This syllogism, if *in Barbara*, is a valid formula. The proof is rather cumbersome, because of the existential quantifier; we shall however give here a developed sketch of it.

In the first place we need two theorems analogous to *5.7* and *5.8*. These may be proved as follows:

(*1*) $Anp(a, b, l, f, g, x, y) \cdot$
$\equiv \cdot Ae(a, b, l, f, g, x, y) \cdot (\exists h) \cdot f = [g \cup h]$
[by *13.2*]

(*2*) $\equiv \cdot S(a, l, f, x) \cdot S(b, l, g, y) \cdot I(a, b) \cdot x \neq y \cdot$
$\cdot f \neq g \cdot (\exists h) \cdot f = [g \cup h]$
[by (*1*) and *5.6*]

(*3*) $\equiv \cdot (\exists h) \cdot S(a, l, f, x) \cdot S(b, l, g, y) \cdot I(a, b) \cdot$
$\cdot x \neq y \cdot f \neq g \cdot f = [g \cup h]$
[by (*2*) and **10.24 Principia Mathematica*.]

(*4*) $\equiv \cdot (\exists h) \cdot S(a, l, [g \cup h], x) \cdot S(b, l, g, y) \cdot I(a, b) \cdot$
$\cdot x \neq y \cdot f \neq g$
[by (*3*) and **13.12 Principia Mathematica*.]

(*5*) $\equiv \cdot (\exists h) S(a, l, [g \cup h], x) \cdot (\exists h) S(b, l, g, y) \cdot$
$\cdot (\exists h) \cdot x \neq y \cdot f \neq g$
[by (*4*) and **10.5 Principia Mathematica*.]

15.1. $Anp(a, b, l, f, g, x, y) \cdot \supset \cdot (\exists h) S(a, l, [g \cup h], x)$
[by (*5*) and "$p \equiv qr \cdot \supset \cdot p \supset q$"]

15.2. $Anp(a, b, l, f, g, x, y) \cdot \supset \cdot S(b, l, g, y)$
[by (*5*) and "$p \equiv qrs \cdot \supset \cdot p \supset r$," dropping the quantifier].

We enumerate now the five hypotheses of the syllogism *in Barbara* with analogical middle terms, explained according to the alternative theory:

H1. $\Pi + m_1 + a_1 \varepsilon T$

H2. $\Pi + b_1 + m_2 \varepsilon T$

H3. $Anp(m_1, m_2, l, \mu_1, \mu_2, x, y)$

H4. $Un(a_1, a_2, l, \alpha_1, \alpha_2, z, t)$

H5. $Un(b_1, b_2, l, \beta_1, \beta_2, u, v)$.

The proof of "$\Pi + b_2 + a_2 \varepsilon T$" runs as follows:

(*1*) $(\exists h) S(m_1, l, [\mu_2 \cup h], x)$ by *H3* and *15.1*

(*2*) $S(a_1, l, \alpha_1, z)$ by *H4* and *5.7*

(*3*) $(\exists h) \cdot [\mu_2 \cup h] \subset \alpha_1$ by (*1*), (*2*), *H1* and *14.2*

(*4*) $S(b_1, l, \beta_1, u)$ by *H5* and *5.7*

(*5*) $S(m_2, l, \mu_2, y)$ by *H3* and *15.2*

(*6*) $\beta_1 \subset \mu_2$ by (*4*), (*5*), *H2* and *14.1*

(*7*) $\beta_1 \subset \mu_2 \cdot (\exists h) \cdot [\mu_2 \cup h] \subset \alpha_1$ by (*6*) and (*3*)

(*8*) $(\exists h) \cdot \beta_1 \subset \mu_2 \cdot [\mu_2 \cup h] \subset \alpha_1$ by (*7*) and **10.35 PM*

(*9*) $(\exists h) \cdot \beta_1 \subset \alpha_1$ by (*8*), "$f \subset g \cdot [g \cup h] \subset j \cdot \supset \cdot f \subset j$" and **10.28 PM*

(*10*) $\beta_1 \subset \alpha_1$ by (*9*)

(*11*) $S(b_2, l, \beta_1, u)$ by *H5* and *5.8*

(*12*) $S(a_2, l, \alpha_1, z)$ by *H4* and *5.8*

(*13*) $\Pi + b_2 + a_2 \varepsilon T \cdot \equiv \cdot \beta_1 \subset \alpha_1$ by (*11*), (*12*) and *14.1*

(*14*) $\Pi + b_2 + a_2 \varepsilon T$ by (*10*) and (*13*)

Q.E.D.

16. Criticism of the alternative theory. It has been shown that a syllogism *in Barbara* with analogical middle terms, defined according to the alternative theory, is a formally

valid formula. This is, however, the only advantage of this theory. Not even all requirements of Theology and Metaphysics in regard to the syllogism can be met by means of it. For a syllogism of these sciences has not only analogical middle terms, but also analogical major terms; e. g. when we write " if every being is good, and God is a being, then God is good," not only " being," but also " good " must be analogical. But this means, according to the alternative theory that *H4* in par. 15 should be replaced by

$$Anp\,(\alpha_1, \alpha_2, l, \alpha_1, \alpha_2, z, t)\,.$$

If so, instead of (3) we would obtain only

$$(\exists\, h) \cdot [\mu_2 \cup h] \subset [\alpha_2 \cup g]$$

which does not allow us to draw the conclusion (*14*). Neither can we try to invert the order of " f " and " g " in *15. 1*; in that case the syllogism would become valid, but the major term in the conclusion would have an alternative meaning, which can hardly be admitted.

Moreover, the theory has other inconveniences. First, the very definition of analogy, as sketched in par. 13, is highly unsatisfactory. By saying that two names are analogical if and only if there is a third name meaning alternatively the contents meant by both, we do not show any intrinsic connection between the contents involved; and every couple of names would be analogical, according to that definition, for we can always introduce into our system a new name, defined precisely as meaning the said alternative. Secondly, there are serious gnoseological difficulties. The situation with which we have to deal, is the following: two names are given, and while we know the meaning of the first by direct experience, we do not know in that way the meaning of the second. In order to be able to use that second name correctly, we must supply it with a meaning correlated in some way with the meaning of the first. Now the alternative theory allows nothing of the sort: it only says how we can deal with middle terms having alternative meanings, when both meanings are already known.

These remarks do not lead to the complete rejection of the alternative theory; but they seem to show that it is at least incomplete and should be completed by another theory. The present author believes that this was the position of Cajetan.

17. The isomorphic theory. This theory is based on the following considerations: the "*proportionaliter eadem*" suggests that there is an identity, not between the contents meant by both analogical terms, but between some relations holding between the first (f) and its thing (x) on one side, the second (g) and its thing (y) on the other. The texts of St. Thomas Aquinas are clear enough here. The said relations are, however not identical; this is also a traditional thesis, strongly emphasized by all classical Thomists. We may therefore admit, as a first approximation, that, while being non-identical, they are both contained in the same relation. The definition of analogy of proportionality would run, in that case, as follows:

$$17.1.\quad Anp(a,b,l,f,g,x,y) \cdot =_{Df.} \cdot Ae(a,b,l,f,g,x,y) \cdot (\exists P,Q,R) \cdot fPx \cdot gQy \cdot P \neq Q \cdot P \subset R \cdot Q \subset R.$$

This is, however, not satisfactory. For if *17.1* would be the definition of analogy of proportionality, there would be a material univocal element; analogy would allow us to transfer to the other name some material relations found in the meaning of the first. Now St. Thomas Aquinas and Tradition are quite clear as to the negation of such univocity. But *17.1* can be corrected by the affirmation that the common element in both relations is formal, i. e. consists in the isomorphy of these relations. The definitions becomes:

$$17.2.\quad An(a,b,l,f,g,x,y) \cdot =_{Df.} \cdot Ae(a,b,l,f,g,x,y) \cdot \cdot \exists P,Q) \cdot fPx \cdot gQy \cdot PsmorQ.$$

This is what we mean by "isomorphic theory." It is strongly supported by the fact that St. Thomas Aquinas uses for illustration of his doctrine mathematical proportionality, the only mathematical function he possessed and a function which makes one immediately think of isomorphy.

One may think, perhaps, that if this be analogy of propor-

tionality, the meaning of our sentences about spirit, God etc., would be extremely poor, indeed limited to some very few formal relations enumerated in the *Principia Mathematica*. But this is not so. It is true that we cannot, as yet, give exact formulations of many formal properties involved in relations used by Metaphysics and Theology; the reason, however, is not the lack of such formal properties, but the very undeveloped state of Biology and of other sciences, from which the Metaphysician and the Theologian must draw his analogical names (and contents). An immense progress in speculative sciences would arise out of a formalization of these disciplines. And yet, even in the actual state of knowledge, where only Mathematics, i. e. the poorest of all sciences, is formalized, we can show, e. g., the difference between the Principle and the Father by purely formal means—as, evidently, the first is transitive, the second intransitive.

18. The existential interpretation of the mode *Barbara*. If the isomorphic theory is admitted, a peculiar interpretation must be given to the mode *Barbara* with analogical middle terms. Let us consider the following substitution: " if all being is good, and God is a being, then God is good." According to the isomorphic theory the only common element meant by the two " being "and the two " good " is a product of some formal relations, say P in the first case and Q in the second. But if it is so, the major must be interpreted as follows: " for all x: if there is an f such that fPx, then there is a g such that gQy "; the minor will be interpreted in the same manner by the formula " for all x: if there is an h such that hRx, then there is an f such that fPx." From this we draw the conclusion " for all x: if there is an h such that hRx, then there is a g such that gQx." This would mean: " if there is an x such that h is the Divinity of x, then there is a g such that g is the Goodness of x." The law used here is:

$$18.1. \quad (x) \cdot (\exists f) fPx \supset (\exists g) gQx : (x) \cdot (\exists h) hRx \supset (\exists f) fPx : \supset : (x) \cdot (\exists h) hRx \supset (\exists g) gQx.$$

This is a correct formula of the Logic of predicates.

The remarkable result of the existential interpretation is that the Thomistic idea of analogy becomes sharply formulated in a very anti-univocal sense. For, we do not know, as a result of our reasoning according to *18. 1*, anything except that there is something (undetermined as to the content) which has to God the set of quite formal relations Q. And yet, the talk about God's goodness is clearly meaningful; moreover rigorous demonstrations concerning it are possible.

19. The validity of the syllogism with analogical middle terms according to the isomorphic theory. We are going to show now how, in such theory, a syllogism *in Barbara* is a formally valid formula. We meet here, however, two formal difficulties.

First we note that isomorphy, being a relation between two relations, cannot be, as such, treated as a relation in which these relations are contained; now this seems to be necessary if we wish to construct a correct syllogism with analogical middle terms, interpreted according to the isomorphic theory.

This difficulty may be, however, obviated in the following manner. Isomorphy implies the identity of a series of formal properties of the relations involved. These formal properties are different in each case of couples of isomorphic relations; but for each of them *in concreto* a product of such properties may be determined. E. g., in some cases both relations will be included in diversity and will be transitive; in other cases they will be intransitive and assymetric etc. Now each of these properties may be conceived as a relation in which the given isomorphic relations are contained. This can be done by introducing in the system the name of a new relation, which is treated as a primitive term, but whose meaning is determined by an axiom. E. g. for symmetry we will put a relation S and determine the meaning of "S" by the axiom $(x, y) : xSy \cdot \equiv \cdot xSy \equiv \breve{x}Sy$. The product of such relations would constitute the relation in which both isomorphic relations are contained.[6]

[6] The author is conscious that the proposed solution is highly un-orthodox; he

The other difficulty is strictly operational. It will appear that we shall need an expansion of our *17.2* in order that the name of the common relation R, in which the relations P and Q are contained, might be treated as an argument of "*Anp*." If so, a new relation must be defined, namely an octadic relation containing as terms, alongside of the seven stated in *17.2*, also R. We shall define it as follows:

$$19.1.\quad Anp(a,b,l,f,g,x,y,R)\cdot =_{Df.}\cdot Ae(a,b,l,f,g,x,y)\cdot \cdot(\exists P,Q,R)\cdot fPx\cdot gQy\cdot P\neq Q\cdot P\neq R\cdot Q\neq R\cdot \cdot P\subset R\cdot Q\subset R\cdot R\,\varepsilon\, Form.$$

By "*Form*" we mean the class of all formal relations, as described in par. 17.

There will be three laws of translation, analogous to *14.1*:

$$19.2.\quad Anp(m_1,m_2,l,\mu_1,\mu_2,x,y,P)\cdot Anp(a_1,a_2,l,\alpha_1,\alpha_2,z,t,Q):\supset \supset:\Pi+m_1+a_1\,\varepsilon\,T\cdot\equiv\cdot(x)\cdot(\exists f)fPx\supset(\exists g)gQx.$$

$$19.3.\quad Anp(b_1,b_2,l,\beta_1,\beta_2,u,v,R)\cdot Anp(m_1,m_2,l,\mu_1,\mu_2,x,y,P):\supset \supset:\Pi+b_1+m_2\,\varepsilon\,T\cdot\equiv\cdot(x)\cdot(\exists h)hRx\supset(\exists f)fPx.$$

$$19.4.\quad Anp(b_1,b_2,l,\beta_1,\beta_2,u,v,R)\cdot Anp(a_1,a_2,l,\alpha_1,\alpha_2,z,t,Q):\supset \supset:\Pi+b_2+a_2\,\varepsilon\,T\cdot\equiv\cdot(x)\cdot(\exists h)hRx\supset(\exists g)gQx.$$

Our hypotheses are

H1. $\Pi+m_1+a_1\,\varepsilon\,T$

H2. $\Pi+b_1+m_2\,\varepsilon\,T$

H3. $Anp(m_1,m_2,l,\mu_1,\mu_2,x,y,P)$

H4. $Anp(a_1,a_2,l,\alpha_1,\alpha_2,z,t,Q)$

H5. $Anp(b_1,b_2,l,\beta_1,\beta_2,u,v,R)$.

The proof of "$\Pi+b_2+a_2\,\varepsilon\,T$" runs as follows:

(1)	$(x)\cdot(\exists f)fPx\supset(\exists g)gQx$	by *H3*, *H4*, *H1* and *19.2*
(2)	$(x)\cdot(\exists h)hRx\supset(\exists f)fPx$	by *H5*, *H3*, *H2* and *19.3*
(3)	$(x)\cdot(\exists h)hRx\supset(\exists g)gQx$	by *(1)*, *(2)* and *18.1*

would be glad to find anything better. It must be remembered, however, that the whole difficulty is purely operational; it seems intuitively evident that once there is a common property, the syllogism is valid.

(4) $\Pi + b_2 + a_2 \varepsilon T \cdot \equiv \cdot (x)\,(\exists h)\,hRx \supset (\exists g)\,gQx$
by *H5*, *H4* and *19.4*

(5) $\Pi + b_2 + a_2 \varepsilon T$ by (4) and (3)
Q.E.D.

20. On analogy in recent logic. While the classical Thomists used analogy in Ontology and Theology, but not in Logic, recent writers seem to make a constant use of it in Formal Logic. We noticed already that the authors of the *Principia Mathematica* re-invented the very name used for analogy by the Thomists (par. 7) and that analogy appears in the construction of Semantics (par. 9). The last phenomenon is connected with the theory of types. It is known that, in order to avoid contradictions, we are bound to divide all objects treated by Logic (or all logical expressions) into classes called "types." The formulae used in each type have quite a different meaning, but exactly the same structure as the formulae used in another. This means that the formal properties involved are identical i. e. that we have to do with analogy, at least if the isomorphic theory is accepted.

The question arises as to why analogy has penetrated the domain of Formal Logic. The answer seems to be given by the theory of Prof. H. Scholz, who says that recent Formal Logic is nothing else than a part of classic Ontology.[7] As a matter of fact, recent Formal Logic generally deals, not with rules, but with laws of the being in its whole generality; most of the laws contained in the *Principia Mathematica*, e. g., as opposed to metalogical rules, are such laws. If this is so, it is not to be wondered at that some consideration must have been given to analogy, for "being" is an analogical term and so are the names of all properties, relations, etc., belonging to being as such.

One curious feature of these developments is that the highly trained mathematical logicians who had to speak about analogy, spoke about it in a very loose and inexact way.

[7] H. Scholz, *Metaphysik als strenge Wissenschaft*, Köln 1941.

What, for example, the *Principia Mathematica* contains on the subject is far more rudimentary than the classic Thomistic doctrine. Yet, recent Formal Logic, once applied to the language itself, supplies superior tools for the elaboration of that notion. The present paper is believed to contain only a very small sub-class of the class of theorems on analogy, which may and should be elaborated by means of recent Formal Logic.

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THE BASIS OF THE SUAREZIAN TEACHING ON HUMAN FREEDOM

[*Third Installment*]

I. The Suarezian Teaching About Human Freedom

IV. the free acts

1. *The Nature of "Free Use."*[124] We have seen the Suarezian teaching on the nature of liberty, its characteristics, its subject, its relation to divine movement and divine freedom, to created intelligence, and to created necessary acts. We have also seen that freedom to be real requires not only the free faculty but the free use of that faculty as well. With that use we shall now concern ourselves.

Suarez indicates that the very use of free will consists in indifference. He appeals to the Council of Trent,[125] for the Council, as we have seen, declares liberty is in the power of indifference. The use, therefore, of liberty is the use of that power. If a man is incapable of the use of this power then he lacks the indifferent power. Man, then, is naturally capable of the free use of the free faculty and in the exercise of human actions he retains this use; otherwise all his acts are outside his nature.[126] It is certain that there is in us liberty such that in the very instant in which we freely operate, the potency retains its indifference.[127] An act in which the power is determined is not free for, Suarez repeats, the act of the will does

[124] Cf. *Opus. Primum*, Liber I, cap. 1-4.

[125] Trent, Sess. 6, can. 5 (Denz., n. 815), cap. 5 (Denz., n. 797), and can. 4 (Denz., n. 814).

[126] (Si) homo ex natura sua incapax est usus libertatis a nobis expositae . . . sequitur non solum carere hominem usu libero suorum actuum sed etiam carere interna facultate (*Opus. Primum*, cap. 1, nn. 6-7).

[127] Sit ergo primum hujus materiae fundamentum certissimum dari in nobis talem libertatem quae in ipso usu humanorum actuum indifferentiam . . . habeat . . . quod ipse usus sit cum indifferentia quam retinet potentia etiam in ipso instanti in quo libere operatur (*Ibid.*, n. 8).

not have the note of freedom immediately, but from the faculty which actually exercises freedom in the very act. If either power (of acting or of not acting) is not proximately expedited for act the act is not free.[128] The free act of willing can be impeded (though the potency remains free) because: a) God's concursus is not given; or b) because the object is not proposed. In neither case is the consequent non-act free.[129] The free act of not-willing, on the other hand, cannot be impeded by the object (for the object can move the will only insofar as the will is born to be moved by it), but it can be impeded by God, Whose infinite power can overcome the creature's finite capacity for both willing and not-willing.[130]

2. *God's Causality With Regard to Free Acts.* Every act depends immediately on God, Who gives being not only to the faculty, but to the operation as well. God acts in our acts, even with immediacy of supposit as well as with immediacy of power. The effect comes forth by one and the same act from God and from the creature; the very act of will is one act flowing immediately and *per se* not only from us but also from God and this, Suarez adds, is the teaching of St. Thomas.[131] God causes this action immediately through His will or power, not through some other action in the creature, for to act another action is given. Through one and the same action God, together with the will, influences the act or the term of action.[132]

[128] *Ibid.*, cap. 2, n. 5.

[129] Potest autem illa facultas quoad potestatem volendi impediri vel ex parte objecti per ignorantiam vel inconsiderationem . . . vel ex parte potentiae si fingamus privari omni concursu (*Ibid.*, n. 10).

[130] Quoad potestatem nolendi vel non volendi non potest impediri usus libertatis ex parte objecti . . . potest tamen impediri ab aliqua exteriori causa . . . quia in voluntate libera duplex sit potestas ad volendum scilicet et non volendum neutra eorum et infinitae virtutis; ergo in utraque potest superari a Deo (*Ibid.*, nn. 11-12).

[131] Suarez cites *III cont. Gent.*, cap. 70 and *Summa Theol.*, I, Q. 105, a. 5.

[132] Influit Deus immediate in opera libera voluntatis nostrae . . . tam divina virtus quam substantia seu suppositum per seipsum proxime et immediate influit . . . effectum una et eadem actione a Deo et creatura tanquam a causa prima et secunda prodire . . . (Deus) non potest autem esse causa actionis per aliam actionem quae in creatura sit sed immediate per suam voluntatem vel potentiam; qua ad actionem non est actio . . . per eadem actionem influit Deum cum volunate in actum seu terminum illius actionis (*Opus. Primum, loc. cit.*, cap. 4, nn. 3-5).

For Suarez, God's concursus is not previous to, or distinct from, the human act, for it is the act of the second cause; it is the act as of God acting and concurring with that cause—and nothing can be previous to itself. Since concursus is the very act, it is concerned not with the principle of the act but with its effect, it gives the principle (in our case the will) nothing. In the case of transient actions that is clear since they are not received into the agent anyway, and confer nothing on the agent. It is true also of immanent acts, such as those of the will. Concursus regards the will not as it is a principle of such an act but as it is a subject about which such an act is concerned. Hence concursus confers on the will nothing by which it is aided, inclined, or strengthened to acting, because through this action the will is not constituted in first act, but in second act, and therefore it supposes in the will whatever is necessary to acting.[133]

A classic objection is that this action is an effect of divine action, and therefore through the divine action something previous is done to the will by which it is aided in eliciting its act. The consequence is proved by this, that action cannot be the immediate cause of action.[134] Suarez answers by a distinction. The divine act can be two-fold: *ad intra* or *ad extra*. An act *ad intra*, not properly an action, is an act immanent in God which is not as a means to a term to be produced externally, but rather is to that term as a principle of acting, or as applying the divine omnipotence. An act *ad extra* is an action received into a creature and is the proper means (*via*) to the effect and term of the action of the created cause. It is the dependence by which the effect depends on God as on its first cause.

Suarez, taking divine act as an act *ad intra*, says that the action of the creature is an effect of divine action, but the consequence is to be denied, for action taken in this sense

[133] Generalem concursum sic . . . non esse aliquid distinctum vel praevium ad actionem causae secundae . . . quia ostensum est hunc concursum esse eamdem actionem causae secundae . . . eadem actio non potest esse praevia ad seipsam. . . . Concursus non versatur circa voluntatem ut est principium talis actions sed ut est subjectum . . . concursus nihil voluntati confert quoad agendum juvetur, etc. (*Ibid*)., n. 6).

[134] *Ibid*., n. 7.

(immanent) can be a principle of action properly so called (transient). Taking divine action as act *ad extra* the act of the created will is not an effect of divine action; it is rather an effect of the divine will and power. The created action depends not on the action of God, but on God Himself and His power immediately, just as it depends on the created will. God's act *ad extra* is not prior to the action of the creature for it is the very same thing as that act of the creature. However, it is prior by nobility.[135]

Granted God's influxus in the effect, is there needed in addition some influx in the second cause itself? [136] Some answer in the affirmative; some previous entity is required in the second cause to move or determine it. Two schools advance this answer: 1) those who say God moves the will through a true action in it by imprinting on it something by which it is forally determined to such an action; 2) those who maintain God moves the will not by imprinting something intrinsic but rather by an extrinsic quasi-effective motion based on the natural subordination and sympathetic response of the lower cause to God. The first school teaches that the will cannot act without such motion, but given it, the will acts necessarily, but by necessity of consequence and of supposition. The will, this school maintains, cannot resist such determination; by it, it is formally determined prior to operating to do one thing; the voluntary act is from the will effectively but the determination is actively from God alone. Yet this school argues that liberty is not destroyed by such motion, for God moves strongly, but also sweetly and proportionately. Suarez sees a difficulty in reconciling the " sweetly " with this school's notion of strongly, but the followers of this school urge all to believe what cannot be understood.[137]

[135] In illo (sensu, i. e. actus ad intra) verum est antecedens sc. actionem creaturae esse effectum divinae actionis . . . in hoc autem sensu negatur consequentia . . . hoc modo utendo nomine actionis posset actio ab actione manare . . . loquendo de actione ad extra, negandum est antecedens . . . nonpendet actio creaturae ab actione Dei sed . . . ab ipso Deo ejusque voluntate et potentia . . . in hoc sensu actio Dei non est prior actine creaturae . . . prioritate causalitatis . . . in re sit omnino eadem actio (*Ibid.*, nn. 7-8).

[136] *Ibid.*, cap. 5-6.

[137] *Ibid.*, cap. 5, nn. 3-5.

Suarez answers that the will in order to act freely, does not need any special help of God (distinct from the will's act itself) by which it is given something previous to its act in addition to its permanent active power.[138] He states that this is the teaching of all theologians except Thomists, and even of some of them; he also says that it is according to the mind of St. Thomas, who teaches that in all created agents only two things are required for act, the agent's own power and God's motion.[139] By the latter, concursus in the Suarez' sense must be understood, else three things are required.

From reason, Suarez argues against a previous motion showing, as we have already seen, that the essential subordination of second causes to the first cause is amply safeguarded by simultaneous concursus. Why require another divine action? It is required to attain the effect of the creature neither immediately nor mediately (as a previous condition), therefore, it is not required at all. It cannot be required immediately, for God immediately influences the effect through simultaneous concursus. If required mediately it influences not the effect but the second cause itself as an application, motion, compliment, or determination of this cause.[140] Now none of these is necessary. An application to act surely is not necessary since there is sufficient application through the proposition of the object. Supposing all other requirements to act as given, just how could pre-motion apply to the will, since on the supposition it has its object already presented through the judgment of reason? The only thing left is that the act itself be the term of the motion, but this application is imagined to be prior to that act.[141]

[138] Voluntatem liberam ad suum actum liberum efficiendum non indigere speciali influxu Dei distincto ab ipso actu . . . quo ei aliquid ad actionem praevium conferatur, distinctum etiam ab ejus virtute activa permanente, naturali vel infusa (*Ibid.*, cap. 6, n. 1).

[139] *Ibid.*, n. 2. Suarez cites *Summa Theol.*, I-II, Q. 109, aa. 1-3.

[140] Ille (concursus i.e. simultaneous) etiam satis est ut causa secunda sit subordinata primae non per accidens sed per se et essentialiter (*Ibid.*, n. 3).

[141] Postquam voluntas habens praesens objectum per judicium rationis . . . inquiritur quid sit necessarium ex parte Dei. . . . Dices terminum (hujus applicationis) esse actionem causae secundae . . . sed . . . applicatio dicitur esse aliquid in causa secunda praevium ad actionem (*Ibid.*, nn. 6-7).

Neither is a motion required by the will previous to its act. Motion requires a term, but this motion has none that Suarez can determine. It cannot be the act of the second agent, for if it were and the will passively receives this motion then only God would be active in producing the act. The only other possibility is a fluid quality, produced in the agent, but a quality, which, as we shall see, is purposeless. We should note, however, that the Aristotelian maxim, " whatever is moved is moved by something other than itself," adduced in proof of this pre-motion means simply that created agents are moved insofar as they receive from another their power of acting (which is continually conserved in them), and application of that power to the object. It does not mean that they receive a motion of that power.[142]

The created will needs, in the third place, no complement in order to act. It is impossible for it to receive such a complement unless outside the ordinary course its act is intensified, extended as to objects, etc. Every power by nature is surely adequate to its own act. Fire is adequate to produce heat; no fluid quality is needed to help it to do so. Again, supposing such a quality as necessary and given it in the will, God's simultaneous concursus is still necessary. Given both motions, the will either needs yet another pre-motion, or it does not. If it does, then the process must proceed to infinity. If it does not, then the first pre-motion is not needed, either, for: 1) on the supposition some second cause (that, namely, to which the quality is already added) does not need pre-motion, hence second causes do not by nature require it; 2) if, from the form of the agent plus this quality, the second agent's power is complete why could not God give creatures permanent powers equal

[142] Eodem enim modo inquirendum est quem intrinsecum terminum habeat haec motio . . . non est . . . immediate ad actionem causae secundae . . . (quia) fieret actionem ipsius voluntatis . . . a solo Deo fieri et voluntatem solum passive ad ipsam concnrrere. . . . Axioma illnd (omne qlod movetur ab alio movetur) in hoc habere verum quod agens creatum non agit nisi virtutem agendi ab alio accipiat, etc. . . . At vero post receptam et conservatam virtutem et factam applicationem passi vel materiae sufficientem, sit necessaria nova motio in agente ut agat, neque est verum neque ab Aristotele alicubi in hoc sensu traditum (*Ibid.*, nn. 9-11).

to this combination of power plus quality? Certainly that would not be contrary to the efficacy of the divine power, and would show God to be even more liberal in communicating His power to creatures. One cannot argue that this quality is incommunicable as something innate to the second cause, for even now the second cause has, in a stable and permanent way, its powers of acting, but has it from the actual influx of the first cause which gives and conserves it. This complement could likewise be given permanently and not merely transiently. Since, whether permanent or transient, it comes from God, we can hardly understand what a transient quality can accomplish that a permanent quality cannot achieve.[143]

In the fourth place, no excitation of second causes is necessary, at least not because of the subordination of second causes to the first cause. In some agents excitation is required but for other reasons; in those cases it is achieved by other second causes (as an odoriferous body emits its odor only when heated). The proponents of this "exciting quality" cannot explain its nature, or agree on its subject.[144]

In general, Suarez summarizes, all arguments for a previous perfecting quality are to be rejected. The argument that the second cause always acts as an instrument of the first cause and therefore needs a transient motion or completing of its power does not prove. In the first place, it is not universally true that instruments need this motion. Heat can be an instrument of fire or even of the soul in producing a new substantial form;

[143] Non solum superfluum sed etiam impossible videtur aliquid sub ea ratione compleri sub qua jam completum est; sed causa secunda (in ordine causae secundae) supponitur completam virtutem habere (*Ibid.*, n. 13). . . . Quis (inquam) credat virtutem solis ad illuminandum in ordine causae secundae incompletam esse? Aut visum optime dispositum et perfecte informatum specie adhuc indigere alio extrinseco complemento? (*Ibid.*, n. 14). Si (causa secunda cum complemento sub discussione) non indiget alio auxilio . . . idem dici poterat de ipsa secunda causa ut praecise constituta sua naturali virtute agendi . . . tum quia jam damus quamdam causam secundam quae non requirit alium concursum . . . tum quia . . . an non potuit Deus dare creaturae virtutem . . . ita perfectam ut haberet ex se totam illam efficacitatem? (Ibid., n. 16) . . . ergo ex hac parte nulla est major repugnantia in communicanda hac virtute permanente quam sit in virtute fluente (*Ibid.*, n. 17).

[144] Haec excitatio a causa prima . . . etiam est sine fundamento adinventa (*Ibid.*, n. 18).

yet it does not act in virtue of pre-motion received into it as is *per se* evident. The same is true of an image in the imagination acting as an instrument in the production of an intelligible species. The usual instances cited as exemplifying the necessity of pre-motion in instruments are artistic instruments. But in them a special motion is required not precisely because they are instruments but because of changes of place required for their operation—but that is not true of all instruments. Secondly, this argument from instrumental causes does not conclude simply because second causes, properly speaking, are not instrumental but principal causes. They are said to be instrumental with respect to God by a certain comparison and to emphasize their imperfection and dependence on God.[145]

There remains finally the question of predetermination.[146] Here Suarez' purpose is to show: 1) that second causes in general do not need to receive determination from the first cause to act; and 2) that the nature of some causes, as free, does not demand it either.

Second causes in general do not require predetermination. Surely secondary natural agents by their very forms or natural properties are determined to one thing, and have no intrinsic indifferences; how could fire, for instance, need something in addition to its nature to determine it to heat things rather than to freeze them? If one objects that some natural agents, the sun, for instance, are capable of many effects and must be determined to this one rather than to that, the answer is that the point under discussion is overlooked in the objection. Such determination as that does not pertain to the subordination of second causes to the first cause. Physically speaking, such determination is always made by the assistance and concurrence of other second causes, efficient or material, with which or

[145] Illa generalis propositio de instrumentis assumpta . . . de motu recepto in instrumento, non est in universum vera. . . . Neque argumentum quod in hac re fieri solet de instrumentis artis est efficax . . . quia tota actio horum instrumentorum fit, vel deferenda aliquod corpus per varia loca . . . vel compellendo aliud a suo loco . . . Deinde . . . causae secundae non sunt proprie . . . instrumenta sed causae principales in suo ordine (*Ibid.*, n. 18).

[146] *Ibid.*, cap. 7.

about which these " indetermined " second causes act.[147] One can conceive a case (though it does not exist) in which determination through second causes would be impossible. Then either no effect would follow or else God would determine the cause, not because of its subjection to Him, but because of its peculiar need for it pertains to the general providence of the first cause that He assist those second causes which are in need. In such cases the determination could be brought about by some previous reality added to the cause, but it need not necessarily be brought about in that way.[148]

The objection, " second causes need to be determined to produce this individual effect " is of no real weight. The determination to this individual effect comes either from the peculiar dispositions of the subject, the conditions and circumstances surrounding the operation, or from the will of God alone. This latter implies no predetermination imprinted on the second cause, for the determination of divine concursus is sufficient to account for it. The determination to an individual effect, if it is a special reality, must act either by impeding the power to other individual effects, which is incredible, or by adding something to the power which efficiently draws the second cause. Applied to free causes this would clearly destroy liberty. If one applies it to natural causes it is a matter of small importance, though it does seem to be an unnecessary multiplication of realities since the same effect can be achieved by limiting simultaneous concursus to this individual.[149]

[147] (Causae naturaliter agentes) . . . ex vi suarum formarum sunt determinatae ad unum . . . ergo non indigent nova forma aut novo impulsu quo determinentur (*Ibid.*, n. 1).

[148] Pertinet enim ad generalem providentiam causae primae ut secundis indigentibus subveniat. . . . In eo casu licet non repugnet determinationem fieri per aliquid praevium superadditum causae . . . non tamen est hic modus necessarius (*Ibid.*, n. 2).

[149] Negamus . . . hanc determinationem fieri a causa prima per aliquam actionem praeviam circa causam secundam, aut ei aliquam rem imprimendo . . . quia sola determinatio divini concursus sufficit ad hanc determinationem . . . aliter igitur potest haec praedeterminatio excogitari per modum additionis et augmenti virtutis activae. . . . Necesse est quod talis determinatio tollat libertatem quoad specificationem. . . . De causis naturalibus si quis ita sentire voluerit parum nostra refert (*Ibid.*, nn. 4-6).

The nature of some second causes, as free, does not require predetermination either.[150] The usual argument for this predetermination is simple enough: A definite effect cannot proceed from an indifferent and undetermined cause.

But the will, given everything necessary on the part of the object, the intellect, and the will's own power, is indifferent to this or that effect. Therefore, before it definitely elicits an act it must be determined by God.

The determination cannot be from any other second cause, since none has efficiency over the will. If the objection is raised: "This proves that even God can do nothing unless He is first determined by another," the proponents of predetermination answer that God is so perfect He determines Himself without being determined by anything above Him, and that is something which is true only of God. If the created will determines itself in the same way it is not in that respect, subject to God.[151]

Suarez' criticism is that this opinion supposes the indifference of the human will to be passive and negative rather than active and positive. It receives determination prior to its act and so does not determine itself, but is passive; likewise it is indifferent in the sense that it is capable of either determination but actually has neither, and so is negative. Suarez repeats that this position leads to a denial not only of free acts, but even of man's free faculty.[152]

The Suarezian position is that a faculty, which is positively and actively indifferent, as the master of its act can, of its own intrinsic power, determine itself to its act. The proposition: "An indifferent power cannot of itself produce a determined effect," would be true of a power which is indifferent by reason of some imperfection in itself or of some defect in the conditions necessary for its act, but hardly of a power indifferent from its very perfection.[153]

[150] *Ibid.*, cap. 8.

[151] *Ibid.*, nn. 1-2.

[152] Supponunt qui ita argumentantur totam nostrae voluntatis indifferentiam passivam esse et non activam et negativam potius quam positivam . . . (In hac positione) indifferentia tantum passiva est ad recipiendum nimirum hanc vel illam determinationem. . . . Non erit indifferens positive per actum eminentem seu virtualem . . . inde aperte sequitur voluntatem non esse liberam (*Ibid.*, n. 4).

[153] Potentiae quae de se est positive et active indifferens tanquam dominum sui

Self-determination is not repugnant, for to be indifferent in first act and determined through second acts is not repugnant as is clear from the examples of God's will. One act does not necessarily involve the negation of the other as it is not repugnant for primary matter to indifferent in passive potency and to be actuated or determined through one formal act. Neither does it involve any infinite power, since this active power, the will, can be participated from a superior power and in dependence on it. God's infinitely perfect liberty is distinguished from ours in this: He is essentially free and no potentiality, composition, or imperfection is involved in the use of His freedom.[154]

Arguing positively, Suarez says that determination of the will not only need not be, but cannot be, from any agent extrinsic to the will, or from any reality previous to the act of the will, for the determination of the will is formally and physically the very act of will. What else can it be? Certainly it is something intrinsic to a man. It cannot be in the intellect, for that faculty can move the will only objectively. Surely it is not in the lower faculties. If the determination is anything at all, then, it must be in the will. Since it is there it can only be the act for it cannot be a habit or something in the order of first act, since the will of itself is sufficiently constituted in first act. There is no medium between first and second act, so the determination can be only second act. Again, a thing is voluntary only if it: a) is the voluntary act; or b) supposes a voluntary act. Now determination of the will does not suppose a prior voluntary act; if it is to be voluntary at all it must be the act of the will.[155]

actus potens est sua intrinseca virtute cum generali concursu primae causae sese ad suum actum determinare (*Ibid.*, n. 5) . . . illa propositio: Potentia indifferens non potest ex se producere determinatum effectum . . . esset vera in causa indifferente ex imperfectione virtutis, vel ex defectu conditionis requisitae ad agendum, non autem in causa indifferente ex perfecta et eminente virtute (*Ibid.*, n. 6).

[154] Hujusmodi facultas et modus agendi nec in sese involvit repugnantiam . . . quia unus actus non includit necessario negationem alterius sicut materiam primam. . . . Nec est cur requirat infinitam perfectionem aut virtutem . . . quia potest esse participata a superiori virtute (*Ibid.*, n. 7).

[155] Voluntatem . . . determinari nihil aliud est quam velle; ergo non potest esse

Suarez explains that the will does not act because it is determined from outside (*aliunde*) but rather it wills because of this that it determines itself, but in such wise that the causal note indicates the formal not the efficient cause. In the line of efficient causality, for the will to be determined is the same thing as for it to effect its volition or nolition. In the line of formal cause, however, it remains determined because it continues to be affected by this act of will rather than by another. In this sense there is no repugnance in saying that the will is determined because it wills, although it is not determined except by willing, because there is here implied the formal cause, not the efficient. Most properly, however and without any equivocation the will is said to determine itself by willing, and to will by determining itself. From this it is clear how the will can be both indifferent and determined. It is not determined in first act, but can be formally determined by second act, and when it is determined in second act it cannot, as to that state be at the same time indifferent, though it retains its indifferent faculty.[156] Physical predetermination destroys indifference both of specification and of exercise, and therefore is incompatible with liberty.

Suarez considers first the freedom of specification.[157] The use of liberty implies a two-fold power: 1) the power to omit the act while retaining the power to place it; and 2) the power to place the act while retaining the power to omit it. Now, then, if this predetermination is necessary for operation the will cannot move without that influx. So long, therefore, as

ab extrinseco agente sine ipsa nec potest esse aliquid praevium ad ipsum velle, quod sit causa efficiens ejus. . . . Si ergo determinatio est aliquid oportet ut sit in ipsa voluntate . . . talis determinatio nihil aliud esse potest praeter actum secundum; neque cogitari potest medium inter actum primum et secundum (*Ibid.*, n. 9).

[156] Quo fit ut . . . non ideo voluntas velit quia aliunde est determinata sed potius ideo velit quia seipsam determinat ita tamen ut in ea causali nota indicetur causa formalis, non efficiens . . . in hoc sensu non est repugnantia in illa locutione: Voluntas determinatur quia vult quamvis non determinetur nisi volendo . . . sine ulla aequivocatione dicitur voluntas sese determinare volendo et velle, sese determinando (*Ibid.*, n. 10).

[157] *Ibid.*, cap. 9.

God does not give the determination to the will, it is not in the power of the will to operate. The motion and determination are free with regard to God, but not with regard to man. Moral responsibility for not acting is thus impossible when man receives no determination, or when man is determined to volition the fact that he does not choose the object cannot be attributed to him.[158]

Some escape this conclusion by arguing that without this determination the will can act, though it never shall. The answer of Suarez is that, on the supposition, the will is in fact insufficient to determine itself; therefore it cannot in any true sense act without this determining factor. If the determination is the ultimate complement of the will, the will's power without it is remote and physical, not proximate and moral, such as liberty requires.[159]

Others try to defend determination by saying that it is in man's power to get this determination. Hence if he lacks it, the lack is imputable to him. Now if it is in man's power it is subject to his will; his will therefore can either do something to get it, or it can do nothing. If the latter, it is not in his power at all. If he can do something to get it how shall we account for the act done to get it? Either he needs predetermination to that act or he does not. If he does, we go tripping along *ad infinitum*, or else come at last to some determination which is altogether from outside a man, and how the act proceeding under it could be in the will's power is inconceivable. If a man does not need predetermination to the act by which he wins predetermination, then the will does not (simply speaking) require predetermination by reasons of its subordination to the first cause. To say the will does nothing positive but

[158] Si determinatio illa est . . . necessaria . . . ergo sine illo influxu non potest moveri voluntas . . . ergo nunquam ipsum velle est in potestate ejus nisi prius Deus . . . determinationem tribuat quod solum est in ejus potestate et arbitrio. Unde ipsi Deo libera esse poterit hominis motio et determinatio, non autem ipsi homini (*Ibid.*, n. 2). Interrogo an in eo casu sit illi voluntati moraliter tribuendum quod nihil voluerit. Certe id affirmari non potest (*Ibid.*, n. 3).

[159] Si non habetur nec haberi potest omnis potestas quae voluntati attribuitur erit mere physica et remota non autem proxima et moralis quae ad usum liberum et culpam necessaria est (*Ibid.*, n. 4).

merely allows itself to be determined settles nothing. By allowing itself, it can be doing nothing, for to do anything it already needs (on the supposition) determination; or if the " allowing " is something the will must already be determined to it and that previous determination is in God's hands alone.[160]

In summary, if determination is in God's power alone the will is passive as regards it; and a passive power cannot be a free power. To introduce some kind of disposition and say that through its mediation the will has power over its determination does not help for two reasons: 1) we must account for that disposition; and 2) it is ridiculous to require a disposition in man for all the natural concursus of the first cause and for all acts of will, even trifling ones.[161]

Suarez shows, secondly, that physical determination militates against freedom of exercise,[162] because determination implies a form impressed on the will which with the will completes the proximate principle of the voluntary act. It is: a) determination because it not only inclines to one thing as to specification but also altogether determines the will to the exercise of the act (otherwise it is not real determination but only a modification, which, like charity, or any other habit, inclines us to one thing); b) *physical* determination because: i) it is a physical cause of the act which is physically in the will; ii) to distinguish it from moral determination, such as persuasion. Now such physical determination means the act cannot be free as to

[160] Quomodo erit in potestate illius hominis habere illam determinationem a Deo . . . ? Aut enim aliquid potest facere voluntas quo obtineat a Deo illam determinationem, vel nihil agere potest. Si nihil facere potest, ergo non est in potestate ejus habere illam. . . . Si autem aliquid potest libere facere, . . . si requiritur determinatio (ad illud volendum) vel proceditur in infinitum vel sistendum erit in aliqua determinatione quae omnino ab extrinseco veniat. . . . Si non requiritur illa determinatio ad primum opus . . . concluditur voluntatem indifferentem et nondum determinatam ab extrinseco agente posse se libere determinare . . . (et) illam determinationm non esse per se necessariam ad operandum (*Ibid.*, nn. 6-7).

[161] Voluntas autem dicitur concurrere passive . . . potentia passiva non satis est ad liberam potestatem. Ridiculum est . . . ad actus omnes volendi etiam circa res minimas dispositionem ex parte hominis requirere, praeter ipsammet cooperationem liberam (*Ibid.*, n. 8).

[162] *Ibid.*, capp. 10-11.

exercise (nor as to specification either, as a consequence) for the will is not free with respect to this determining reality. It is not free to receive it (for the will is passive as to receiving it) nor, having received it, to use it or not, for given it, the will can no longer not-operate. Always one part of the power required for indifference and liberty is impeded; hence, freedom is taken away. The common answers to this difficulty (that the will can not-operate in the divided sense, or that it is of itself indifferent even though with this determination it cannot not-operate, and such indifference is enough to preserve freedom) are inadequate. The first answer diverts consideration from the use of liberty, which is the question, to the free faculty. Even there, those who use this answer are mistaken, for in fact determination such as they suppose destroys even the freedom of the power. The second answer implies liberty is a passive power, which is simply to be denied.[163]

Suarez interprets the council of Trent [164] itself to teach that God does not predetermine us, for the Council says of God's motion that the will can cast it off (*quippe qui illam alijicere potest*) and again that the will can dissent from that motion (*posse dissentire si velit*). The Council is certainly speaking of prevenient motion and in the composed sense, for no one can cast off what he does not have or which is not offered to him. According to the Council, then, it is required for liberty that in the composed sense the will under God's motion can not-act.[165]

[163] Determinatio physica dicitur esse forma quaedam voluntati impressa quae cum illa complet principium proximum actus . . . dicitur . . . esse determinatio voluntatis . . . quia omnino determinat illam ad exercitium actus (*Ibid.*, cap. 10, n. 1). Ex tali determinatione sequitur actum non esse liberum quoad exercitium . . . neque . . . quoad specificationem . . . quia respectu illius determinationis voluntas nostra non est libera; nam ad illam recipiendam . . . mere passive se habet; post receptam autem illam necessario prodit in opus . . . semper ergo habet (voluntas) impeditam alteram partem illius potestatis . . . et ita tollitur usus libertatis (*Ibid.*, n. 2). Prima enim responsio ab usu ad facultatem liberam divertit . . . Secunda . . . solum ponit libertatem in passiva indifferentia quod est illam funditus destruere (*Ibid.*, nn. 3-4).

[164] Suarez quotes Trent, sess. 6, cap. 5 (Denz., n. 797) and can. 4 (Denz., n. 814).

[165] Est certum Concilium loqui de motione Dei praeveniente nostram voluntatem

Some authors, faced with this argument, Suarez continues, concede that given God's motion the will can resist and not-operate, but infallibly it never uses this power, and this is sufficient, they say, for efficacious motion from God and also for safeguarding freedom in man. This is in open contradiction to their original propositions, such as "given God's motion the will can not not-operate," and "given motion it is necessary to operate," propositions which they confirm by appealing to St. Thomas' dictum: "If God moves the will to something it is impossible for the will not to act." [166] St. Thomas simply cannot be understood to be speaking of the previous motion in the place cited; he is speaking of God's cooperative motion which, as we have seen, includes the very act. Since that motion includes act, it is clearly impossible that under it there be no acts.[167]

If God efficiently moves us, we cannot resist; [168] therefore, we are not free. Again, we can ask whether or not this predetermination is subject to man's will in its use. If it is, it is not determination but inclination to act, something in the order of first act which leaves the will indifferent. If its use is not

. . . certum est loqui Concilium in sensu composito . . . quia nemo dicitur abjicere nisi id quod habet aut quod ei offertur . . . juxta Concilii doctrinam . . . etiam in sensu composito necesse est ut maneat in voluntate potestas resistendi (*Ibid.*, n. 5).

[166] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 10, a. 4, ad 3um. Suarez both here (*Opus. Primum, loc. cit.*, n. 6) and in the Metaphysics (*Disp. Meta.*, disp. 19, sect. 4, n. 1) quotes St. Thomas as saying this though the words he quotes as St. Thomas' differ slightly in the two places cited. The Leonine and Faucher editions of St. Thomas read: "Si Deus movet voluntatem ad aliquid incompossibile est huic positioni quod voluntas ad illud non movetur. Non tamen est impossible simpliciter. Unde non sequitur quod a Deo ex necessitate moveatur." The Piana edition reads: "Si Deus movet voluntatem ad aliquid impossibile est poni quod voluntas ad illud non moveatur." The *Codex Vaticanus* 733 reads similarly: "impossible eat hoc poni quod, etc." The Vienna edition of 1478 and several codices (*Palatinus* 353; *Vaticanus* 732; *Vaticanus* 736) read not "incompossibile" but "impossibile." However, every edition we have seen adds "non tamen est impossibile simpliciter."

[167] Locutus est (S. Thomas) de motione cooperativa quae, facta compositione, includit actum ipsum. At praedicti auctores illum interpretantur de hac motione praevia (*Opus., Primum, loc. cit.*, n. 6).

[168] *Ibid.*, n. 7. Suarez cites Romans ix: "Voluntas ejus quis resistet?" and *Esther* xiii: "Non est qui possit tuae resistere voluntati."

subject to the will, then second act flows by natural necessity; the will cannot not-operate.[169]

Suppose that the created will by its very nature requires this determination, then creatures have no free acts, and moreover lack any free faculty. For the will without the extrinsic determination is not proximately apt to choose anything. Therefore the faculty does not by its nature demand the free use of operating (for it cannot of its very nature demand two repugnant conditions for operation). Therefore it is not free, for free powers do demand free use. Moreover, the will can only be passively indifferent if it needs determination; and a passively indifferent thing (like the hand) is not free.[170]

Suarez begins then to expose his own opinion on how God's concursus does, in fact, fall on our free acts, and in exposing how, without resorting to predetermination, our wills' subordination to God can sufficiently and exactly be preserved he gives, he says, the best possible argument against determination.[171]

Now it is clear that whatever God operates He operates through His will, for God's omnipotence is an attribute rationally distinct from His will. His omnipotence operates nothing unless the intellect precedes as directing, and the will as applying. Now God can influence man's free act in two ways: 1) by willing absolutely that such an act be placed by such a will at this time, and in this way. Such an act of will antecedes God's foreknowledge of the effect as future; it determines the will; 2) God can will by an act which is conditional, not absolute, that this act be placed by the created will. The condition is "if the created will determines itself to eliciting this act"; God, under the same condition wills to concur in the act, expecting, so to speak, the influx of the created will, for

[169] Si ergo primum (i.e. si illa determinatio subditur usui libero voluntatis) . . . illam non esse determinationem ad opus . . . sed esse ad modum cujusdam habitus . . . qui de se ad unum actum inclinat (*Ibid.*, n. 8). Si . . . eligatur . . . hanc praemotionem esse inseparabilem ab actu secundo ex natura sua . . . dicendum est actum secundum naturali necessitate ab illa manare (*Ibid.*, n. 10).

[170] Dicunt hanc determinationem esse necessariam ex intrinseca natura creatae voluntatis; ergo sine illa non est voluntas apta proxime ad aliquid volendum . . . ergo neque ex natura sua est facultas libera (*Ibid.*, n. 13).

[171] *Ibid.*, cap. 14.

God wishes to accommodate Himself to us in such a way as not to injure our free will. In virtue of this divine will, God's omnipotence remains applied (*applicata*) to flow into the act of the human will, without any new act on God's part. This latter mode is the one Suarez accepts.[172]

His arguments for it are: 1) it involves no repugnance. We see from experience that the sun, for instance, concurs in a general way with each of the secondary causes which depend on it; 2) it is most apt. The power of the will is above that of all other natural agents, and is not bound to any one thing. It is necessary that God's concursus have the same eminent, universal, and abstract character. Determination, says Suarez, is too restrictive for the will. Any concursus other than this would be repugnant to man's freedom, for it would imply that man would be indifferent in first act and yet determined in first act, a clear contradiction since determination and non-indifference are the same thing.[173]

Appealing to Scripture in support of this kind of premotion, Suarez sees in such passages as: " God left man in the hand of his own counsel," [174] an indication that after God's concursus there is yet room for man's deliberation, which would not be true if concursus determined man. Scripture, it is to be noted, is speaking of a proximate and moral power, and of God's indifferent concursus proposed and offered. Support of his position is common among Scholastics, Suarez thinks. St. Thomas does

[172] *Ibid.*, nn. 4-6. Duobus modis posse intelligi divinam voluntatem velle influere in actum liberum humanae voluntatis: primus . . . simpliciter et absolute volendo ut talis actus a tali voluntate fiat . . . et hunc modum hactenus impugnavimus. Alius . . . est Deum non absolute, sed quasi sub conditione velle ut hic actus fiat a voluntate creata . . . et sub eadem conditione velle influere . . . expectando . . . influxum creatae voluntatis. . . . Ex vi autem hujus divinae voluntatis, ita manat applicata divina omnipotentia ad influendum in actum humanae voluntatis, ut hac influente. . . . Deus etiam influat (*Ibid.*, n. 5).

[173] Cum potestas liberae voluntatis sit veluti superior et eminentior caeteris naturalibus agentibus . . . necesse est ut hic concursus cum eadem eminentia, abstractione et universalitate (ut sic dicam) tribuatur (*Ibid.*, n. 7). In hoc involvitur contradictio quod . . . eadem potentia . . . agat determinata et non determinata . . . indifferens et determinata ab alio in actu primo, i.e. non indifferens nam haec duo idem sunt (*Ibid.*, n. 8).

[174] *Eccles.* xv. *Opus. Primum, loc. cit.*, n. 9.

not expressly teach it, but on the other hand "he nowhere affirms that God of Himself and by His efficacious will alone determined to one act the concursus to be given the human will by determining the will to it." [175] The Angelic Doctor says without distinction that the knowledge of future things in their causes is conjectural.[176] Were he of the opinion that God efficaciously predetermines our wills he would have held that God knows our future acts in the predetermination of His will. As it is, he derives the certitude of God's knowledge of such things from their presence to eternity. Again he teaches that God's general concursus does not consist in determining the will to one thing, but that God of Himself confers concursus which is indifferent and ordered to the general object of the will, namely good. "Without this universal motion man can will nothing," which clearly implies that God's motion as God's is indifferent; with this general concursus the will is determined through reason and liberty.[177] St. Thomas says explicitly that by grace God sometimes moves certain people, but he does not say that He ever predetermines anyone. St. Thomas clearly teaches that God so moves our wills that He "does not determine them necessarily to one thing." [178] Suarez cites other places in St. Thomas,[179] but the three mentioned above contain his strongest points.[180]

[175] Divus ergo Thomas . . . nullibi affirmat Deum ex se et sola sua efficaci voluntate ad unum actum determinasse eum concursum quem erat exhibiturus voluntati humanae praedeterminando eam ad illum (*Ibid.*, n. 10).

[176] Suarez cites *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 14, a. 13. Actually St. Thomas says there that God knows contingent things as they are *actual*, i.e. He must know them in some other way than they are in their secondary causes, as contingent.

[177] I-II, q. 9, a. 6, ad 3um. The universal motion spoken of by St. Thomas is given to the will as a nature, to move it as a nature. To subsequent free motions man determines himself through reason as St. Thomas points out. The fact that the will needs a universal motion with regard to a universal object does not militate against the fact that the *liberum arbitrium* needs a determining motion for God provides for each thing according to its nature.

[178] This is the very crux of the matter. God moves us, not violently; God determines us, without necessitating us.

[179] For example he appeals to *Q. D. de Verit.*, q. 5, a. 5, ad 1um; *Q. D. de Pot.*, q. 3, a. 7, ad 13um; *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 73, etc.

[180] *Opus. Primum, loc. cit.*, nn. 10-11.

The objections against such concursus Suarez reduces to four capital difficulties: [181] 1) It supposes that God applies His will and power to concurring with the creature in a confused, general way, which is imperfect; 2) it implies that God influences the created act in a blind, ignorant way unless He concurs before hand and so knows what the creature will do under concursus; 3) the creature determines God to operating this act rather than that, which is absurd for the higher determines the lower and not vice versa; 4) God would cooperate as a natural agent according to the need of the second cause, and by a transient action which passes into the second cause, and all of that would indicate very imperfect causation.[182]

The general answer to these objections is simple; God knows everything which second causes can do, with this or that concursus. Even more wonderfully, God foreknows not only what they can do but even what they would do if they were procreated with this particular help or occasion to do such or such a thing. This mediate knowledge is very properly attributed to God, as the Fathers and the Holy Scriptures testify. The fact that it is difficult for us to understand is no valid argument against it. Given this knowledge in God, then, His will destines things to their ends and selects for them means suitable to their natures.[183]

From this Suarez proceeds to answer the objections in particular. To the first, there is no confusion in the way in which God applies His will and power to concurring, for God foreseeing the results of His concursus offers His help for this individual act. This is not predetermination, for God, by a similar act, offers the will concursus sufficient for the other acts of which the will is capable. Nor is the effective act of giving

[181] *Ibid.*, cap. 15.

[182] *Ibid.*, n. 1.

[183] (Divina cognitio) repraesentat quidquid per causas secundas, et voluntates creatas cum hoc vel illo auxilio et concursu fieri potest. . . . Sed quod mirabilius est non solum cognoscit Deus anteriore scientia . . . quid omnes voluntates possint facere sed etiam quid facient si cum hoc auxilio vel occasione ad hoc vel illud volendum procreentur. . . . Hac ergo supposita scientia in Deo accedit divina voluntas quae res singulares in suos fines destinat, et media eligit (*Ibid.*, n. 2).

concursus absolute; an implicit condition is always included "if the will consents." [184]

To the second objection he answers that God is not ignorant of the result of His concursus before giving it, for by mediate science He already knows the will's act.[185] To the third objection he notes the determination of the first cause can be understood in a two-fold way: a) the application by which God orders His omnipotence to helping the second cause, and concurring with it; b) the determined created action proceeding from the divine will and power, cooperating with the human will.

The first of these is from the free determination of the Divine will; the human will is not its cause. However, some aspects of this determination can be accounted for by the objects or the human will, since by its very nature it demands this mode of operating.[186] The second, the determined action, receives its determination from the created cause; not that this creature is the sole effective cause of its determination, but in that cause is found the proper and proximate reason for the determination. It is the proximate cause which determines the action to this species, this time, etc. All this argues not to imperfection in God, but to very great perfection, since He has devised such a way of safeguarding created free causality. In the instant in which God, as first cause, actually influences, He is understood to have previously (by a priority of nature) a determination by which His will is ready to concur in this or that act. His will is indifferent only by a universal and absolute indifference, and determined (conditionally) to co-

[184] Deus enim distinctissime praevidens omnes hos actus . . . distincte ac definitive vult ad hunc vel illum, et sic de caeteris, praebere concursum seu offerre quantum in ipso est . . . tamen quia Deus etiam praevidet quem actum illa voluntas effectum sit . . . Deus . . . concursum offerat, ideo Deus determinate . . . vult cum illa concurrere ad talem actum . . . nec illum absolute velit sed cum dependentia ejusdem actus a proxima causa . . . et includendo in se implicitam conditionem: Si ipsa consentire voluerit (*Ibid.*, n. 3).

[185] *Ibid.*, n. 4.

[186] Ex parte autem objecti vel humanae voluntatis reddi potest nonnulla ratio hujus determinationis nimirum quia ex natura sua postulat hunc operandi modum (*Ibid.*, n. 5).

operating with the created cause, so that if the latter acts, God necessarily acts by a necessity of supposition. Now the created will in the instant in question is altogether undetermined. There is absolutely no necessity about its influxus; the act begins solely from its indifference of liberty, when and as its wills. For this reason, the determinateness is assigned to it as to its proximate root, though divine concursus is clearly necessary that liberty effectively cause the determinateness. According to causality, neither first nor second cause has any priority of nature, for neither acts on the other, but each acts on the effect; neither applies the other or causes it to do something by reason of this concursus. The first cause can be called prior in causing, inasmuch as it gives and conserves the being of the second cause, effects the conditions or motions preceding the action, concurs in a more outstanding way, and so forth.[187]

To the fourth objection Suarez teaches that God does act necessarily, but the absolute necessity that His power act is based on a supposition; viz., the previous determination of His will to act. To say God's action is transient is of no great importance; the cardinal point is that God causes that act immediately and hence the created action is an act of God, for action is a thing as it proceeds from its cause, or the dependence of an effect on the agent, and the created action has this respect to God. That God have transient action in His effects argues no imperfection in Him but places in creatures perfection presupposed in God.[188]

[187] Verissimum est actionem illam accipere determinationem suam a proxima causa seu voluntate humana . . . quod humana voluntas sit propria et proxima ratio illius determinationis. . . . Proxima vero causa . . . suo influxu determinat actionem ad hance speciem, ad hoc tempus, etc. (*Ibid.*, n. 5). Deus . . . solum est indifferens universali quadam et absoluta indifferentia; determinatus tamen quasi sub conditione ad cooperandum creaturae . . . creata voluntas in illo priori naturae est omnino indeterminata et nullam habet necessitatem influendi . . . et ideo in eam tanquam in radicem proximam haec determinatio revocatur (*Ibid.*, n. 6). Si prioritas naturae sumatur proprie secundum causalitatem . . . neutra harum causarum priusquam alia influit; quia neutra influit in aliam . . . et neutra applicat aliam aut facit illam facere ex vi hujus concursus (*Ibid.*, n. 7).

[188] *Ibid.*, n. 8.

There remains one really important difficulty.[189] From Suarez' thesis it seems to follow that God does not have a perfect providence with regard to our free acts, that He does not predefine them by an absolute and efficacious decree of His will before He sees that those acts should be placed by our will with His concursus. The objection seems very strong, for if one answers by saying that God does, by His absolute decree, predefine our acts, it follows then He efficaciously moves us to the defined acts and this seems to be the very same thing as the predetermination Suarez has argued against at such length.[190] Here then is a dilemma.

The answer requires some preliminary discussion. By predefinition Suarez means " a certain eternal decree of the divine will by which it absolutely establishes that something be done in time." This decree " precedes foreknowledge of the future act " and by it God absolutely decrees the act, and therefore ordains the means through which it shall be brought about.[191]

This predefinition is not contrary to our liberty. It is incredible and unworthy of God that God could not predefine our acts. To say that He cannot is to limit His power too greatly and to suppose that all free acts are outside His efficacious intention. We can distinguish a two-fold physical predefinition: internal, which God establishes in His own will, not that through it He immediately affects or predetermines the second cause, but only that in Himself He has a defined and absolute intention of some end and by reason of it He applies apt means so that the thing is infallibly brought about as it has been predefined. The second is external, which reaches out to the external effect with such efficiency that it physically determines the human will to its act. The first of these we shall simply call predefinition; the second predetermination.[192]

[189] *Ibid.*, cap. 16. [190] *Ibid.*, n. 1.

[191] Quoddam aeternum decretum divinae voluntatis quo absolute statuit ut aliquid fiat in tempore . . . proprie dicit decretum antecedens praescientiam futuri actus, quo Deus absolute decrevit ut (homo) haberet illum (actum) et ideo ordinavit media per quae fieret (*Ibid.*, n. 2).

[192] In hac divina praedefinitione . . . distinguere nos possumus quamdam esse praedifinitionem internam quam Deus in sua voluntate statuit, non ut per eam

This predefinition is reasonable, Suarez points out, since, supposing God's determination that such and such an effect take place, it is certainly to be brought about by God's power in that one way which infallibly insures the result. God will do neither more nor less than is necessary. Since a predetermination of the human will would take away the very freedom through which, on the supposition, God has determined that the effect should proceed, He does not give so efficacious a motion as that. Neither does He just preordain a series of causes with which He sees the decreed act will be placed by us. With regard to our good acts, He can also preordain the very act.

This predefinition does not destroy freedom of exercise, as predetermination does. The latter is certainly unnecessary since a moral motion plus science by which God sees that, given these circumstances, the rational appetite will consent to this act is sufficient. God predetermines us by an act which is like an intention and of itself produces nothing external, since God's will operates through His omnipotence and not, immediately, of itself. Since it neither imperates nor uses the created will it brings no physical predetermination to bear on it. The fact that the means to the end are somehow contained in God's intention of the end argues nothing against the case; predefining the act through such a means does not predetermine but moves the will in a fitting and efficacious way, which God sees is so accommodated to this will that it will infallibly be attracted to consenting.[193]

immutet causam secundam immediate, aut illam determinet . . . sed solum ut in sese definitam et absolutam intentionem habeat alicujus finis . . . aliam vero esse aut cogitare posse praedefinitionem . . . quae cum tali tantaque efficacia . . . exeat ut voluntatem humanam physice determinet. . . . Priorem vocabimus praefinitionem seu praedefinitionem; posteriorem vere, praedeterminationem (*Ibid.*, nn. 5-6).

[193] Ex vi illius decreti solum (Deus) applicat suam potentiam ut illo modo efficiat . . . quia ad intentum finem obtinendum infallibiliter sufficiat. . . . Contingere potest ut . . . praedeterminatio physica repugnet cum illo decreto, ut in actibus liberis praefinitis contingit; et tum . . . ex tali praedefinitione . . . repugnabit sequi; quia impediret libertatem, quae simul cum actu praedefinita erat. . . . Sufficit alia motio (i.e. alia a praemotione) moralis cum communi concursu adjuncta conditionata scientia. . . . Praedefinitio non imperat illi (voluntati humanae) nec utitur illa (*Ibid.*, nn. 8-9).

The differences between such predefinition and Thomists' predetermination are many: 1) predefinition is also a will of this means which means move the free will contingently, though infallibly from God's foreknowledge; predetermination requires no means other than the efficacy of the very determination which, determining the will, overpowers it;[194] 2) predefinition defines the act with regard to the mode in which the second cause operates, so that its object is the act as it is to be done by determination of the free will itself; the object of predetermination is not only the act but also its mode, i. e., the physical determination through God's efficacious motion; 3) predefinition abstractly considered (prescinding from the application of the accommodated means) is neither immediately active *ad extra* nor applicative of divine power (though the predefinition in reality is the same as the determining of the means, the mind can make the precision); while predetermination is of itself active; 4) by predefinition God's ordinary concursus is not changed, but the will so governed that it infallibly uses it; predetermination so changes concursus that the latter uses the will rather than the other way round.[195]

That predefinition, on the other hand, leaves us free as to exercise is clear; it merely applies a means by which the will is infallibly attracted, though it can still not-operate. Of course the human consent is certain from divine foreknowledge. The connection between predefinition and the execution of act is founded precisely in this divine foreknowledge plus providence, attracting by moral motion, and not in the physical efficacy of a decree determining the will to one thing. Suarez notes that: 1) predefinition is not, simply speaking, antecedent to the use of liberty; it supposes preknowledge of it as a future conditional thing and falls on that free consent as it is to be induced through

[194] (Praedeterminatio) non requirit aliud medium quam suam efficacitatem, qua secum rapit voluntatem, determinando illam (*Ibid.*, n. 10).

[195] Praedefinitio abstracte concepta . . . non sit immediate activa ad extra nec applicativa potentiae divinae donec intelligatur determinata ad tale medium . . . praedeterminans voluntas per seipsam est activa vel applicativa potentiae divinae ad vim . . . ex vi (praedeterminationis) necesse est variari concursum Dei talemque praestari ut ille potius voluntate utatur quam voluntas illo (*Ibid.*, n. 10).

the means which, as God foresees, will infallibly bring it about; and 2) given it the will can, simply speaking, not-act. This power is not a power to resist God's will, for: a) God's will does not immediately move the human will; b) He sees the act to be placed in such a way that it can be impeded. What would be repugnant is not that God foreknow both that I shall do this and also my power not to do it, but that this be predefined and not take place. There is no potency for the latter. This repugnance, Suarez adds, comes not only from the causality and power of the supposition but from this that the foreknowledge supposes this future use of freedom, granted the conditions. The necessity, then, is only that when a thing is, it be.[196]

Predefinition leaves freedom of specification unharmed. Many of our acts are not predefined, yet we have ordinary concursus for them. The latter does not suppose the definition, nor is it given through predefinition, because such definition is not required by reason of the subordination of second to first cause.[197]

We consider now the various kinds of human acts; they can be either natural or supernatural. Natural acts, again, are either good or bad, a distinction which has no place with regard to supernatural actions since all evil voluntary actions can be placed by the natural power of the will. We shall now consider natural acts and evil acts, then good acts.[198]

It is certain in the first place that God does predetermine the will, or in any way incline it to this formal element of sin. Suarez thinks it *de fide*, certain that God does not excite us,

[196] Praedefinitio . . . applicat medium quo ita moveatur liberum arbitrium ut revera possit non operari . . . quamvis ex divina praescientia certus sit et infallibilis consensus liberi arbitrii . . . in priori praedefinitione fundatur connexio (cum actu) et necessaria consecutio in divina praescientia, adjuncta providentia, morali modo attrahente . . . praedefinitio haec non est simpliciter antecedens usum libertatis, quia supponit praescientia ejus . . . sed supponens aliquo modo usum libertatis, cui sese accomodat (*Ibid.*, nn. 11-13).

[197] Esse plures actus humanos ad quos Deus, . . . concurrit, etsi eos non praedefiniat. . . . Concursus generalis non datur per hanc praedefinitionem neque ad illum est necessaria (*Ibid.*, n. 14).

[198] *Ibid.*, Liber II, Introductio.

or move us by moral motion to morally bad acts. St. James implies this.[199] Again, the Council of Trent defined: "If anyone shall say that it is not in the power of man to make his ways evil, but that God operates evil works just as He does good works, not only permissively but also properly and *per se*; so that Judas' betrayal is no less His work than the calling of Paul, let him be anathema."[200] The Council speaks of "evil works" making no fine distinction between the work formally and materially regarded. It outlaws the opinion that God operates such things and does not say, for example, "save in a material way." To argue that God causes sins materially but not formally is therefore unjustified. He would not only give His concursus, He would even determine it to this act; what more could be required for Him to be its cause? To say God is the cause of material sin and not of the formal sin is meaningless. If God so determines man to act in these circumstances it is impossible that the act be anything but a sin, as, for example, to determine Judas to betray Christ with his knowledge of, and attitude to, Christ, and his dispositions, would have been precisely to determine him to sin.[201]

It is even true that God never moves our wills by this moral motion (exaltations, persuasions) to any act, even though it be indifferent or good in itself, with the positive intention that man take from it the occasion of doing evil, that is, of eliciting another act which man could elicit only evilly. While this is not so expressly of faith as the first proposition, it seems sufficiently certain that the contrary is erroneous. Such an intention is intrinsically evil and therefore is repugnant to the divine

[199] "For God is not a tempter of evils and he tempteth no man" (*James*, i, 13). Cfr. *Opus. Primum*, Liber II, cap. 2, nn. 5-6.

[200] Sess. 6, cap. 6 (Denz., n. 816).

[201] Neque hic (in verbis Concilii) locus relinquitur distinctioni de materiali et formali. . . . Imo cum posito materiali necessario consequatur formale . . . nunquam hoc est in potestate libera voluntatis (*Opus. Primum, loc. cit.*, n. 22). (In suppositione praedeterminationis) Deus est directe et per se causa illius malae voluntatis . . . ex intentione sua praedeterminante influxum suum ad talem volitionem . . . quid ergo amplius requiri potest ut vere ac proprie dicatur causa illius peccati (*Ibid.*, n. 10). Quid enim est Deum esse causam materialis peccati et non formalis? (*Ibid.*, n. 12).

goodness. Again, if God could directly intend an evil and He could immediately move us (morally) to it for that would be no worse than intending evil. Now we cannot conceive God in His goodness soliciting us to sin, therefore neither does He intend our sins.[202]

God does not move us morally to sin; Suarez goes further and says that even predefinition to evil acts is repugnant. He argues from Scripture, for example, "*Non Deus volens iniquitatem tu es.*" [203] The Second Council of Orange declares: "Not only do we not believe that some are predestined to evil by the divine power but also, if there are those who wish to believe so great an evil, we, with all detestation, call them anathema." [204] Since predestination and predefinition differ only in name, the teaching of the Church is clear.[205] He also argues from reason: it is evident that God cannot intend evil.[206] When Scripture seems to speak of God exciting men to particular sins it must be understood as either a negation of concursus or as an excitation to sins through a positive, good operation which will be the occasion of ruin, which ruin God foresees and permits, though He does not intend it.[207]

Even more certainly, Suarez concludes, predetermination to sin by God is impossible. What God can do in using evil wills is to have presented to them some object so that the will, of itself actually determined to evil, tends to this object. Even this, however, is regularly done, Suarez thinks, not by God immediately but through the devils whom God orders to apply certain objects rather than others. This, of course, is to order a lesser evil, for it limits the diabolic powers. Even as to sin which is punishment for a previous sin God gives only permission. The reason is that while punishment is good, evil cannot be done that good may come of it; God is not even a true cause of the hardening of sinners, certainly not through any positive

[202] *Ibid.*, cap. 8, nn. 1-2.
[203] Psalm V.
[204] III de Praedestinatione (Denz. # 200).
[205] *Opus. Primum, loc. cit.*, cap. 4, nn. 1-3.
[206] *Ibid.*, nn. 9-12.
[207] *Ibid.*, cap. 5.

action and direct intention of this effect. This hardening is sinful for it is an inhering in evil, a voluntary impenitence and resistance to God's call. Such things are attributable to God permissively only. He hardens hearts, blinds minds, and deserts men only insofar as He, as punishment for previous sins, does not give the grace by which these things could be avoided. The occasions by which such conditions are brought about God permits or causes not as they are occasions of evil, but as good things from which God foresees evil will result; but that event is due only to human malice.[208]

Yet God has providence of evil acts in particular. This does not mean that God provides that sins be, in the sense that He decrees, intends, or procures them. Yet sins fall under divine providence, and providence is concerned about them in some way. God gives the necessary concursus, not that they be but that they can be, in order that freedom be safeguarded in all respects. Knowing from all eternity that they will be, God ordains them, providentially, to punishment or to some other effect.[209]

Of our good acts, God is, simply speaking, the author. He not only concurs in them as he does in sins, He intends them *per se*; for their sake He gives to the will a very powerful propensity to that which is right and reasonable. To good acts, all laws and precepts, all rewards and punishments, are ordered. God directly and *per se* influences as to the good; He provides that such acts be, and procures their being placed. That God by an absolute decree, previous (in nature) to His foreknowledge of future things, predefines these good actions is not a matter of faith nor is it a theological conclusion. Theologians hold various opinions on the matter. More probably, Suarez

[208] Constat voluntatem hominis non praedeterminari physice ad actum malum a voluntate Dei efficaci (*Ibid.*, cap. 8, n. 5). Potius dicendum est Deum applicare voluntatem ad minus malum quam ad malum . . . atque hoc ipsum (ut ego existimo, regulariter non fit a Deo immediate sed per angelos . . . malos (*Ibid.*, n. 7). Deum obdurare . . . quia in poenam praecedentium delictorum nec dat gratiam qua cor emolliat, nec lumen (*Ibid.*, nn. 9-10).

[209] Verissimum est Deum habere providentiam malorum actuum in particulari. . . . Nam Deus providet auxilium seu concursum necessarium ad actum malum non quidem ut ille fiat sed ut fieri possit (Ibid., n. 10).

thinks, some good acts are so defined and others are not, depending on God's good pleasure and the things He intends.[210]

The question of the predefinition of indifferent human acts does not really arise, since divine providence is concerned with individual acts. No individual act is ever indifferent; it is good or bad—good from a good end and bad either from a bad end, or no end at all, for an act specifically indifferent, ordered to no end is by that fact sinful. God is, therefore, not its author; He neither predefines it nor excites to it. He can however, move us to indifferent acts for a good end, and we can place the act and never intend the end. In that case the act is from God, though its indifference or uselessness is not from Him. It does not seem repugnant to Suarez that God could move us to a specifically indifferent act through which He intends an end, yet not move us to will that end. In general, however, he thinks it better to say that God moves us only to good acts; that any acts be indifferent He merely permits and influences through His ordinary concursus.[211]

We come now to the question of supernatural acts and the special help required for them.[212] It is clear that a gratuitous and supernatural aid for such acts is required.[213] This aid (actual grace) admits of many divisions;[214] for Suarez' purpose however, the most important is the distinction between that named sufficient and that named efficacious.[215]

Sufficient grace he describes as that which prescinds from any actual effecting and includes its negation. The efficacious

[210] Horum (actuum bonorum) simpliciter auctor est Deus . . . propter illos dedit voluntati potissimam propensionem naturalem ad id quod honestum est . . . an vero Deus praefiniat absoluto decreto praescientiam futurorum antecedenter ut hi actus boni . . . naturales fiant non est res ad fidem pertinens. . . . (Aliqui dicunt) quosdam praefiniri, quosdam non item. . . . Quem dicendi modum ut probabiliorem eligimus (*Ibid.*, n. 11).

[211] Individuo nullus est actus indifferens. . . . Potest autem interdum Deus movere ad talem actum faciendum propter bonum finem et homo suo arbitrio eligere actum et omittere finem a Deo intentum (*Ibid.*, n. 12).

[212] *Ibid.*, Liber III.

[213] *Ibid.*, cap. 2.

[214] *Ibid.*, capp. 4-5.

[215] *Ibid.*, cap. 6.

is always sufficient; but a sufficient cause need not be efficient; e. g., if it is sufficient in one line of causality and the necessary cause in some other line is wanting. For us, sufficient aid is that which is enough (*satis*) for effecting (*ad efficiendum*) a supernatural act, but yet does not produce it, not because the aid is insufficient, but because of the will's freedom.[216]

That such sufficient grace is given to men is of faith. God Himself testifies that He has done all that was sufficient for the salvation and conversion of sinners. "What is there that I ought to do more to my vineyard, that I have not done to it?"[217] The Fathers and the Councils of the Church also witness to this.[218]

Just what sufficient grace is, is disputed. Some say it is sufficient so that man can act, but not sufficient to this that man *act*.[219] This is rejected by Suarez who argues that with regard to a sufficient aid, two elements must be distinguished: 1) what is formally given; 2) the term or end of the aid given. What is formally given to man through sufficient grace is the power to act; but its end is the act. Sufficient grace is sufficient for the power (*ad posse*) if the formula is understood of the formal effect, not if understood as the term. Potency is not given for the sake of power, but for the sake of operation. Any sufficient grace is sufficient for operation. As man is commanded to do things and not merely to be able to do them, so the help given him is sufficient that he accomplish them (if he wills to) and not merely that he be able to do so. Any principle that is, simply speaking, sufficient must have all the power necessary for the *act*. If something more is needed where is the sufficiency? This is to be understood, of course, of aid which is approximately sufficient for acts.

[216] Sufficiens gratia praescindit ab actuali effectione ejusque negationem includit . . . quidquid est efficax esse etiam sufficiens; potest vero e converso causa esse sufficiens et non efficax, i. e. actu efficiens . . . erit ergo auxilium sufficiens quod satis est ad efficiendum supernaturalem actum illum tamen non facit, non ex insufficientia auxilii sed ex libertate voluntatis (*Ibid.*, n. 1).

[217] *Isaias* v, 4.

[218] Council of Orange, can. 25 (Denz. nn. 198-200); Trent, sess. 6, c. 5 (Denz. n. 797) and c. 13 (Denz. n. 805); cfr. *Opus. Primum*, Liber III, cap. 6, nn. 2-5.

[219] *Ibid.*, n. 3.

A man who does not actually have all the aids necessary as principles is yet said, sometimes, to have sufficient grace. This is meant in a remote and potential sense. That it be true even in that sense, however, a man must be able to do something to obtain that aid which is proximately necessary, by praying, for example, and doing all he can. God will not be deaf to such a man. A difficulty here arises in relation to infidels and Christians who have fallen into serious sin. They seem altogether unable to arise from their condition, so how have they sufficient grace for conversion, Suarez answers that as long as the infidel remains untouched by *gratia excitans* he does not actually have sufficient help, and his not placing supernatural acts is not imputable to him. In other ways, however, he can be said to have sufficient grace in universal causes (the preaching of the Church, Redemption of Christ) or because God illuminates everyone, even him who does nothing worthy of the illumination. As to the Christian sinner, he has sufficient help for he has God ready to aid him as often as his will, excited by faith, applies itself to his conversion.[220] It is clear, then, that the nature of sufficient grace does not demand that man actually receive it into himself as concursus. The latter is given only in the very operation; and it is not the very ratio

[220] Quod formaliter datur per auxilium sufficiens est posse; terminus vero seu finis propter quem datur est velle seu perficere. Cum ergo dicitur auxilium sufficiens dari ad posse . . . si intelligatur quasi de formali effectu auxilii, verissimum est; . . . si autem intelligatur de fine . . . falsum est; nam potentia . . . datur . . . proter operari; imo non potest dare primum sine secundo (*Ibid.*, n. 3). Est igitur de ratione auxilii sufficientis ut ad operandum sufficiens est . . . quodcumque auxilium detur, si ultra illud est necessarium aliud per modum principii alterum non poterit esse sufficiens simpliciter, sed ad summum in aliquo genere (*Ibid.*, n. 4). . . . Contingit enim hominem non actu habere omnia haec auxilia necessaria . . . et nihilominus dici habere auxilium sufficiens; sed illud intelligendum est remote et in potentia. . . . Ut vero hoc etiam sensu habeat homo auxilium sufficiens necesse est ut sit in potestate ejus aliquid facere ad obtinendum illud auxilium quod proxime sufficit (*Ibid.*, n. 5). (Respectu infidelis) quamdiu hic motus (auxilii excitantis) actu non *fit* in homine non habere hominem auxilium sufficiens in actu . . . neque . . . in potestate sua intrinseca . . . fidelem peccatorem habere sufficiens auxilium adjuvans . . . quia habet Deum paratum ad juvandum illum quotiescumque liberum ejus arbitrium per fidem excitatum sese ad suam conversionem applicaverit (*Ibid.*, n. 6).

of sufficient help that it actually operate. It is in man's power that sufficient help become concursus; for when man applies himself to operation, God enters in.[221]

The existence of efficacious help is certain; "No one can come to me unless the Father Who sent me draw him."[222] What this efficacious aid is, is disputed. Heretics say it is a divine motion which necessitates the will, without which the will cannot act; they deny any merely sufficient aid. On the other extreme, some Catholics say divine aid is called efficacious from the effect; no grace is *ex se* efficacious, but all grace is called either efficacious or sufficient depending on whether man wills to cooperate or not. Since this opinion is difficult to reconcile with the words of Scripture and with those of St. Augustine, Suarez adopts the view that grace is called efficacious because it offers to the will most efficacious powers. Concursus cannot properly be called efficacious help for it is not so much efficacious as the very effecting; in it, sufficiency and efficacy cannot be distinguished, and it always has the very same conjunction with the effect. Only help which is a principle of operation admits a division into sufficient and efficacious. Suarez describes efficacious grace, then, as that principle of grace which has peculiar force and efficacy to induce the human will to consent.[223]

Since efficacious aid is given in order that a man will one thing determinately, its efficacy seems to consist in a certain power to determine the will to this act. Some theologians teach that the efficacy consists in this power to determine, in a physical way, as we have seen earlier with regard to God's

[221] Concluditur non esse quidem de ratione auxilii . . . sufficientis ut homo actu et in se recipiat . . . concursus, quia non est de ratione sufficientis principii ut actu operetur; illud autem auxilium non datur nisi in ipsa actuali operatione . . . voluntate nostra applicante se ad opus statim ac Deus influit (*Ibid.*, n. 7).

[222] *John* vi.

[223] Nunc ut probabilius et verius statuimus auxilium non dici efficax quia facit, sed etiam quia vires praebet efficacissimas voluntati . . . hoc nomen . . . non proprie attribuatur illi auxilio quod est per modum concursus. . . . Solum ergo datur illa divisio (sufficiens et efficax) de auxilio per modum principii. Est ergo auxilium efficax illud gratiae principium quod peculiarem vim et efficaciam habet ad inducendam humanam voluntatem, ut consentiat (*Opus. Primum*, Liber III, cap. 6, n. 8).

motion in the natural order. This is rejected by Suarez for two reasons: a) it is opposed to the sufficiency of grace and hence also to liberty of specification; b) it is opposed to liberty of exercise.[224]

It is opposed to the sufficiency of God's other help. Sufficient grace is truly sufficient if the will chooses to cooperate; hence physical determination is unnecessary. On the other hand, if physical determination is necessary for supernatural acts, it follows that the unconverted do not have a grace even sufficient for conversion. Even Protestants see this point and deny any sufficient grace; it is all efficacious for them.[225]

To answer that sufficient grace gives ability to act (*posse velle*) but determination is necessary only to the actual operation is no answer. By the teaching of the defenders of physical determination the efficacious motion is the ultimate complement of the power in which it inheres; it is therefore necessary to it that it have the ability to act. Any aid short of determination is, then, not sufficient, for the principle of the act would remain incomplete.[226]

Some of Suarez' opponents, he says, seeing the force of this argument, say that it is in the power of a man who has sufficient grace to have efficacious grace too, if he does not resist; man never lacks efficacious grace except by his own free sin. While in itself it is true that whatever is necessary to man's salvation is somehow in his power, the principle can hardly be consistently enunciated by defenders of determination. This efficacious aid is said to be a supernatural entity which God causes in us without us, for it is not our vital act but a power previous to act. Since it is infused it does not

[224] *Ibid.*, capp. 8-9.

[225] Auxilium quod dicitur sufficiens est vere et realiter ad hoc sufficiens si liberum arbitrium . . . cooperari velit. Si hujusmodi auxilium hoc sensu efficax ut physice . . . praedeterminans sit simpliciter necessarium, . . . sequitur eos, qui non convertuntur, non habere sufficiens auxilium ut convertantur (*Ibid.*, cap. 8, n. 1).

[226] . . . dicti auctores docent auxilium hoc efficax esse . . . veluti complementum ultimum virtutis necessariae ad agendum; ergo non solum est necessarium . . . ut voluntas velit, sed etiam ut velle possit . . . ergo . . . auxilium quod hoc non includit non potest dici sufficiens etiam ad posse (*Ibid.*, n. 2).

depend on us. It can be said to depend on our wills only by reason of some disposition in us, given which, God grants that aid, and only then. Yet that there be such a disposition Suarez thinks impossible.[227]

The supposed disposition could be imagined to be either positive or negative; there are no further possibilities. Both are repugnant. The positive could only be a good act and indeed a supernatural one (since a natural act is not a sufficient disposition and especially not an ultimate and necessitating disposition to grace), yet it is unheard of that to contrition, say, or to the first will to believe, such an ultimate disposition is necessary Again, for this preparatory good and supernatural act divine determination is necessary, therefore another earlier disposition must have been in man to receive that predetermination and so *ad infinitum* If one wishes to defend predetermination one cannot maintain that free consent making it efficacious is in man's power, for the possibility of a negative disposition is advanced by practically no one.[228]

Predetermining grace is opposed to the exercise of freedom. Suarez speaks of *gratia excitans* here, reasoning that if it is true that this grace, which more than other precedes our wills, does not predetermine us, it is certainly true of other graces. His argument from reason is simple *Gratia excitans* moves man to consent only by illuminating him (objectively) or by touching his affections through certain imperfect and indeliberate motions of fear, affection, or joy. Neither of these ways of moving the will is sufficient to determine it physically. There-

[227] . . . hoc ipsum principium quod in hac responsione confitetur non potest cum ipsa sua assertione consistere . . . hoc auxilium efficax dicitur esse qualitas seu entitas quaedam supernaturalis quam Deus efficit in nobis sine nobis; ergo quod nobis infundatur talis qualitas non pendet a nobis . . . ut a cooperante illam entitatem (*Ibid.*, n. 6).

[228] Positiva dispositio esse tantum potest per actum . . . qui debet esse bonus (non naturalis) . . . hoc est inauditum scilicet, quod ad contritionem v. g. sit necessaria alia ultima dispositio; et multo minus verisimile erit id dicere de attritione, vel de prima voluntate credendi . . . addo . . . ad priorem actum . . . necessarium esse divinam praedeterminationem . . . Praedeterminatio ergo ad illum actum non erit in potestate hominis; alioquin . . . infinite proceditur (*Ibid.*, nn. 7-8).

fore *gratia excitans* does not predetermine us. The minor premise will bear some comment. The first part is clear: outside the beatific vision no particular object determines the will, especially not as to exercise of the act. Besides, an intellectual judgment can physically determine the will only by reason of a prior free act from which the determining act necessarily follows. By the second part of the minor premise (that the touching the appetitive part of man through imperfect motions of fear, joy, etc., does not determine the will physically) Suarez shows that these motions are imperfect, certain velleities only which cannot of their own force determine the will to give absolute consent. The will is never determined by one act to place another unless there is a necessary connection between them.[229]

The next appeal is to the Council of Trent which says that man can assent or dissent when God touches his heart through the illumination of the Holy Ghost; in other words, he is not determined by it. But the Council previously calls this same illumination *gratia excitans*. Therefore, *gratia excitans* does not determine us.[230] Note that the Council speaks in a general way of *gratia excitans*. To say the declaration means that exciting grace gives power to act, though with that grace alone such an act will never be placed, is unjustified, among other reasons because the Council is speaking of a true potency which often is reduced to act. Therefore, it speaks rather of act than of potency when it says man can consent if he wills to do so; it speaks of an excitation by which man is converted. Such a movement is always called efficacious. Some answer, "Well, the Council says man can resist. But even where the will is determined, it can resist though it does not, of course." To this Suarez replies that in the composed sense (that is, given

[229] . . . extra visionem beatificam nullum particulare objectum determinat voluntatem, praesertim quoad exercitium actus . . . illi motus . . . in suo ordine sunt imperfecti . . . ergo ex intrinseca illorum vi non potest voluntas physice determinari ad plenum et absolutum consensum praestandum (*Ibid.*, cap. 9, n. 8).

[230] (Concilium) definit, tangente Deo cor hominis per Spiritus Sancti illuminationem, quod paulo antea excitantem gratiam vocaverat, posse hominem . . . dissentire (*Ibid.*, n. 2).

the determining grace), the will can not simultaneously dissent (on the supposition that grace determines) for what determines a thing does not leave it undetermined.

If the opposition admits that in the composed sense the will can not-consent, well and good; all Suarez intends is that grace of itself by its own power does not necessarily induce consent. But if one says: "man can dissent but never will," he is mistaken. Man not only does not do contradictory things, he can not do them. If, then, he necessarily consents by reason of this grace he cannot join dissent with that grace. The lesser cannot overcome nor impede the greater. But efficacious grace (on the hypothesis) is greater than the will since it necessarily induces its act. Therefore, the will does not and can not impede it. One might say: "As the Council declares, given grace one can dissent, but only in the divided sense, i. e., without that grace it could dissent." But the point is, Suarez replies, the Council says he who has the call (and refuses it) is the one who dissents, not he who lacks the divine call. It is, therefore, speaking of the composed, not of the divided, sense. Again, without the grace one does not dissent; rather one does not consent, i. e., there is a negation of any act, not the placing of a negative act. Liberty in this divided sense is common to all agents; to place human freedom in such liberty is to deny the specific reality of human liberty.[231]

In order to operate supernaturally it is not required that *gratia excitans* bring even a moral predetermination, i. e., a certain vehement propensity which, leaving in the faculty a

[231] . . . Concilium loquitur de vera . . . potentia quae in actum saepe reducitur, . . . imo potius de actu quam de potentia agendi loquitur . . . potentiam ad consentiendum determinatam posse dissentire (sensu composito) . . . est aperta repugnantia et contradictio; nam forma physice determinare potentiam . . . nihil aliud est quam ex vi sua . . . necessario secum afferre seu conjunctum habere consensum . . . quod simul sit consensus et dissensus . . . est impossibile . . . homo non solum nunquam efficit contradictoria, sed nec facere potest. . . . Item vis inferior non solum nunquam vincit superiorem sed neque vincere potest . . . sed illa gratia efficax dicitur . . . tam potens ut necessario inducat suum actum; ergo voluntas creata . . . illam . . . neque impedire potest . . . non dicitur (a Concilio) dissentire qui caret vocatione, sed qui illam habet et respuit . . . plane facit sensum compositum (*Ibid.*, nn. 3-4).

real power to resist, yet usually or even always leads to the effect. The reason this is not required Suarez thinks is clear; if it were necessary for the effect, then it alone is sufficient grace, and ordinary grace lacks something required to produce the effect. Hence those who do not believe all the articles of faith when they are called to faith are not sufficiently called, a proposition Catholics dare not concede. If moral determination is in any way required physically or morally then most men in sinning are not fully free or fully culpable; for most men are not so determined (since determination works its effect practically always). Since man needs no determination to act naturally neither does he need it to act supernaturally.[232]

This is not to deny the possibility of moral determination. When man acts with a very evident judgment that this act is expedient and its contrary unfitting he is so determined. The devil can so vehemently induce men to evil acts that, morally speaking, they cannot refrain from consent without God's grace; even more surely, then, God can predetermine us morally to good. Just what predetermination of this kind is, in each case, is hard to decide. There is a certain minimum divine call which is, simply speaking, necessary that man be converted if he wish it. God can give more than this minimum by communicating a greater light, exciting a more intense act or drawing the will more strongly in other ways. Yet the will sometimes remains equally indifferent and the effect equally contingent to both possibilities; sometimes, again, the man's conversion is more difficult, but often the will, because of the efficacy of the call, or the abundance of the grace, is rendered (as if in first act) more inclined to consent. Then we say the will is morally determined; it can be so determined more or less.[233]

[232] Necessaria non sit (praedeterminatio moralis) ad . . . supernaturalem actum humanum . . . quia alias nulla gratia excitans quae non efficeret in homine hanc moralem determinationem esset in suo ordine auxilium sufficiens. . . . Voluntas moraliter praedeterminata . . . aut nunquam . . . aut vix et raro dissentit (*Ibid.*, cap. 10, n. 1).

[233] Ad actus malos potest daemon tam vehementer inducere hominem . . . ut nisi gratia Dei juvetur moraliter non possit sese continere quin consentiat; ergo multo magis potest Deus . . . ita illuminare hominem et affectum ejus inclinare ut

This determination admits even of a grade, Suarez thinks, in which the connection between grace and free consent is a moral infallibility which can, simply speaking, be said never to fail. God so comprehends the will that He can infallibly make it consent. Even the devil and other men can do this, so why not God? Yet the infallibility is not absolute, since liberty still remains and so it is not impossible that the effect be not produced.[234]

What then is efficacious grace? Besides *gratia excitans* the will needs *gratia adjuvans*. The latter affects the act in a physical way more than *gratia excitans* does. This assisting grace is called *cooperating* insofar as, *together with the will*, it is a principle of eliciting the act; insofar as it precedes the act by priority of nature it is called prevenient grace; insofar as it is infused by God alone it is called operating grace.[235]

Suarez' first point is that there is inhering in us no kind of assisting grace, operating or cooperating, i e., something which is neither a habit nor an act, though for the first supernatural acts which precede the habits he admits as probable a kind of fluid first act, though it does not determine us.[236] The opinion that there is in us a determining aid which is neither habit, nor act, he sees as without foundation in the Fathers, the Councils, or St. Thomas.[237] Neither the subordination of second cause to first, nor the indifference of the will requires extrinsic deter-

moraliter eum . . . determinat . . . potest autem Deus uberiorem et majorem (vocationem) conferre . . . quibus voluntas magis alliciatur (*Ibid.*, nn. 5-6).

[234] . . . censeo posse perveniri in hac determinatione ad moralem infallibilitatem quae simpliciter dici possit nunquam deficere . . . quia Deus comprehendit capacitatem et inclinationem humanae voluntatis . . . daemon sua tentatione potest ita hominem opprimere ut infallibiliter sequatur consensus nisi gratia Dei subveniat . . . unus homo potest efficacissime illum (alterum) pertrahere . . . quid ergo non poterit facere Deus? (*Ibid.*, n. 7).

[235] *Ibid.*, cap. 12, n. 1.

[236] Opinio quae ad cliciendos primos actus supernaturales qui non eliciuntur ab habitibus ponit aliquam gratiam adjuvantem et inhaerentem voluntati per modum actus primi fluentis probabilis est, dummodo talis actus . . . in auxilio sufficiente includatur et absque physica praedeterminatione ponatur (*Ibid.*, n. 2).

[237] Suarez cites *Summa Theol.* I-II, q. 3, a. 2 as supporting the teaching "nullam esse gratiam per modum actus primi nisi habitum." Cf. *Opus. Primum, loc. cit.*, n. 3.

mination; the Councils and the Fathers have never founded the necessity of grace on the indifference of the will, but rather on the weakness of fallen man, or on the deficiency of his powers. Granted, for example, a will informed by charity and granted the object sufficiently proposed, man has a sufficient principle of loving God, given concursus proportioned to the grace. Such expressions as: "God makes us will (*Deus facit ut velimus*)," "God operates the act of will in us (*operatur in nobis velle*)," and others of like import Suarez interprets to mean that grace excites, morally rules, and directs our steps. Our cooperation and free consent are required for such works, though God is the principal cooperator.[238]

His second point is that, even admitting this kind of grace, one can not hold that it physically predetermines the will prior to the second act of the will: the efficiency of grace cannot be found in any such characteristic as that. And why not? Because such determination would destroy the freedom through actual indifference; Suarez appeals here to reasons given earlier and adds that this predetermination to one thing is in a proximate cause inasmuch as this cause is constituted in first act. But necessity in acting is precisely determination to one thing in the cause, inasmuch as the cause is constituted in first act. Man, therefore, by such determination would be constituted as a necessary and not as a free agent. The major premise is clear: the determination is something prior to second act, its cause, which constitutes the will as completely ready to act. It is, then, first act. The minor is evident from the very terms.[239] One cannot argue that, granted this determined entity

[238] Ex subordinatione causae secundae ad primam non esse necessariam talem virtutem fluentem. . . . Haec omnia (locutiones Sacrae Scripturae) dicta sunt ratione gratiae excitantis et moraliter regentis; . . . quatenus vero nostra cooperatio et liber consensus requiritur, tribuuntur Deo ut principali cooperatori (*Ibid.*, nn. 4-5).

[239] Illa deductio eodem modo in his actibus supernaturalibus facienda est, qua eam supra . . . in communi fecimus de actibus liberis voluntatis . . . praedeterminationem ad unum (si est) esse in causa proxima quatenus constituta in actu primo ad efficiendum; nihil autem est aliud necessitas in agendo nisi determinatio ad unum in causa, quatenus est in actu primo constituta; ergo per illam determinationem constituitur homo in ratione agentis necessarii et non liberi (*Ibid.*, n. 6).

in the will, the will is yet free, because of its greater power; this determination, on the supposition, is superior to, and overcomes, the indeterminateness of the will. God's infinite power can quasi-force the will but a created being, such as this grace is said to be cannot do so.[240]

Suarez argues that the Council of Trent was clearly opposed to this doctrine of determination; the answer that Trent speaks only of *gratia excitans* and not of assisting grace (*gratia adjuvans*) he rejects. He maintains that the Council felt and taught implicitly that: 1) the power to resist any motion prior to act is of the very nature of liberty; 2) no antecedent motion can so determine the free will as not to leave in it the power to resist the motion. The Council says: " Nor does man do nothing at all receiving that inspiration; indeed, he can refuse it." Now the word " do " here means to do something which proceeds from one's own will and reason, i. e., freely. The will, then, in assenting to grace is not merely passively determined to one thing. The Council says: " The free will moved and excited by God," etc.; since " motion " is used broadly it comprehends any divine motion which precedes man's consent, even *gratia adjuvans*. Implicitly, then, the Council taught that any motion which does not destroy liberty leaves the power of resistance in the will, a power, Suarez adds, which premotion denies (in the composed sense, of course, and as the will is proximately disposed for act).[241]

To Suarez it is clear that no supernatural aid given to man as a principle of consent to an act physically predetermines him to that consent. But what of concursus itself he asks. It is quite evident that it does not predetermine the will, either; for while concursus in itself can determine the will formally, it

[240] Omitto vix posse intelligi qualis est illa entitas quae inhaerens voluntati ita sit illi superior . . . ut vincat et superet indifferentiam ejus . . . ut ipsum (objectum) non possit non efficaciter . . . determinare voluntatem . . . non ergo facile intelligitur quomodo possit eam quasi agere. . . . Deus enim propter infinitam vim activam . . . habet hanc vim (*Ibid.*, n. 8).

[241] Ergo implicite docet (Concilium) hanc potestatem (resistendi) semper relinqui in omni motione antecedente, quae libertatem non tollit; ergo e contrario praemotio, quae hanc potestatem aufert impedit libertatem (*Ibid.*, nn. 9-12).

cannot do so without the will. This concursus is the voluntary act itself; it cannot be, therefore, unless the will is operating. Action surely does not predetermine the agent to acting, but formally constitutes him as acting in second act.[242]

Even considering concursus in its root, i. e., in the divine will, Suarez continues, it is true that it does not predetermine the will. Concursus so considered is conceived as an act of God *ad intra*, which supposes no preknowledge of man's cooperation, an act which proceeds from God's absolute and efficacious will by which He efficaciously determines the created will to consent to a determined supernatural act, not by impressing on the human will any reality prior to act, but only by drawing it. Suarez applies here what he has already said of the impossibility of such determination in the natural order. What was said there applies here; this position denies the reality of free acts.[243] He adds, however, the following considerations.

If such an act of God's will is necessary in order that man can act then man can not act in a supernatural way when he does not so act. When he does not act he is not determined by God's will to act; therefore, power to act is lacking.[244] It solves nothing to say that man has it in his power infallibly to receive this determination by negatively allowing himself to be moved by God. This negative disposition is a negation of something positive, i. e., of a voluntary act which is in the will's power, for as a free disposition, it supposes that its opposite is possible to the will. That act would be either good or bad. If bad, it would follow that when a man sufficiently excited (by *gratia excitans*) to make an act of faith, does not commit some other sin infallibly he will be determined by God

[242] Auxilium igitur hoc prout in homine recipitur potest quidem formaliter determinare voluntatem, non tamen sine illa; . . . nec determinare illam potest prout nunc loquimur . . . quia auxilium non est nisi ipsamet actio voluntatis quae principalius a Deo est (*Ibid.*, cap. 13, nn. 1-2).

[243] *Ibid.*, nn. 3-4.

[244] Aperte sequitur (ex hac opinione) non esse in potestate hominis supernaturaliter operari, quando actu non operatur. Probatur, quia cum homo non operatur non determinatur per voluntatem Dei praedeterminantem; ergo . . . neque est in potestate hominis facere (*Ibid.*, n. 5).

to believe. This conclusion is contrary to our faith, for one to whom the faith is sufficiently proposed can, in fact, will not to believe. If the act were good it follows that God would determine this man to believe for the precise reason that the man does not place a good act, which is ridiculous. Again, as any act of man's is because God premoves him, so the negative disposition is because God does not premove him. Thus the very negation is not free but necessary. In the third place it is absurd that the ultimate disposition to God's most efficacious supernatural help should be the lack of some natural act, even more absurd than supposing the disposition to be a positive, though only natural, act.[245]

The truth, according to Suarez, is that God wills the acts of men's wills as conditional; i. e., He does influence on the condition that the human will cooperate. But what is efficacious grace if it is not physical predetermination? The word " efficacious " can be taken in three different ways, as naming: 1) any power or faculty of acting, especially one having some special energy, even though the power is not acting; in this sense, sufficient grace is truly efficacious; 2) a power of acting as actually conjoined to its action; in this signification grace can not be said to be efficacious without the consent and free determination of our will; 3) a grace which not only can effect and does effect, but is effective in such a way that it always infallibly has the actual effecting joined to it.[246]

Efficacious grace in this third and proper sense does not formally include concursus; if it did it would in no wise differ from efficacious grace taken in the second sense of actual conjunction with the effect. Formally this aid is a principle of

[245] Erit ergo alicujus actus. . . . Vel ergo ille actus est bonus vel malus: si bonus sequitur determinare Deum voluntatem . . . hominis . . . quia non operatur alium actum bonum, quod ridiculum est; si vero sit actus malus, ergo, quoties ille homo . . . sufficienter excitatur . . . non committit aliud peccatum infallibiliter determinabitur a Deo ut velit; consequens autem est falsum et contra doctrinam fidei (*Ibid.*, nn. 6-8).

[246] Tertio modo potest gratia appellari efficax non solum quia effectiva est, neque solum quia actu efficit; sed quia ita est effectiva ut semper habeat infallibiliter conjunctam actualem effectionem (*Ibid.*, cap. 14, n. 4).

operation, not an operation. Infallibly it brings on the act and consequently (not formally) it has the conjoined actual help which is concursus and even the cooperation of the will. As St. Augustine saw, it consists in a certain calling, which pertains to operative grace. Its efficacy, for St. Augustine, consists in two things: 1) that God gives it from the firm intention of converting or saving men, an efficacious election; 2) that God calls man at such a time and in such a way as is accommodated to the effect intended by God, viz., man's conversion. Hence, St. Augustine names this call " congruous." [247]

In what does this congruity consist? Some have thought " it consists in a certain proportion which exists between such an illumination or inspiration effected in such a way by God in a man of such complexion, nature and condition; for God most accurately comprehending all these things in any man if his heart is touched in this way he is softened and consents." [248] While it is true that God's efficacious call sometimes consists in something specially accommodated to the man which God operates in the man (as the call of St. Paul), yet that is not required for a call to be efficacious; otherwise, those not called with this special call, would not have a sufficient call. Again, mere congruity is not sufficient for efficacy, for it induces of itself only moral certitude that the act will follow, whereas truly efficacious help must be so infallible that the non-position of the act is repugnant and contradictory.[249]

[247] In gratia efficaci non debeat formaliter includi auxilium illud quod est per modum concursus. . . . Igitur gratia efficax formaliter constituenda est in aliquo auxilio quod sit per modum principii . . . et consequenter etiam habet conjunctum actuale auxilium quod est . . . concursus (*Ibid.*, n. 4). Consistit efficacia hujus . . . gratiae (ex doctrina S. Augustini) in duobus. Primum est quod a Deo datur ex proposito . . . convertendi vel salvandi hominem . . . secundo necessarium est . . . ut Deus tali tempore et modo hominem vocet qui accomodatus sit ad effectum . . . atque hinc Augustinus . . . hanc vocationem congruam appellat (*Ibid.*, nn. 6-7).

[248] *Ibid.*, n. 7.

[249] Licet verum sit saepe vocationem efficacem fieri hoc singulari modo . . . tamen neque id requiri potest ut necessarium ad vocationis efficaciam . . .; quia alias qui non ita vocaretur non haberet vocationem sufficientem neque etiam illa congruitas satis est ad illam efficaciam (quae) tanta esse debet ut implicet contradictionem aliquando deficere (*Ibid.*, n. 8).

The efficacy of God's call consists in this that " God, in His infinite wisdom seeing what each cause or will shall do in every event and occasion, if placed in it, also knows when and to which vocation each will shall give assent if it (the call) is given (to the will). Whence, when He wills to convert a man He wills also to call him at that time and in that way in which He knows he will consent, and such a vocation is called efficacious because although of itself it does not have an infallible effect, yet inasmuch as it is subject to such divine knowledge infallibly it shall have it " (the effect). The efficacious grace can be with or without the special congruity; its efficacy is moral, not physical, and is to be sought not in the vocation itself but rather as it proceeds from God and is under His direction. It implies not necessity (which regards the cause), but certitude and infallibility, which look to foreknowledge. The will shall never resist it, though it can, since foreknowledge does not remove the power of doing the opposite of what is foreknown.[250]

Suarez' arguments from reason for the convenience of this doctrine, are: 1) the efficacy of grace can be explained in no other convenient way; 2) this doctrine is most apt in conciliating freedom with grace. We have already seen that. He adds, however, that the efficacy ought to be proportioned to the causality of the call, which is moral; hence the efficacy should be understood in a moral sense, too. To liberty moral persuasion is by no means repugnant; nor is infallibility, since that quality is not from a cause but from the supposition of a future thing as a true and knowable object.

Nor does this explanation of the efficacy of grace deny the

[250] Efficaciam hujus vocationis in hoc consistere quod Deus, infinita sua sapientia, praevidens quid unaquaeque causa seu voluntas in omni eventu et occasione operatura sit, si in ea constituatur, etiam cognoscit quando et cui vocationi sit unaquaeque voluntas assensum praebitura si ei detur. Unde quando vult hominem convertere vult etiam illum vocare illo tempore et modo quo novit illum consensurum, et talis vocatio appellatur efficax quia licet ex se non habeat infallibilem effectum tamen ut subest tali scientiae divinae infallibiliter est illam habitura. Unde hanc efficaciam . . . neque esse spectandam in ipsa vocatione secundum se . . . sed prout progreditur a Deo et est sub intentione ac scientia . . . ejus (*Ibid.*, n. 9).

sufficiency of the grace in those who are not converted, for the non-conversion can come from their will alone. It is to be noted that efficacious and sufficient grace do not differ in this that the former has any reality, or motion, or quality which a non-efficacious call has not.[251] There is a difference on God's part in that He foresees the effect in one and not in the other; but man has the power " to make God foresee that he will consent to the call "; so it is in his power to have an efficacious call. What determines that this man be called by God at a time when God foresees that the call will be respected? The will of God is the only answer. Nor can one say, " But on this theory there might be some one whom God foresees will never cooperate with grace; such a man could never be called efficaciously by God." God's infinite power and wisdom can find a way to reach every one, by extraordinary means at least. If one insists that it could happen that man resist every call (though, morally speaking, it never happens), we must admit it; metaphysically or logically speaking there is no inconvenience in this proposition.[252] Divine omnipotence is safeguarded by this fact that God could efficaciously convert such a man by impeding the use of his freedom.

[251] Neque etiam (repugnat libertati) infallibilitas quae oritur ex praescientia, quia illa ut sic non est ex causa, seu ex suppositione antecedente, sed ex suppositione ipsius rei futurae in ratione objecti veri et cognoscibilis (*Ibid.*, n. 12). Gratia efficax praeveniens usum liberi arbitrii prout a nobis explicata est nullam rem, qualitatem aut motionem necessario requirit, quae non possit includere vocatio non efficax (*Ibid.*, n. 14).

[252] Ex parte autem Dei antecedit praescientia effectus in uno et non in alio; tamen haec ipsa differentia non est ex solo Deo sed etiam ex libero arbitrio; nam in potestate hominis . . . est facere ut Deus praesciverit ipsum consensurum vocationi . . . atque ita est in potestate ejus habere efficacem vocationem (*Ibid.*, n. 14). Cum infinita sit Dei potentia et sapientia, qua novit omnia auxilia et omnes modos quibus potest voluntatem hominis ad aliquid inclinare, impossible est quin aliquem praevideat, quo tandem homo consenturus est si ei applicetur. . . . Quod si quis . . . contendat totam hanc impossibilitatem solum esse moralem, atque adeo non implicare contradictionem quod oppositum accidat . . . ideoque simpliciter admittendum esse posse ita accidere, metaphysice seu logice loquendo respondetur totum hoc verum esse . . . inde nihil sequitur contra divinam omnipotentiam sed solum sequitur voluntatem vere ac proprie manere liberam . . . (Deus) posset illam (voluntatem creatam) convertere quo vellet, impediendo libertatis usum (*Ibid.*, n. 16).

Let us now summarize. The doctrine which maintains that efficacious grace is efficacious by reason of a reality which physically determines the created will to act denies, Suarez repeats, the sufficiency of grace in those who *de facto* are not converted. Such efficacious grace is necessary in order to act; therefore, if one does not receive it he lacks something which is altogether necessary in order to operate. It follows that God expects the impossible (since He fails to give some men the help necessary to meet His demands) and that either omission of these good acts is not imputable to men, or else that God blames men for not doing the impossible.[253]

The answer " without efficacious grace man has grace which is sufficient, sufficient to be able to act, though not sufficient to act " Suarez refutes for 1) God orders us to do things, not to be able to do them; hence He ought to give grace sufficient not for " ability to do" but for the doing; 2) He wills not only that man can be saved but that he be actually saved, as St. Paul says; hence He gives men grace sufficient actually to save them; 3) the Thomists' idea of sufficient grace is not even sufficient for " power to act "; it leaves the faculty not proximately expedited for act but only remotely and physically empowered. The distinction is, moreover, without basis in any of the Fathers or older theologians.[254]

To answer, on the other hand, " It is in a man's own power to have efficacious grace such as we describe, and if a man does not have it, it is his own fault," simply opens up further difficulties. The grace can be in man's power only by reason of some prior act or disposition. What of that act or disposition? It cannot be natural; that is Pelagianism. Suppose, then, it is supernatural; is efficacious grace needed to have it? If it is we

[253] Doctrinam hanc (de efficacia praedeterminante) prout in illa sententia explicata est non posse in concordiam redigi cum hoc principio . . . dari hominibus qui nolunt . . . auxilium sufficiens . . . ad agendum. Itemque sequitur Deum praecipere homini impossibilia (*Opus. Tertium*, nn. 15-17).

[254] Deus non praecipit homini ut possit operari sed ut operetur. . . . Deus non tantum vult ut homo possit salvari sed ut salvus fiat . . . ergo ad hoc dat auxilium sufficiens . . . qui nec habet nec habere potest quae necessaria sunt ad operandum non solum non habet auxilium ut faciat sed nec etiam ut possit moraliter et proxime loquendo (*Ibid.*, n. 21).

can go on to infinity; if it is not, then why is such determining grace needed for any other act? [255]

Secondly, predetermining grace is opposed to liberty. Under such grace the non-position of the act is impossible; the placing of the act then is not free since, as Trent says, the use of freedom requires the power of dissenting from the divine motion. And the words are meant in the composed sense, since one cannot throw off something he does not have. Moreover, the will is merely passive in receiving the motion, and the passive is not free. Yet this does not imply that God cannot predefine our supernatural acts and induce the will in a moral way. The will by the mere fact of being subordinated to the First Cause does not need grace. Even for the Fathers the necessity of grace arises from other fonts, e. g., the repugnance of the appetite, the deficiency of our powers, and their lack of proportion to the true end of man and the means to it.[256]

From predetermination follows the absurd conclusion that God premoves and predetermines the will to evil, for the will is quite as indifferent to evil acts as to good, and just as subordinated to the First Cause in effecting evil as in effecting good. Thomists, according to Suarez, should conclude that God efficaciously determines and moves us to evil, that without this determination one cannot consent to evil, but given it one can not not-consent. If God's efficacious motion to good depends as to its distribution on God's will, so does His motion to bad objects.[257]

[255] Naturalis esse non potest . . . si autem est supernaturalis interrogo an ad illum sit necessarium auxilium efficax praedeterminans necne; nam si necessarium est . . . ad alteram dispositionem procedendum erit . . . etiamsi in infinitum procedatur . . . si . . . non est necessarium . . . idem dicendum erit de quolibet alio actu (*Ibid.*)

[256] Dicitur . . . voluntatemque nostram . . . ab eo (auxilio) ita determinari ad unum actum, et ad exercitium illius . . . ut impossibile sit voluntatem . . . non operari ac consentire; ex quo manifeste fit illum consensum non esse liberum (*Ibid.*, n. 25). Nunquam reperitur in sanctis Patribus quod fundent necessitatem gratiae . . . neque in sola subordinatione causae secundae ad primam (*Ibid.*, n. 29).

[257] Videtur . . . sequi Deum esse auctorem mali actus vere ac proprie non permittendo solum sed etiam praemovendo . . . quia voluntas ex se tam est indifferens ad malos actus efficiendos sicut ad bonos, et in eorum effectione tam subordinate primae causae . . . ex duobus hominibus hunc facit (Deus) consentire (in actum malum), illum dissentire, solum quia vult (*Ibid.*, n. 24).

To say to all this, " Yes, God moves us to evil, but to evil materially taken, not formally," is not acceptable to Suarez. The two elements are inseparable; the intention of the agent tends to this human act from which the deformity of the act cannot be separated, and God's will must bear on such an act absolutely (on the supposition), and not merely conditionally. Those who argue from Our Lord's words: " No one can come to me unless the Father draws him," to physical determination should conclude that Judas could not have betrayed Christ unless the Father had drawn him to will it. If this and similar passages mean that our wills can do nothing without God's general motion, then nothing can be drawn from them about the excellence of supernatural acts and grace itself.[258]

On the conciliation of this notion of grace with God's efficacy, Suarez first lays down certain propositions; then he shows their conformity with man's freedom. The propositions are: 1) Man by the unaided power of his free will and without the assistance of divine grace can work no supernatural good, no pious deed conducive to attaining eternal life, nor can man even keep the natural law over a long period of time without grace. 2) Grace not only assists man, but excites him; it precedes man's operation and excites him to act well. This beginning of our salvation is worked in us, without any merit of ours and without our free cooperation, or any disposition. This " calling " is *gratia operans*, through which God alone operates in us that we should will, but to the willing itself we do cooperate.[259] 3) Though God's call does not have its effect in all who are called, yet, even for those who do not answer, the call is sufficient in such a way that it is truly in their power to answer. We have seen the reasons for this already, and at some length. We should bear in mind that, since we are speaking of moral

[258] Nonnulli auctores . . . se . . . exponere vel potius eludere Scripturas et Conciliorum definitiones adhibita distinctione de actu malo pro formali vel pro materiali . . . ac si separabile sit, moraliter loquendo formale a materiali quando intentio agentis definite . . . tendit ad ipsum actum humanum, a quo inseparabilis est deformitas . . . et ita illum (Deus) vult ut non velit quasi conditionate et dependenter a voluntate creata sed absolute nolendo (*Ibid.*, nn. 35-36).

[259] *Ibid.*, nn. 37-38.

acts, which require man's activity, an exterior call (the proposition of truths, let us say) is not truly sufficient; the Holy Ghost must interiorly inspire and excite a man. That assisting grace be sufficient it is necessary that it include whatever assisting grace is. If one maintains that it is first act, or a principle of act, one must maintain that sufficient *gratia adjuvans* includes that total reality, for it is truly necessary in order that a man can will and do what he is called upon to will and do. If he does not have the totality of assisting grace, the lack of his consent is not to be attributed to him. Since the actual concursus of grace is in a man only when he is, in fact, acting, it can not be included, in the same way, in the sufficient call given a man who is not acting. Yet for the sufficiency of that call the concursus must be so offered by God that it is in man's power to have it if he wishes.[260]

Besides the sufficient call nothing further, simply speaking, is necessary to actual operation except the actual concursus of grace which God infuses in the very act. The call constitutes man in a first act sufficient to give consent; he needs only a proportionate concursus which must be in his own power. If something further were necessary it would be a principle of, or necessary condition for, the act: one lacking it would not be sufficiently disposed.[261] 5) Aid which is efficacious in that it

[260] . . . ut vocatio sit sufficiens non satis est exterior doctrina sed oportet ut. . . . Spiritus Sanctus interius operetur et hominem excitet . . . hoc modo dicimus vocationem sufficientem includere omnem gratiam excitantem interiorem simpliciter necessariam ad volendum (*Ibid.*, n. 40). Rursus ex parte gratiae adjuvantis intelligi potest necessarium vel aliquod auxilium quod sit per modum principii . . . seu per modum actus primi . . . vel . . . ipsemet concursus actualis Dei . . . ut vocatio sit sufficiens necesse est ut includat omnem adjuvantem gratiam quae per modum principii necessaria est ad illum actum (*Ibid.*, n. 41). Si vero de concursu gratiae sermo sit . . . non potest hoc modo includi in vocatione sufficiente quam habet is qui non operatur: necessarium vero est ut hic concursus cum ipsa vocatione sufficiente ita offeratur . . . ut sit in hominis potestate illum habere si voluerit (*Ibid.*, n. 42).

[261] . . . ultra vocationem sufficientem . . . nihil esse simpliciter necessarium ad actualiter operandum praeter actualem gratiae concursum quo Deus . . . influit in actum ipsum . . . nobis constat post vocationem expectare Deum ut homo aperiat et consentiat; supponitur ergo . . . hominem esse jam constitutum in actu primo sufficientem ad consensum . . . et solum indigere concursu proportionato (*Ibid.*,

actually operates consent in a man does not necessarily require (besides sufficient exciting and assisting grace) anything else except that aid of grace which consists in actual proportionate concursus. In other words, over and above sufficient grace, efficacious aid does not necessarily add anything except concursus and the operation itself, though, from God's bounty, it can include more copious exciting helps.[262]

6) Though efficacious grace, physically speaking, does not necessarily place anything in man over and above sufficient grace, yet on God's part it does add a special benefit and a certain moral ratio which consists in this that God from His special and efficacious proposition offers this call to man at that time and in that mode which He knows is accommodated to man so that he shall consent, though he is able not to consent. The fundament of this moral congruity is God's wisdom and knowledge. He knows beforehand what each of us should do under any set of circumstances. Any efficacy which is more than moral would make grace an affecting grace (*gratia efficiens*) rather than efficacious (*efficax*). The certitude and infallibility of this moral efficacy is from God's science.[263]

Last of all, Suarez shows the conciliation of this efficacious grace with men's freedom. Since there is no doubt that the explanation given safeguards liberty it will suffice to show that it also safeguards the necessity and efficacious working of divine grace.

This opinion attributes the beginning of faith and salvation

n. 43). Si aliquid aliud esset necessarium illud deberet esse praevium ad actum. . . . Unde fit ut homo illa re carens, . . . adhuc sit impotens, et consequenter nondum habeat auxilium simpliciter sufficiens (*Ibid.*, n. 44).

[262] . . . concludimus auxilium efficax ut actu operetur consensum liberum . . . ultra sufficiens excitans et adjuvans et actualem ejus cooperationem cum voluntate nihil necessario requirere . . . praeter illud auxilium gratiae quod in actuali concursu proportionato consistit (*Ibid.*, n. 46).

[263] Quamvis gratia efficax physice et re ipsa nihil ex necessitate ponat in homine ultra sufficientem tamen ex parte Dei auxilium efficax . . . addere speciale beneficium . . . et motionem . . . quae in hoc consistit quod Deus ei (homini) praebet illam vocationem et in illo tempore et modo prout novit accomodatam ut cum illa homo . . . cum effectu consentiat. . . . Constituenda igitur est in illa congruitate morali quam Deus infinita sua sapientia praenovit et benigna misericordia (*Ibid.*, n. 48).

to grace, i. e., to a divine call which is the work of God alone, not due to nature in any way and given to men without any merit of theirs.[264] Besides the call there is required an assisting or cooperating grace by reason of which man's free consent is principally from grace, not only as operating, but also as cooperating grace. To cooperating grace man's free consent must be added, for it is in man's power to impede the effect of grace or to bring about that effect. The will of itself alone can do the impeding since that consists only in defect, but to bring about the effect it needs grace. Because of this, if the will resists grace it deserves punishment; if it cooperates, it deserves praise and glory.[265] God is said to give not only the power of operating but also the will, by reason of the efficacious call. He is said to operate in us in this sense, that we will because, in the order of moral cause, He alone draws us by preventing (*pralienientis*) and inducing us, though in giving consent man has integral freedom. Thus though God alone operates this in us that we will God alone does not operate the willing but He, with us, operates it (*ipsum velle*). He is a principal, but not the total, cause. By reason of His more principal influxus He is said to bring about the willing and the doing (*dicitur operari velle et perficere*).[266]

This explanation enables one clearly to understand in what the high and profound mystery of divine election consists, according to Suarez. God gives a fitting, a congruous call to whom He will; at times He gives to one a call which shall not be congruous to him, and denies the one which would be congruous, as Christ's famous words about Tyre and Sidon show. A call which would have been efficacious to Tyre and Sidon

[264] *Ibid.*, n. 53.

[265] Ultra vocationem hanc requirimus adjuvantem seu cooperantem gratiam ratione cujus ipsa conversio . . . principaliter etiam est a gratia . . . in (voluntatis nostrae) potestate est impedire effectum gratiae, et illum efficere; sed illud prius per se solo potest praestare, quia in defectu tantum consistit (*Ibid.*, nn. 54-55).

[266] Deus dicitur dare . . . etiam voluntatem . . . quia nimirum in eo genere causae moralis, praevenientis suadentis et inducentis solus Deus est qui docet interius et trahit hominem . . . licet Deus solus operetur ut velimus, non tamen Deus solus operatur ipsum velle sed nobiscum illud operatur et est principalis non tamen totalis causa ejus (*Ibid.*, n. 56).

was denied them and given to the Jews to whom it was not efficacious.[267] Though the efficiency of the grace as to its effect (man's consent) does not exist without man, yet the very distribution of the call (i. e., that an accommodated call is given to one and not to another) is from God's will alone. So to the question, " Can it be that with equal divine assistance one man is converted and another is not? " The answer is clear. If we are speaking of prevenient aids which are principles of free supernatural consent, the answer is yes, for one man can resist aid which is even greater than that which touches the other who is converted. Yet he who actually is converted exceeds in the actual concursus and influx of grace.[268]

It can be objected that merit seems to precede the distribution for the vocation is efficacious in one man because it is foreseen that it will operate in him; it is not efficacious in another because it will not operate in him. But it will not operate in the first man unless he freely consents; it will not operate in the second because he will oppose it. In this, then, is some merit or some ratio on the part of the free will. The objection is confirmed by this that unless this is maintained then it is not in our power to have a congruous and efficacious call; a difficulty which Suarez advanced, himself, against the Thomistic position.[269]

Suarez answers that God elects one whom He foresees will consent not because he will consent (which would imply merit, and would therefore be repugnant to grace) but in order that he consent (which implies an end intrinsically included in the grace). The very purpose of God's preparing help for His elect is efficaciously to induce them to certain works. There is nothing which merits reward until God calls a man to consent; there is no reason for such a call on man's part. The conclusion: " It is not in man's power to have an efficacious call,"

[267] *Mt.* xi.

[268] . . . interdum dat uni vocationem quae illi congrua futura non est negat autem illi cui futura esset accomodata, si ei data fuisset; sicut Christus de Tyro et Sidone dixit . . . ipsa distributio vocationis, quod huic detur accomodata potius quam illi solius est voluntatis divinae (*Opus. Tertium*, n. 57).

[269] *Ibid.*, nn. 62-63.

does not follow. Man can operate with the call he has; if he does, it will be efficacious in him. Since, absolutely speaking, the will by divine grace can bring about that no call be invalid and without effect, even the help which, in fact, is inefficacious is still sufficient.[270]

* * *

So much then for the doctrine of Suarez about human freedom and its movement under God. Even from a cursory reading of that doctrine one is aware of vast differences between it and the Thomistic account of the same reality, and aware, most of all, of very great differences between Suarez' teaching about God's part in a free human act and the Thomists' teaching on the same point. One suspects that what is involved here is different notions about the very nature of the will as a potency. Thomists say that man's will must be pre-moved and pre-determined by God; Suarez says that no such premotion or predetermination is necessary. How then did Suarez conceive this potency which is the will, and how did he conceive its relation to its own act? To know that, we must know in the first place what Suarez though of potency and act in general, just as to know what St. Thomas meant by his teaching on temperance we must know what he taught about virtues and habits in general. Really to penetrate what Suarez understands by this free faculty and its act we must know what he understood by faculties, or potencies, and their acts in general.

It is impossible to find in one place in Suarez a complete and adequate exposition of his teaching about potency and act, but we can find a full exposition of his notions of potency and act in several diverse orders, and of course, many indications of those notions throughout his works. We therefore shall not arbitrarily reduce all of Suarez' teaching to a few propositions

[270] Non sequitur Deum elegisse eum quem praevidit consensurum, si eum sic vocaret, quia consensurus erat, sed ut consentiret . . . illud prius dicit habitudinem et rationem causae meritoriae quae gratiae repugnat, posterius vero dicit solum habitudinem finis quae in ipsa gratia intrinsece includitur nec vero hinc fit non esse in potestate hominis vocationem efficacem, quia in potestate ejus est facere et operari cum ea vocatione quam habet quod si faciat et velit, illa erit in eo efficax (*Ibid.*, nn. 64-65).

expressed in our own terms but rather shall expose Suarez' teaching in each of the major fields in which the doctrine of potency and act is fundamental. Only then, after we have really seen Suarez' own teaching, shall we look for a proper way of expressing any basic unity of concept that may be found in it, and that may throw light on his more particular teaching on human freedom and its acts. We shall, so to say, let Suarez speak for himself and shall simply indicate his teaching in this order.

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(To be continued)

BOOK REVIEWS

Apologia Pro Vita Sua. By JOHN HENRY CARDINAL NEWMAN, edited by Charles Frederick Harrold. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1947. Pp. 421, with index. $3.50.

A Grammar of Assent. By JOHN HENRY CARDINAL NEWMAN, edited with a preface and introduction by Charles Frederick Harrold. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1947. Pp. 416, with index. $3.50.

The Idea of a University. By JOHN HENRY CARDINAL NEWMAN, edited with a preface and introduction by Charles Frederick Harrold. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1947. Pp. 451, with index. $3.50.

I

The works of John Henry Cardinal Newman were published during his lifetime, and since that time have never been out of print. The 1940-41 bombings of London and the resultant fire in Paternoster Row, however, destroyed the entire existing stock. Longmans Company has projected a new edition, and entrusted it to Dr. Charles Frederick Harrold, Professor of English at the Ohio State University. Professor Harrold is a well known Newman scholar who has published an expository and critical study of the mind, thought and art of Newman. His name appears under Newman's quite frequently in the current bibliographies of *Modern Philology* and the *Publications of the Modern Language Association.* The function of an editor is the preparation of the most reliable text with such additions and changes as render it most useful to the modern reader. In this capacity Dr. Harrold has been an eminent success with only one or two minor exceptions.

In this edition of the *Idea of a University,* the editor has done the Newman public a great service in the publication of Discourse V, "General Knowledge Viewed as one Philosophy," which Newman himself, once released from the Irish University project, omitted from subsequent editions of the *Idea.* In view of the difficulty of synthesizing Newman's educational thought, this discourse, marking a stage in the evolution of that thought, may be an aid towards a more definitive evaluation than has so far been had.

"To make a place for the Discourse," the editor explains, "two chapters of 'University Subjects' have been omitted from this edition. They are 'Elementary Studies, 1854-56' and 'University Preaching, 1855.' Their lack of relevancy for our time, at least from a comparative standpoint, would seem to justify their omission." This is of a piece with the editorship of other English scholars of Anglo-Saxon texts who omit dogmatic and

homiletic passages on the grounds that their interest is null for the modern reader. The lecture on university preaching is not only a gem of advice but is the theory behind the sermons of a great preacher. The discourse on elementary studies in its fourth part includes a discussion of exactly what theological studies Newman as Rector would put in the curriculum of his University, certainly a salient point in a book which has for one of its main topics the relation of theology to University teaching.

But these are small matters. Besides the text and the preface concerning the text, Dr. Harrold has exceeded his editorship by writing a formal introduction for each volume. Now an Introduction for a definitive edition should be written by a competent scholar with some sympathy for his subject and with all the qualifications necessary for an evaluation of his subject. Professor Harrold manifests sympathy, and of his scholarship there can be no cavil. But what competency does a Professor of English bring to an evaluation of the thought of Newman? Although Newman's prose doubtlessly has a claim to a place in English literature, he himself would hardly have considered himself primarily a literary artist. Dr. Harrold himself once wrote that any consideration of Newman as a literary artist must be preceeded by an expository study of his thought. The genius of Newman is many faceted, but the light which pours into the spectrum of his genius to be diffused in many colors is the white light of theology. Not a professional theologian, Newman centered his whole literary labor on questions of theology. The best evaluation of his thought then, since it is religious thought, would come from a theologian. But Dr. Harrold is a Professor of Literature, and indeed not a Catholic, but, as he says in another place: " to use a word Newman disliked, an ' Episcopalian.' " Harrold realized his own inadequacy in this regard, and feared that his " objective " approach might be construed as secret sympathy or antipathy, or—worst of all—indifference. The disadvantages of such an " objective " approach are evident in these Introductions on several points on which the hypothetical theologian with a sympathy for Newman and a scholarship equal to Dr. Harrold's might have fared better.

The *Apologia* for instance is Newman's testimony to the faith that was within him. It is almost inevitable that those who do not share that faith should question the value of the testimony. Of course Newman is not called a liar; Kingsley's mistake is not repeated. But Frank Leslie Cross has charged that Newman's trend to Catholicism is falsely stated. Therefore Dr. Harrold discusses Newman's truthfulness and his success at self-analysis in which discussion he is obviously influenced by Houghton's *Art of Newman's Apologia*. Cross's words are " exaggerative." Of course the very word apologia suggests " distortion," and the picture, while substantially true, is " shaded a little." Newman has a " sinuous " mind which is more concerned with " *how* he felt at a particular time than *why* he so felt

or thought." "Emotional factors as much as intellectual ones" brought about the conversion of "a most subtle and paradoxical character." The main emotional factor is supposed to be the rejection of Tract XC by the Anglicans. although it does not seem to have occurred to such critics that such a rejection showed Newman intellectually that Anglicanism was not what he had thought it to be. These remarks (pp. xix-xxi) are similar to the Anglican rebuttal that Newman's literary powers declined after his conversion, or the vividly painted contrast between the powerful preacher of Littlemore and the broken down old man of Birmingham. They do not obscure the luminousness of Newman's testimony, but, proceeding as they do from a principle Newman fought against: "that a sufficient account is given of an opinion, and a sufficient ground for making light of it, as soon as it is historically referred to some human origin," it is regrettable that such remarks found their way into an edition of the *Apologia*.

The Introduction to the *Grammar of Assent*, on the other hand, is not unfavorable at all, but only inconclusive. The Introduction, Dr. Harrold decides, is "not the place to enter fully into Newman's complex and subtle argument" (p. xviii). He suggests that this may be the way of the scholar or special student, but recommends to the general reader just skimming through the various chapters "catching a general view of his argument, but lingering over certain passages, which, by their imaginative and literary quality, lift the book above the level of the usual treatise of its kind" (p. xix).

It is true that the *Grammar* is a difficult book, even for the theologian, because of the unusual sense Newman puts on his words. Still, a theologian could have dealt more adequately with the reality underlying the words, that is, the motives of credibility which have involved Theology, Psychology, Ethics and Criteriology. Dr. Harrold could have written a more definitive introduction had he relied more heavily on Father Juergen's *Newman on the Psychology of Faith in the Individual* which he mentions in the Bibliography. The omission of Father Benard's *Introduction to Newman's Theology* in the same bibliography is a serious one, not only because Father Benard's book is a helpful aid in understanding Newman's argument in the *Grammar*, but because it is a good refutation of the imputation of Modernism.

Last of all, Dr. Harrold finds that the *Idea of a University* "betrays a temporal provincialism" (p. xx) for Newman will not admit research, except on a very limited scale, into his ideal university. "He has no premonition," says the Professor from Ohio State, "of what the world's great universities are to become, centers not only of the humanities but also of the vast scientific learning and investigation ministering to human enlightenment and welfare" (p. xx). That Newman might have modified his views is of course possible; that he would have changed them is highly

doubtful. Newman is hardly the man to bow before the *fait accompli*, no matter how formidable. Whatever may be said for Dr. Harrold's argument that " an instructor's research may enrich and vitalize his role as a teacher " (*ibid*), the *Idea* maintains the contrary, and the introduction to a definitive edition is hardly the place to argue with the work itself.

It may seem a concentration on negation to point out incidental flaws in the great work Dr. Harrold has done. It may seem all the more ungracious since, on July 10th of this year, after bringing out three volumes of the *Essays and Sketches*, the editor died. Neverthless, while the reviewer rejoices that the name of this great Newman Scholar will always be associated with this truly monumental edition, he believed that a critical appreciation involved not lavish praise, which the edition does deserve, but the separation of a little chaff from a great harvest of wheat.

II

The *Apologia pro Vita Sua* without doubt is the best introduction to the life and work of the great English Cardinal. The very title is singularly appropriate for his whole career was in the highest sense of that abused word, apologetic. Well might Cardinal Manning preach the funeral panegyric: " We have lost our greatest witness to the Faith." In its own day the *Apologia* was a witness to the veracity of Newman, a veracity the bigoted Kingsley had called into question in a larger attack on the Catholic priesthood. Newman challenged the statement, and in the controversy that ensued it became evident that Kingsley, as an exponent of muscular Christianity, was no match for the intellectual refinement of his opponent, a refinement which Kingsley regarded as guile and effeminacy. Kingsley's bludgeon was totally ineffective against the rapier satire of Newman. That phase of the controversy long over and relegated to an appendix, its only importance now is that it was the occasion for the history of Newman's religious opinions. The *Apologia* has long been read as a history of a conversion from Anglicanism; a more profound view might see in it a record of a great apologete's lifelong struggle with an enemy of Dogmatic Christianity, namely, Liberalism.

Today Liberalism has become a shibboleth; at the very most it has but a relative meaning. Newman was never a Conservative in the sense in which he defined a Conservative: " a man who upholds government and society and the existing state of things,—not because it exists,—not because it is good and desirable, because it is established, because it is a benefit to the population, because it is full of promise for the future,—but rather because he himself is well off in consequence of it, and because to take care of number one is his main political principle " (*Essays and Sketches*, II, p. 340). Newman was ever a Liberal in the sense of progressivism. He always admired Père Lacordaire who had said: " I die a repentant Catholic but an unrepentant Liberal."

The Liberalism that Newman opposed was of quite a different nature. Religion for him was revealed, objective and dogmatic; Liberalism was fundamentally anti-dogmatism and a subjective religion. "Now by Liberalism I mean false liberty of thought, or the exercise of thought upon matters, in which, from the constitution of the human mind, thought cannot be brought to any successful issue, and therefore is out of place. Among such are first principles of whatever kind; and of these the most sacred and momentous are especially to be reckoned the truths of Revelation. Liberalism then is the mistake of subjecting to human judgment those revealed doctrines which are in their nature beyond and independent of it, and of claiming on intrinsic grounds the truth and value of propositions which rest for their reception simply on the external authority of the Divine Word" (*Apologia*, p. 261). Liberalism is more a spirit than a coherent philosophy; today it is called Secularism which is the reliance on reason, science, education, the state, or any agent but the supernatural to save man from ignorance and chaos. In Newman's day, Liberalism was in a period of transition from an earlier Deism to the present Modernism which holds that religion should be reformed in the light of modern thought. The Philosophy of Locke, the Economics of John Stuart Mill, the Higher Criticism of the German theological schools, the Scientism of the British Associationists—all were motivated by the Liberal spirit that made Swinburne cry out: "Glory to man in the highest for man is the measure of things." In the face of such a spirit, Newman feared that his wrestling was not with flesh and blood. "Are you aware that the more serious thinkers among us are used, as far as they dare form an opinion, to regard the spirit of Liberalism as the characteristic of the destined Antichrist? . . . Antichrist is described as the ἄνομος, as exalting himself above the yoke of religion and law. The spirit of lawlessness came in with the Reformation, and Liberalism is its offspring" (*Apologia*, p. 173).

Newman's own early life was not without Liberal influence. He was brought up in Evangelicism, which, though its fundamentalist character may seem to us poles apart from Liberalism, Newman thought "played into the hands of the Liberals" by its basic assumption of a subjective religion. Although the future champion of orthodoxy at an early age "received impressions of dogma, which, through God's mercy, have never been effaced or obscured," he likewise read Paine's *Tracts against the Old Testament*, Hume's *Essay on Miracles* and some verses of Voltaire in denial of the immortality of the soul. At Oxford he was active in the Latitudinarian party as represented by Whately and his Noetics. For five years he worked with these "liberal Christians" in their efforts to banish the mysterious from religion. At last he came to fear that he was preferring intellectual to moral excellence. "In proportion as I moved out of the shadow of that Liberalism which had hung over my course, my early devotion towards the Fathers returned" (p. 23).

The change in Newman's course amazed his former friends. Whately and Blanco White viewed his "bigotry" with alarm. Newman's brother Francis remonstrated. His course was directly opposite, ending in a rejection of all supernatural religion and retaining only a vague belief in a shadowy Divinity. The Scotch Utilitarian school motivated an attack on Newman's own clerical, humanistic Oriel. The times were against Newman; Mrs. Browning sniffed that the Tracts for the Times, which began at this period, should be called the Tracts against the Times. But the Oxford movement went doggedly on, and Newman formulated his theory of the *Via Media*, still, Christopher Dawson maintains, the best intellectual justification for Anglicanism.

The *Via Media* however was but a paper theory, and it soon began to crumble under the attacks of the church it had set out to defend. Tract XC was rejected; the Thirty Nine Articles would not bear an interpretation that was not hostile to Catholicism. There was the affair of the Jersusalem Bishopric; Anglican prelates in effect recognized Lutheran orders. The *Via Media* had been seen as a ground between Rationalism and Catholicism; now there was the progressive and painful realization that there could be no such ground. If Anglicans were part of the Church Universal, their severance could not be justified "without using arguments prejudicial to those great doctrines concerning Our Lord which are the very foundation of the Christian religion" (p. 135). England then was wrong, but how could Rome be right?

Newman felt that his Liberal enemies were rushing him over the brink of a terrible precipice. "The object of the Movement was to withstand the Liberalism of the day" (p. 95). Now "the most oppressive thought . . . was the clear anticipation . . . that it would issue in the triumph of Liberalism. Against the anti-dogmatic principle I had thrown my whole mind. . . . The men who had driven me from Oxford were distinctly the Liberals; it was they who had opened the attack on Tract 90, and it was they who would gain a second benefit, if I went on to abandon the Anglican Church" (p. 184). But it could not be helped. He had already come "to the conclusion that there was no medium, in true philosophy, between Atheism and Catholicity, and that a perfectly consistent mind . . . must embrace either the one or the other" (p. 179). Liberalism was but the halfway house on one side, as Anglicanism was on the other (p. 184). But one perfectly consistent and of good will cannot live in a halfway house. In 1845, as Renan, who was a prophet of Liberalism, was leaving the Church, Newman, the arch-foe of Liberalism, was making his profession of faith at the feet of Father Dominic.

In the light of such a view of Newman, it is strange that he of all people should have been taken as a prophet of Modernism or any other weakening of the objective Christian tradition which was his doctrine and

life. For one thing, the Modernists were using his name as a screen for their doctrines. An extant letter of Pius X to an Irish Bishop however absolves Newman from any implication in the condemnations of Modernism. If Newman has suffered much from those who unjustly used his name, and from over hasty critics, he likewise suffers from undiscerning admirers of the *Credo in Newmannum* school. The *Apologia* pleads for understanding. The misinterpretations, now on different grounds, continue. A careful reading against the proper background should show that Newman, despite the subjective note in his literary style, his uncongeniality to Metaphysics, and his willingness to conduct an argument on the enemy's ground, is ever in the vanguard of the forces of transcendency against vital immanence.

III

The *Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent* is Newman's apologetic against a particular form of Liberalism, the Rationalism of John Locke. Locke had enuntiated the principle of certitude that " doctrines are only so far to be considered as they are logically demonstrated." The natural corollary was: " It is dishonest in a man to make an act of faith in what he has not had brought home to him by actual proof." Newman saw the danger in the application of these principles to the faith of the average Catholic, who would not have a scientific demonstration of his motives of credibility.

The *Grammar of Assent* is his rejoinder. A forbidding book to many, the fundamental principle for its understanding is Newman's enigmatic remark that " it is what it is and not what it is not." It is not a treatise on the theological genesis of faith. It is not an attempt to discredit the traditional, scientific apologetic of the schools. It is not an easy book for the believer himself, but a book to show the rationalist philosopher that the average believer can have a faith that is rational. It is an argument formulated by Newman himself that the harmony between the religion of conscience (or Natural Religion) and the religion of revelation constitutes a sufficient accumulation of probabilities to justify an assent to the credibility of revelation.

Newman chooses a long and somewhat involved approach to his subject. In the first part of the book, he discusses the various modes of apprehending and assenting to propositions, making his famous distinction between the notional and real assents, and finally applying the abstract discussion to belief in the one God, the Trinity and dogmatic Theology. In the second part, he discusses unconditional assent (i. e. for him, an assent which does not depend, and is not conditioned by previous syllogistic reasoning), certitude, the nature of inference, the famous illative sense, and finally the application to religion. All this is more like the

Newman who composed a logic with Whately than the familiar rhetorician who shines through in the concluding chapters of each part.

The *Grammar* is not easy to grasp. The theological censors had an unhappy time of it, Father Harper published an attack from the scholastic point of view, and Father Perrone threw up his hands in horror: "*Newman miscet et confudet omnia.*" But Newman insisted that the best approach to the problem was the one that was most personal, thus giving ground to the German sneer: Newman *subjectificaät.*

The language provides a great deal of the hazard. Some have maintained that English is not adaptable to philosophical purposes. Alfred had difficulty with the abstract thought of Boethius in the very beginning, and some have thought that the progressive refinement of the language made it more poetic but even less scientific. Whatever the case may be, English is a living language. Newman's book was written in archaic English when it appeared, for he wrote in the language of the problems he was facing, the language of Lockean philosophy, the language of the common rooms of the Oxford of thirty years before. Newman therefore is cut off from the precise terminology of the *philosophia perennis* by the insularity of British thought, and from us by changes in a living language. But surely this difficulty would vanish were we to accept Newman's terms in the sense he intended. That is precisely where the difficulty lies. Newman most frequently does not define but describes with a richness that is bewildering. For instance, it is hard to see whether the distinction between notional and real assent is that between the speculative and practical, or the universal and particular.

It is with some trepidation then that one ventures to criticize work he is not sure he has fully grasped. Scientific demonstration of the credibility of revelation Newman does not deny, but simply passes by. He would argue from conscience, which he accepts in the sense of Aristotle's φρονήσις. The illative sense is the heart of the argument. When the mind is confronted with the convergence of a sufficient number of probabilities (for Newman facts not capable of demonstration) the illative sense is able to conclude. It is the process of induction which Newman saw was not strictly a demonstration.

In his whole approach, Newman seems impatient with the metaphysical sphere, and almost Kant-like is eager to be on more familiar ethical grounds. He is motivated by a spirit not unlike that which makes St. Thomas say in the introduction to the Secunda-Secundae of the *Summa*: "... there is little use in speaking about moral matters in general, since actions are about particular things." But Newman allowed his impatience to carry him too far. Of course, it was really impatience with the excessive rationalism of Locke. And his own English character was notoriously not given to speculation, as he once confessed to his Irish students.

But that impatience made him reduce universals to mere generalities and bypass metaphysical argument with what amounts to vituperation. Thomists might agree that *universalia non movent*, but they would not imperil all speculation by denying universals. Newman's distrust of paper logic led him to commit the most arrant sophisms about reasoning and laughing animals instead of rational, risible animals.

But these things are incidental to the main argument, which can be seen in all clarity in the summation which is the old Newman. At the beginning of his work Newman put the words of St. Ambrose: "*Non in dialectica complacuit Deo salvum facere populum suum.* It was probably a warning against the Liberalism which he was writing to confute, but also an act of humility for his own dialectic. Quite fittingly one might write below the words of St. Ambrose the words of St. Paul: "It has pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe."

IV

The *Idea of a University* has a similar place in Newman's struggle with the Liberal spirit. These lectures were occasioned by the foundation of a Catholic University of Ireland, of which Newman was the first Rector. The scheme to counteract an educational system invincibly secular by a university that was both theological and humane eventually failed, but not before Newman had put in seven of the best years of his life in the work, and had delivered a series of lectures on the nature and extent of university education and related topics. These discourses, for the most part published in this volume, constitute a genuine classic. The language is unsurpassed; the balance and harmony of the English prose can be compared only to a magnificent symphony.

They can best be seen in relation to the *milieu* against which they were written. In general, these lectures form part of Newman's strategy against what he called in these very lectures a form of infidelity of the day. In his own days at Oxford, Newman had seen an educational reform launched by his own Oriel bitterly opposed by the Scotch utilitarian school, and the Liberals whose gospel was Locke's *Some Thoughts Concerning Education.* Newman now reiterated his insistence on the non-utilitarian character of liberal education. Scientism too was in the ascendant. The newly founded University of London had excluded theology from the curriculum; several government commissions were busy preparing clerical, humanistic Oxford for the days when the philosophy of John Stuart Mill would reign. The Liberal policy, conscious or unconscious, was not to fight theology, but to ignore it. By concentration on research in the positive sciences, the interest and imagination of students would be so captivated that theology would soon be forgotten. Newman countered that a university was a place for teaching; research was to be left to the Academies, Societies and

similar foundations. He maintained vigorously that a university by its very name professes to teach universal knowledge; therefore, the exclusion of the science of theology would destroy the universality of the university.

Modern interest in the *Idea* is not that of curiosity in a literary antique, but that of inquiry from a master in the philosophy of education. In this respect, the first nine (or ten, counting Discourse V which Newman omitted from later editions, but which Dr. Harrold gives in appendix) discourses that make up the first section are of greater interest than the lectures of the second section on university subjects. The lectures on University Subjects are for the most part separate and each a perfect unit. The lectures on University Teaching are supposed to constitute one perfect argument. The main doctrines as outlined in the previous paragraph are clear enough, but many have found the synthesis of the nine (or ten) lectures difficult in view of seeming contradictions, and withal an uneasy and hesitant manner that almost amounts to diffidence.

The main argument is that a university is a place for teaching universal knowledge. The first four (or five) discourses are concerned with the " universal," that is, the integrity of the university. For that integrity, theology is necessary. But what Theology? The fact has been grasped; the nature of the fact eludes many. Newman, who is arguing on human grounds, and, he says, on grounds common with Protestants and other monotheists, seems to be holding for a mere Natural Theology or Theodicy. His definition and description of Theology points to that. Yet, the conclusion goes beyond that. If the Incarnation be a fact, he says in effect, it is a part of knowledge, has an influence on other knowledge, and must be considered in any complete education. Therefore, the Theology for which Newman is holding is not simply Theodicy but " that system of revealed facts and principles which constitute the Catholic faith."

In another lecture (" Elementary Studies " not printed in this edition) Newman is more particular on the theology to be taught in his ideal university. He respectfully opposes those who would teach Theology proper, or even replace the Classics with Scripture and the Fathers, and prefers to follow the English tradition. In this he is motivated by the object of University education as he sees it, the lay gentleman. This question will be discussed shortly. Theology proper, he thinks, would be taught superficially by lay professors, be received superficially by young minds, and might even be the occasion for intellectual pride. He urges instead a broad knowledge of doctrinal subjects, and that part of Scripture and Church History which is considered sufficient in the general culture of a layman. The only theological works he would admit are those like Bellarmine's *Controversies*, Suarez' *On Laws*, and Cano's treatise on the *Loci Theologici*.

The relation of Theology to the rest of the curriculum brings up another

interesting question. In both Discourse III and IV, Newman seems to hold only that the other sciences have a negative subordination to Theology. In this as in other matters, he held that his ideal university was Louvain, though Oxford is much more in evidence. In the hitherto omitted discourse on "(Universal) Knowledge viewed as one Philosophy" Newman speculates on the possibility of Theology being in a more vital sense the unifying wisdom. In a footnote (p. 399) he supposes it plausible that Theology is the form of the other subjects, i.e. the external form as charity is of *fides formata*. This he rejects on the grounds that theology then would not be one subject among the others. But perhaps this objection could be met by a distinction not precise but descriptive. Theology is both a science and a wisdom. As a science, it might be with the others and be *in fieri* towards the wisdom which would be *in facto esse*. Such a tentative proposal might more nearly approximate the ideal of Pius XI who insisted that "Religion . . . be in very truth the foundation and crown of youth's entire training" (*Divini Illius Magistri*).

It is this same encyclical of Pius XI that causes difficulty with the next five lectures on the essence of a university. These lectures maintain that the object of the University is intellectual, not moral. Knowledge is to be its own end in such wise that the product of university education is "not the Christian, not the Catholic, but the gentleman." Newman concludes that his mission in the University was that of St. Philip Neri whom he sees, in a brilliant peroration, as preferring "to yield to the stream, and direct the current, which he would not stop, of science, literature, art, and fashion, and to sweeten and sanctify what God had made very good and man had spoilt" (p. 208). Yet it is the same St. Philip the Holy Father quotes against such a philosophy of severance. The encyclical maintains that "the proper and immediate end of Christian education is to cooperate with divine grace in forming the true and perfect Christian. . . . Hence the true Christian, product of Christian education, is the supernatural man who thinks, judges and acts constantly and consistently in accordance with right reason illumined by the supernatural light of the example and teaching of Christ." These views, however, may not be so opposed as they appear; in fact, they may well be complementary, though it would be difficult to reconcile them in every particular. Newman is reasoning from different principles; he reaches a conclusion not too far from the Holy Father's.

Knowledge as Newman said, is of course its own end. Learning is the good of the intellect, as health is the good of the body. But these ends are only intermediate. Knowledge is an end in itself, but not man's end. From the aspect of the intellect, the good which is knowledge is a *bonum honestum*; from the higher aspect of the whole man it is a *bonum utile*. The object of education, as Newman himself admits, in the added connota-

tions he gives both "education" and "wisdom," is not simply the intellect, but the body, soul, intellect and will which make up the whole man. Newman was not wrong in what he affirmed; if anything he was wrong only in what he did not affirm. *Abstrahentium non est mendacium.* If the reader does not think Newman returned clearly enough to the totality from which he abstracted, he might read the *Tamworth Reading Room* articles for Newman's views on the other side of the paradox. Newman was the last man in the world to be an intellectualist; at Oxford he had been in trouble with Provost Hawkins because the young Newman maintained that the work of the tutor was not only intellectual, but "quasi-pastoral." In the spade work of viewing the university as a bare idea before seeing it, like the Pope, as an instrument of the Church, Newman has done valiantly. That his work should be passed over so lightly in the current discussions on the theology and philosophy of education is a grave misfortune. One may not agree with a theory of the *Idea*; to have passed it over is to push back the starting place of the investigation, and to lose much needed time.

V

Newman was not a Thomist. The stock remark that he was an eclectic, while in the main correct, hardly puts the matter in the proper perspective. Not a "professional" theologian, he more than once candidly admitted his limitations in that respect. His entire training had been Anglican; in many ways his mind was already formed when he entered the Church. He spent but one year at the Propaganda in Rome before Ordination. And those were the days before Leo XIII when the sacred sciences were hardly in a flourishing condition. Newman wrote from Rome to his friend J. D. Dalgairns, who had favored a Dominican apostolate for the group of Oxford converts: "Aristotle is no favour here . . . nor St. Thomas. . . . St. Thomas is a great saint . . . people . . . reverence him, but put him aside." Philosophy, Newman said from the reports he received, was "odds and ends, whatever seemed best—like St Clement's *Stromata*. They have no philosophy. *Facts* are the great things, and nothing else. Exegesis, but not doctrine" (Ward's *Life*, I, 166 f.).

Newman called Aristotle his master (*Grammar*, p. 327) and pays high tribute to the Stagirite: "While the world lasts, will Aristotle's doctrine on these matters last, for he is the oracle of nature and of truth. While we are men, we cannot help, to a great extent, being Aristotelians, for the great Master does but analyze the thoughts, feelings, views, and opinions of human kind. He has told us the meaning of our own words and ideas, before we were born. In many subject-matters, to think correctly, is to think like Aristotle; and we are his disciples whether we will or no, though we may not know it" (*Idea*, p. 97). But the Aristotle he knew was the

Aristotle of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Rhetoric* and not of the *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. In fact, he once wrote a Platonic interpretation of the *Poetics* with no reference to the catharsis, and maintained in the face of the *Organon* that Logic was not an instrumental art.

Newman always reverenced St. Thomas and spoke of him with genuine admiration. He had in his library the *Summa Contra Gentes*, but in the half dozen times or so he cites St. Thomas, he may very likely be using current scholastic manuals.

It would be impossible to cite his divergences from the Common Doctor. Over and above the matters already mentioned, there are several small things in the appendices of the volumes under review. In Note III of the *Grammar* after a careful consideration of what had been written by St. Thomas and others on the punishment of the damned having no termination, he ventures the opinion that " a *refrigerium* was conceivable, which was not strictly a cessation of punishment though it acted as such: I mean the temporary absence in the lost soul of the consciousness of its continuity or duration." Then almost at the end of his remarks, he notes: " In what I have been saying, I have considered eternity as infinite time, which is the received assumption (p. 387). It may be the received assumption, but it is not correct, nor is it received in theology which was precisely where the author was arguing until he vitiated the discussion by the use of a word in a sense other than theological. Note G of the *Apologia* makes a rather good analysis of the problems concerning lying and equivocation, but closes with this: " . . . as to playing upon words, or equivocation, I suppose it is from the English habit, but . . . for myself I can fancy myself thinking it was allowable in extreme cases for me to lie, but never to equivocate " (p. 323). Which gives a rather disappointing picture of one who, despite careful study, remains prejudiced by an earlier impression rather than by solid reasoning.

But these minutiae are lost in the large picture of a great Catholic thinker with his roots deep in antiquity, yet ever progressive. To mention but one thing, his *Development of Dogma*, a pioneer work in an important matter, has provided hints for the more thorough studies of Father Marin-Sola and other theologians. Perhaps it is no coincidence that this great progressive Traditionalist was created Cardinal by the same Leo XIII who gave St. Thomas back to the schools. As a matter of fact, the new Cardinal addressed a warm letter of congratulation to the Pontiff on the publication of the *Aeterni Patris*. In 1880 one of the Oratorians jokingly asked the Cardinal what he should do were he elected Pope. His Eminence responded seriously that he would as his first act organize commissions on Biblical criticism and the early history of the Church. Which was what Pope Leo later did, a step that foreshadowed the work of Père Lagrange.

Newman's sympathy for Catholic tradition with his awareness of modern problems, his subtle mind coupled with a genius for clear expression would have made him a magnificent Thomist. But it is hardly good Thomism to waste time in vain speculations on "might have been." Newman is what he is, and he is great. Writer, preacher and thinker he is pre-eminently an apologete. And presupposing truth, the ultimate criterion of any apologetic is determined by its effectiveness. Newman's apologetic has been effective in his day, and it is still effective in ours. More than one modern problem is an outgrowth of the Liberalism Newman fought. History is not disparate, but continuous and causally connected. The Atomic Age is not cut off from Victorianism by an iron curtain.

It is true that our times have their peculiar problems, and therefore have need of special apologetics. One great apologete of our day proposes an apologetic of the passions for the Freudians. Several converts have found their way through Aristotle and St. Thomas. And there is no doubt that many, led astray by a secularist philosophy, reading Newman would be led to question the validity of principles they had regarded as self evident. Should they pursue the question long enough and sincerely enough they might join that number of souls, who under God owe their faith to the work of John Henry Cardinal Newman.

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An Historical Introduction to Modern Philosophy. By HUGH MILLER. New York: Macmillan, 1947. Pp. 615, with index.

I could scarcely believe my eyes when I read the following statement from the pen of this responsible author, professor of philosophy at U.C.L.A., that Saint Thomas was a Benedictine monk, who therefore was interested in upholding authority! Not a major point, but if anybody said Aristotle was a Spartan or Descartes a Dutchman, he would be dubbed an ignoramus; we would drop his book and go to a reliable source. How long are stupid blunders about even the greatest figures of the Middle Ages to be tolerated?

Should we drop the book, or proceed? Let us be doubly fair and see what the author has to say. In fact, as it turns out, what he has to say is instructive in more ways than one. He is endeavoring to provide a synoptic view, not so much of the history of philosophy, as of philosophy itself in terms of history. This is necessary, he thinks, to grasp the historical, and hence the philosophical, significance of two tendencies—the rationalist and the empiricist—those well-known pivots around which the

history of philosophy turns. Deeply empiricist, Miller feels, nonetheless, that the empirical tradition cannot be really fruitful unless it assimilates the insights of the rationalist tradition, particularly through its representatives in ancient times. When this assimilation is accomplished, the philosopher should be able to integrate philosophy in terms of political faith and the passion for justice, and in terms of an evolutionary doctrine which does not spurn rational necessities.

Professor Miller admires the Greeks, especially for their scientific attitude and their thorough-going intellectual honesty. Because Plato and Aristotle are deeply intellectualistic, and inclined too much to "absolute verities," the empiricist cannot accept their doctrines today, but at least these thinkers are not narrowly rationalistic, like the "clear and distinct" rationalists of the Cartesian era, and we desperately need to recapture their insights. Miller, one suspects, admires Plato the most of all the Greeks, and admires him not least because of his passion for justice.

The contemporary historian, as evidenced by every book of this sort published in the past few years, including Mr. Russell's *History of Western Philosophy*, can hardly avoid devoting some space to the fifteen hundred years between the Hellenistic Schools and Rene Descartes. What proportion of space does Hugh Miller, in his turn, give to this period? He devotes eight chapters to the Greeks, in the section entitled "The Great Beginning." Twelve chapters are given over to the moderns from Descartes to Marx, while chapters nine and ten of the same section, "The Antecedents of Modern Philosophy," are devoted to "A New Heaven and a New Earth" and "The Long Middle Age." Much might be said about the author's statements concerning Jesus, Saint Paul, and the early Fathers. He is, obviously, trying hard to be fair in treating of religious matters. It is scarcely debatable, he says, that Jesus existed historically, but he evidently does not think Jesus was truly sent by God. He admires Augustine, the great psychologist, the "modern" man with his emphasis upon the mind and heart of the individual. He pays grudging tribute to Aquinas, whose architectonic anl hierarchic Summa reflects the hierarchical and authoritarian organization of the mediaeval society in which he moved. He praises the Franciscans most of all—Francis, Bonaventure, and Ockham are singled out—for these men, he holds, in their various ways, express the passion for justice, which in them is deepened by the religious impulse of love. They mark an advance in human development by returning, in a more authentic fashion than their contemporaries, who stress authority and order, like the "Benedictine" Thomas, to the spirit of liberty and love of the Founder of Christianity.

Hugh Miller acknowledges that one should study the Middle Ages more deeply and should learn the lessons it provides in such abundance, but he disagrees with those contemporary publicists who claim that we should

return to the Middle Ages and Medieval Order. If he has read them, does he really think that Chesterton, Belloc, Dawson, Maritain, and the rest advocate what would be tantamount to a literal return to the Middle Ages? Even if he does not think this, he disagrees with the principles of order upon which the mediaeval order was based, and here the divergence between our philosophies lies. In fact, Miller's opinion is that, for all of their neglected worth, the Middle Ages were too hierarchical, authoritarian and confining to the spirit.

There is little we need say of Professor Miller's discussion of the rationalistic and empirical schools of modern times. One must admire, he says, the ingenuity of the system-makers, Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, but the empiricists, he feels, are more solidly grounded in reality. We cannot accept the particular terms of Kant's critical reconciliation of Empiricism and Rationalism, but no such reconciliation can be effected without the Sage of Königsberg.

In the latter half of the book, comprising sections on " Contemporary Philosophy," and " The Future," the author finally comes to his personal synthesis of the two traditions he has been pursuing throughout their checkered history. Contemporary movements of importance are realism, pragmatism and positivism. These he treats ably and informatively. The achievement of Bertrand Russell, he thinks, in deepening the understanding of the logical function fulfilled by mathematical theory in modern science, marks the greatest advance in philosophic insight since the Greeks twenty-five hundred years ago. He recognizes the weakness of pragmatism, that " rich and many-sided movement." It is still unconsciously idealist in its preconceptions; in this country it draws much of its strength from the American traditions of liberty and the search for progress, whereas elsewhere its insufficiency is more exposed; " American pragmatism is today the moral resource of people still informed by religious faith, but unable to find religious expression in creeds and institutions which have become obsolete . . . (Pragmatism is) the child of religious faith, seeking to apply faith. The son of the preacher teaches pragmatism in the college. What will *his* son teach? " That is *the* question.

In this discussion of contemporary movements, the ubiquitous existentialism, oddly enough, is not treated or listed in the index; Thomism is mentioned briefly in the section on Saint Thomas, while Gilson's works, among others, are listed in the bibliography.

The author now proceeds to report " the significance of this history." We are challenged today to recapture the Greek spirit of science and the Greek spirit of political liberty and constitutionalism. Obfuscated even in the ancient period, these philosophic insights, chiefly of the moral and political order, were cramped by rationalistic metaphysics, which, in such men as Plotinus and Spinoza, reduce the rich diversity of the many to the

One, and by feudal ecclesiasticism, which is ultimately antithetical to the spirit of science and liberty. The empiricists freed us from rationalistic metaphysics, yet were often political absolutists. The pioneering spirits behind the rise of political freedom and religious congregationalism liberated us from absolutism, but did not have a solid philosophic foundation. All of these strands must be woven together—the rationalist's insights into science and logic, the concern of the empiricist for concrete individual things, the passion for justice and the love of " God " of the political and religious liberators. Hugh Miller would not, doubtless, say bluntly that God does not exist. After all, he might say, why should he be stigmatized as an atheist and lose the attention of people? Are not, he asks, your rigid anthropomorphic religionists the true materialists? What is " universal Being," mind or spirit of God? " Does not everything we know assure us that if there be such universal Being, its character must be that defined by the largest principles of physics, so that Reality is physical matter? " The truly religious man, Professor Miller assures us, will experience exaltation in the contemplation of all of nature, and in the recognition that the evolutionary process is not unintelligible but reveals deep logic and direction. (One cannot help asking, " To what ultimate end? ") Included in the process, which true science discovers, is the age-long struggle for freedom and justice. This is the " spirit-side " of the complex evolutionary progress. This, which Plato envisioned and fought for, is true philosophy, truer by far than any " metaphysics."

These are the views, expounded by Professor Miller in his introduction to the philosophy he regards as primarily a moral enterprise. We have considered them at some length because they are fairly representative of the intellectual journey travelled by many contemporaries reared within the empirical tradition. Such men are, in many instances, unwilling to go all the way with Dewey and adopt his instrumentalism, as devoid of metaphysics perhaps as any metaphysics could be; they have become sensible of the radical insufficiencies of empiricism; they feel they could never return to the discredited clear-and-distinct rationalism of the early modern era; they are impelled to turn to the ancient and mediaeval tradition. They are dazzled by the splendor of the ancient vision of the universe, though they are prevented from seeing its fulness of meaning by deep inveterate empirical habits of mind, and yes, by unrecognized prejudices, stemming from the rationalism they detest. They fail to do justice to the mediaeval tradition, though they acknowledge its majesty and achievements, because they do not see it from proper perspective. In somewhat eclectic fashion, finally, they construct their own personal philosophies. It is not from such men that the great philosophies most significant for our age will come, yet in their own way they are characteristic of what we call the " contemporary mind."

Of this company is Professor Miller. It would be easy, doubtless, to score him on many counts for his treatment of mediaeval philosophers, and to criticize his own personal philosophy for shallowness due to the lack of any real metaphysics. (Is his distrust of metaphysics due to the fact that he can only think of metaphysics in terms of the rationalism he rejects?) It would doubtless be easy so to criticize, but perhaps we should at the same time ask ourselves whether we are not to blame for his not having a more complete and sympathetic view of our philosophy. Why is it that Miller, like Professor Wild of Harvard, feels that Thomism (despite the work of Maritain and others), is not really interested in the contemporary problems of justice and liberty and has little really contemporary to say? Miller's philosophy, based so largely on the spirit of political liberty and the passion for justice, is insufficiently metaphysical, but have we shown the passion for justice and freedom that would lead such men to examine more dispassionately the foundations of our philosophy? Such, in the hearts of men, is the curious link between the speculative and the practical orders.

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The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus. By A. B. Wolter, O. F. M. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1946. $2.75.

This is a doctoral dissertation submitted to the School of Philosophy of the Catholic University of America.

The purpose of the dissertation is to expound Scotus' theory of transcendentality, and the function of each of the main classes of transcendentals, emphasizing particularly their theological implications. The author remarks that such a study has been neglected up to now—an inexplicable neglect, for the theory of transcendentality is indispensable in understanding Scotus' ideal of a systematic and scientific metaphysics, which the Subtle Doctor defines as "the science of the transcendentals."

Doctor Wolter has refrained from attempting any critical or comparative study, and has limited himself to the interpretation of Scotus' teaching. This limitation of field was undoubtedly legitimate and even necessary. We hope, however, that he will some day attempt to give us a critical appreciation of Scotus' theory as well as its relation with St. Thomas' teaching. The incidental remarks which he makes in this connection increase the interest of such an undertaking. He affirms that Scotus' theory can be justly critisized on several counts. This statement

will make many a reader wonder whether the points susceptible of just criticism are the basic ones, and whether consequently the whole Scotistic metaphysics is built upon sand. Regarding the relation between Scotus' and Thomas' teaching Dr. Wolter remarks over and over again that " the chasm between both is not so unbridgeable as his commonly believed," that the doctrine of the two Scholastics is, in the majority of instances, complementary rather than contradictory. This affirmation deserves to be proved and substantiated for several reasons—not the least important being to eradicate from the earth the tribe of those who call themselves either Scotists or Thomists *and deliberately* ignore the teaching of St. Thomas or Scotus respectively.

Dr. Wolter bases all his treatise on a text taken from the *Opus Oxoniense*, b. 1, d. 8, q. 3, nn. 18-19 (Vives Ed., IX, 597b-598b). This key text gives him even the plan and the main divisions of the whole work, which is divided into two parts. The first deals with the idea of transcendentality in general and its basic presuppositions, namely, the nature of a real concept and univocation; the second discusses the various classes of transcendentals, namely, being, the properties or attributes coextensive with being as such, the disjunctive attributes, such as " infinite-or-finite," " substance-or-accident," etc., and finally the " pure perfections," which are of two kinds: those predicable of God alone and those predicable of God as well as of certain creatures. A separate chapter is appended by way of conclusion, showing how Scotus integrated into an organic whole the heterogeneous elements of Aristotle's metaphysics.

Transcendental, according to Scotus, is whatever rises above all general and transcends all categories. Scotus therefore does not limit the term " transcendental " to concepts which are convertible with being. The disjunctive attributes as well as pure perfections are also transcendentals. The transcendentals proper to metaphysics—there are also logical transcendentals—are real concepts or *primae intentiones*, which stand for realities, as opposed to logical concepts or *secundae intentiones*, which stand for other concepts. Hence the first basic presupposition of the theory of metaphysical transcendentality is the notion of a real concept.

A concept is real if it stands for some reality. The realities corresponding to different real concepts must be somehow distinct *a parte rei*. In this connection the author discusses Scotus' theories of formal distinction and *natura communis*, pointing out that the Subtle Doctor adopted the doctrine of formal distinction to guarantee the metaphysical character of our concepts and our knowledge. The reader is surprised by the fact that the question whether the formal modal distinction—a distinction between a formality and its mode—is or is not *a parte rei* is left rather in doubt. Later on we will note the implications of such a doubt.

The second basic presupposition of Scotus' theory of transcendentality

is his doctrine of univocation. Although regarding the notion itself of univocation there is nothing given here which cannot be found in other commentators, ancient or modern, of Scotus, Dr. Wolter's interpretation of *Metaph.*, 4, q. 1, n. 12; VII, 153a, where Scotus seems to deny the univocation of being, is original and acute. In this passage, Dr. Wolter says, Scotus is not speaking of the concept of being at all, but of the term "being." The main interest of this chapter, however, resides in pointing out 1) the relation existing between univocation and the whole theory of transcendentals, and 2) the absolute necessity of univocation in Scotus' view as the only valid basis to justify in Aristotelian terms our knowledge of God and substance. The contention of the author, which is not original with him, that the theory of analogy is ultimately based on some sort of illumination is highly interesting, although it will not convince many.

The second part of the dissertation deals with the transcendentals in particular. A separate chapter is devoted to the discussion of each class. The first chapter dealing with transcendental being is by far the most important. It includes the following questions: the first object of the intellect by way of origin; the concept of being; the primary or adequate object of the intellect, and the twofold primacy of being, namely, the primacy of commonness and the primacy of virtuality. Though his interpretation of the primacy of virtuality, and of the denominative predication of being as regards ultimate differences and proper attributes is far from being completely satisfactory, it is in this chapter especially that the author displays his acumen.

In the last chapter, appended as a conclusion and entitled "Metaphysics as a Theologic," Dr. Wolter attempts to show how Scotus constituted an organic whole with the diverse and loose elements of Aristotle's metaphysics. As is well known, Aristotle in one place defines metaphysics as the science of first principles, that is, God and the "Intelligences," and in another place as the science of being as such. This dualism became acentuated in the two main currents of Arabian Aristotelianism, represented by Averroes and Avicena. According to Dr. Wolter, the merit of Scotus would have consisted in harmonizing these heterogeneous elements. Beginning with the simple and univocal notion of being, the science of metaphysics, as conceived by Scotus, continues with the analysis of the actual conditions of being, such as its contingency, etc.; by the study of the disjunctive transcendentals it rises to the knowledge of the more perfect members of the disjunction; and finally through the study of pure perfections "it is possible to bring out the highlights of this being we call God, until He is revealed to be the ultimate solution to the fundamental question of the metaphysician: Why does being exist?

As this incomplete summary indicates, the contents of the dissertation could hardly be more appealing. If we add that, as a general rule, the

author displays an unusual penetration from both the analytical and synthetic points of view, we can say, not as a mere formality but in truth, that the work should find its place in the library of every metaphysician.

This is not to say that the discussion of the different questions touched upon is equally solid. There are some vulnerable points. We will point out a few of them, those which in our opinion are more fundamental.

Possibly the weakest point of the entire work is that Dr. Wolter, as pointed out above, leaves undecided the question whether the formal modal distinction is or is not *a parte rei*, although he himself is inclined to believe that it is *a parte rei*. He writes (the italics are ours):

> Scotists dispute whether this so-called *distinctio formalis modalis* is really a distinction *a parte rei* or merely a virtual or mental distinction. While *reasons for both interpretations* may be found, the author is inclined to believe that Scotus regarded it as a distinction *a parte rei*.

But to leave undecided this fundamental question is to leave in doubt the metaphysical character of the whole dissertation, which, deals, we are told categorically, with the transcendentals in so far as they are metaphysical or real concepts. The reason is manifest. The formal modal distinction is the basis of metaphysical univocation. The concepts of being, wisdom, etc., are univocal if they can prescind from their modality. On the other hand, according to Scotus a concept is not real unless there be some distinction *a parte rei* between the realities for which it stands and the realities signified by other real concepts. That the univocal concept of being and other univocal concepts are, according to Scotus, real concepts cannot be affirmed categorically unless it is established without any shadow of doubt that Scotus posits some distinction *a parte rei* between the realities corresponding to these concepts and their modality. And since univocation, as Dr. Wolter tells us, is not an incidental factor, but the very foundation of Scotus' theory of transcendentals, any doubt concerning the nature of the modal distinction casts doubt upon the metaphysical character of the whole theory.

In discussing univocation the author devotes a few lines to the notion of analogical concept and the so-called "unity of analogical concept." He rightly points out the obscurity of this phrase as well as the seeming disagreement of neo-scholastics upon its meaning. He himself, however, seems to be perfectly satisfied with such a state of affairs. He does not make any great effort to reach some clarity or at least to prove that such a clarity is unattainable. To show the lack of agreement between neo-scholastic writers he quotes the notions of analogical concept given by Descocqs and Gredt. It is obvious that no agreement can be expected between these two authors. While Descocqs considers the analogy of attribution as the fundamental analogy, in the view of Gredt and others the only valid analogy is that of proper proportionality, which alone would

imply the unity of meaning required in a valid reasoning, namely, *one* intrinsic proportion. To be effective, Dr. Wolter's criticism should have been directed towards proving that an analogical concept has not and cannot have one meaning. Instead his criticism is based upon the impossibility of one and the same concept having two meanings—a point on which Gredt, for example, would perfectly agree with him. Incidentally the author does not quote Gredt's definition of analogy of proper proportionality but his generic definition of analogy, applicable to both the analogy of proper proportionality and the analogy of attribution, which according to Gredt implies two meanings and consequently two concepts.

The explanation of the " virtual primacy of being " given by the author, though in perfect agreement with the words of Scotus himself, does not appear explanatory at all. This point is discussed in dealing with the adequate object of the intellect. According to Scotus, being is the adequate object of the intellect because everything intelligible either contains being essentially or is contained essentially or virtually in something which includes being essentially. Being consequently has a primacy of commonness as regards those intelligibles which contain the concept of being *in quid* or essentially—genera, species, individuals and their essential parts—, and a primacy of virtuality regarding those intelligibles which neither contain being essentially nor are contained essentially in something which contains being essentially. Such are the attributes of being, namely, " true," " one," etc. According to the author this " something " in which the attributes are virtually contained is the concrete object, the *thing*. In other words, the so-called " virtual primacy of being " does not mean *virtual* primacy of *being* at all, but virtual primacy of *the thing*.

The common objection against univocation, namely, that the modalities or ultimate differences and attributes are also being, is answered by Scotus by saying that they are being *denominative*. According to the author this does not mean that being belongs to these differences and attributes, as one could expect from the rather lengthy explanation of denominative predication and the examples he gives. On the contrary, it means that these differences and attributes are " of being," " pertaining to being." In other words, the legitimate conclusion which from this explanation follows is that they are not being. No one would affirm that the coat is Peter because it belongs to Peter. It seems therefore that between being and nothing there is something. Dr. Wolter, however, does not admit such a conclusion and thinks that the difficulty is obviated by simply stating that the attributes, etc., are being *denominative*.

It would have been desirable for the benefit of those who are victims of the neo-scholastic terminological confusion that Dr. Wolter had given Scotus' doctrine on the notion of concept, its division, its relation to reality, etc.

It is apparent that these and the few other critical remarks which could be added are traceable to Scotus himself or the actual condition of his works rather than to the interpreter. Dr. Wolter is perfectly aware of the weakness of certain points and the tentative character of some of his interpretations (p. xi). They do not detract from the merits of the work. Truly the Subtle Doctor has met in Dr. Wolter a subtle interpreter. We heartily recommend this book to every true metaphysician.

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The Theology of Catholic Action. By THEODORE M. HESBURGH. Notre Dame, Ind.: Ave Marie Press, 1946. Pp. 209. $2.50.

De Fundamentis Actionis Catholicae ad mentem Sancti Gregorii Magni. By JAMES VOSS. Mundelein, Ill.: Our Lady of the Lake Seminary Press. 1943. Pp. 119.

These are two dissertations which aim to establish the dogmatic basis of the lay apostolate.

Father Voss, following the teaching of St. Gregory the Great, propounds the twofold thesis that 1) the ultimate theological basis of the lay apostolate is the nature of the Church considered as the Mystical Body, and 2) the proximate basis of the lay apostolate is lay participation in each of the threefold offices of Christ, that of prophet, king, and priest. After synthesizing Gregory's teaching on the Mystical Body, Father Voss treats each of the three powers of Christ; he shows that each is continued in the ecclesiastical hierarchy and that the layman participates in each of them.

The book is a historical rather than theological study. It merely arranges Gregory's teaching without much attempt at analyzing it. The chief value of the book is that it establishes that the layman does share in all three offices of Christ, thus it thwarts the attempts of those who would "keep the laity in their place" by crediting them merely with a share in the power to teach and thereby limiting their activity as lay apostles to one of catechetics or other kinds of religious instructions.

Gregory the Great had a keen realization of the dignity and duties of the Christian layman. He expressed his convictions on this point with his characteristic simplicity and force. His message has a meaning today, when the need for lay apostles is so evident and there is an attempt to recapture the total view of the Church, of which the laity is an integral part. As Pere Congar, O.P., has dryly observed, our ecclesiology should

rather be called hierarchology since it is concerned chiefly with the hierarchy: the primacy of the Pope, the monarchical organization of the Church, etc. It usually omits the other two essential elements of the Church—the Holy Spirit, who is its soul, and the laity, who make up most of its body.

It is a pity that this little book by Father Voss is written in Latin. It is a simple and non-technical mosaic of Gregory's doctrine and would have made excellent reading for apostolic laymen who are trying to fulfill their Christian responsibilities.

Father Hesburgh's study first appeared as a doctoral dissertation of the School of Theology, Catholic University, under the title: "The Relation of the Sacramental Characters of Baptism and Confirmation to the Lay Apostolate." It aims "to determine the place and function of the layman in the Church, by a theological consideration of the basic structural sacraments of baptism and confirmation."

To give a frame of reference for his theological treatment, Father Hesburgh devotes the first part of his study to the lay apostolate in recent papal documents, showing that it has come into prominence as the papal solution to secularism and that the Popes have sketched its nature and theological foundations. In part two, he treats the redemptive priesthood of Christ, the term of participation through the sacramental character; he emphasizes the mediatorial aspects of the Incarnation and Redemption, which is synthesized in the Church's teaching on the grace of headship, the point of contact between Christ's objective work of mediation and man's participation in it. In part three, the core of the study, Father Hesburgh gives a complete exposition of the Christian's participation in Christ's priestly mediation through the sacramental characters of baptism and confirmation. He presents the evidence for the existence of the sacramental character, gives the Thomistic analysis of its nature, and shows its relation to the lay apostolate.

Father Hesburgh has made an excellent study in sacramental theology. He has shown clearly the fact and nature of lay participation in the Priesthood of Christ. He has demonstrated the solidity of the priesthood of Christ. He has demonstrated the solidity of the dogmatic truths underlying the lay apostolate and has established that lay participation in Christ's priesthood can not be confined solely to a share in liturgical worship but extends also to a share in the Christian apostolate. Research of this kind is necessary to give sureness to the theory of the lay apostolate and to allay the fears of those who view it as untraditional and lacking a theological basis; it should also help prepare the minds of Catholics for the apostolic work that modern conditions demand.

The Theology of Catholic Action is the same book as *The Relation of the Sacramental Characters of Baptism and Confirmation to the Lay Apos-*

tolate. Only the title is different. The change in the title has undoubtedly increased the appeal of the book and has given wider distribution to its contents. From this point of view, it was a happy inspiration to change the title: the material in the book is important and should be more widely understood. It will, however, be unfortunate should the title of the book lead people to accept it as the complete and definitive theology of Catholic Action. The author had Catholic Action in mind when he wrote the book, and he wrote it to contribute to the understanding and solidification of Catholic Action theory. Nevertheless, the study was done on a subject (the lay apostolate) broader than Catholic Action and on a dogmatic basis (the sacramental character) narrower than the dogmatic basis of Catholic Action. Therefore, it is a misnomer to call the book *The Theology of Catholic Action.*

The problem of "the theology of Catholic Action" is an interesting one, and the title of Father Hesburgh's book gives an opportunity to discuss it briefly. Is the theology of Catholic Action co-extensive with the study of the sacramental characters of baptism and confirmation? The sacramental characters seem rather to be only a part of the dogmatic basis of Catholic Action. Dogmatic theology should make further contributions to the theology of Catholic Action, notably pertinent material from the tract on the Church. Two recent works with useful material of this kind are Canon Jacques Leclercq's *La Vie du Christ dans son Église* and Abbe Hassyeld's *Dans Christ et dans l'Église,* which are the class notes used in his course on the Church given at the *Grand Seminaire* of Lille. *Catholicisme* by Henri DeLubac, S.J., is also of interest on this matter. Furthermore, dogma should also furnish a treatment of the social aspects of grace, such as Father Fournier has developed in *La théologie d'Action catholique.* It must also investigate the effects of the Incarnation on material reality, possibly along the lines suggested by Gustave Thils in his *Théologie des Réalites terrestres.* The theology of Catholic Action will also have to explore further the relation between the spiritual and temporal orders to delineate more clearly the layman's area of competence. Even these dogmatic considerations would not round out the theology of Catholic Action. Moral theology would have a contribution to make, too; this would consist in at least an analysis of social justice and the other social virtues, a trend begun by Rev. William Ferree, S.M. in his *Act of Social Justice* and *Limits of Individual Responsibility for Social Reconstruction.* Finally, the theology of Catholic Action must contain an analysis of that which, according to most authorities, formally constitutes Catholic Action, the mandate. Certainly, the theology of Catholic Action—and even its dogmatic basis—is broader than a treatment of lay participation in Christ's priesthood through the sacramental characters.

While on the one hand, the two dissertations under consideration narrow

down too much the theological basis of Catholic Action, on the other hand they deal with a subject broader than Catholic Action. They deal with the lay apostolate rather than with Catholic Action. Unfortunately, both of the studies seem to confuse or identify Catholic Action with the lay apostolate. Father Voss says that Catholic Action is just the modern name for the auxiliary lay apostolate (p. 109) and that it differs from the traditional lay apostolate only in its form of organization (p. 111). Father Hesburgh uses the terms interchangeably, *e.g.* (p. 22), "What then is the nature of this *lay apostolate* according to Pius XI? It is well to begin with a definition since Pius XI has formulated and canonized one. His classical definition of *Catholic Action* is: The participation . . . etc." Father Hesburgh does mention in passing the relationship between the "official Catholic Action organization with other organized apostolates of a less universal nature" (p. 21), but there is nothing in the study that gives a basis for making such a distinction. It would seem from these studies that there is no basis theologically for distinguishing Catholic Action from other forms of the lay apostolate, although—in practice, at least—the Popes insist upon distinguishing between them.

It is a fact that Pius XI and the other Popes have at times used the term Catholic Action broadly so as to be practically equivalent to the lay apostolate. Simultaneously, however, they insist upon a distinction between Catholic Action in the strict sense and other activities of the lay apostolate. Father Hesburgh explains this apparent papal contradiction by saying that the distinction refers to Catholic Action taken either in the dynamic sense (an apostolic activity following upon supernatural being) or in the static sense of an officially mandated organization of the lay apostolate. Theologically speaking, Catholic Action from the dynamic point of view is the same as the lay apostolate; they differ only in the form of organization and canonical status. This is an assumption that cannot be accepted without proof. Neither author gives proof.

This gratuitous identification of Catholic Action and the lay apostolate seems to be based upon the failure to distinguish a deputation to participate in the apostolate of the hierarchy, which is given by the hierarchy to some from a deputation to defend the faith of Christ publicly and firmly, which is given by Christ to all, as a secondary deputation of the Confirmation character. The definition of Catholic Action is the participation of the laity in the apostolate of the hierarchy, while the dogmatic basis for the lay apostolate is the secondary deputation of the character. The two, therefore, are not identical, and differ not only in their comprehension but in their proper causes as well. It follows also that Catholic Action differs from the lay apostolate not only statically (in its organizational form) but also dynamically (in its intrinsic nature). Failure to distinguish between Catholic Action and the lay apostolate because of

this confusion of principle can result also in a germane error held by some that Catholic Action is the visible organization of the lay priesthood, the entire "lower half of the church formed into a single organization," that would parallel the organized hierarchy, "the upper half of the Church."

Obviously, the laymen in Catholic Action share in the deputation of the character, since they are baptised and confirmed as are other Catholics. Also, their apostolic activity performed in Catholic Action will be at the same time an exercise of their deputation. The converse is not true. One can do apostolic work for which one is fitted by the exercise of one's deputation and need not at the same time be engaged in Catholic Action. Wherein lies the difference?

The difference apparently lies in whether the activity is an exercise of the secondary deputation of Confirmation only or of this deputation and also of a participation in the apostolate of the hierarchy. This raises the question as to what the apostolate of the hierarchy is and how the laity share in it. Most writers on Catholic Action hesitate to attribute to the laity a share in either the power of orders or the power of jurisdiction. Certainly not in orders. And neither in jurisdiction, since the explicit authority of canon law and Church tradition is against this. Probably the most satisfying answer to the problem of what the apostolate of the hierarchy is and how the laymen share in it is that given by Canon Glorieux in his booklet *Catholic Action: the Mandated Apostolate* (Berliner & Lanigan, Nevada City, Calif.). Glorieux says that Catholic Action is a participation in the apostolate which is *proper* to the hierarchy, *viz.*, "the assuming of the responsibilities for the whole church, the taking of measures for and the constant care of the whole" (p. 6). Thus, in Catholic Action, the laity share in the pastoral responsibilities of the Bishop. The Bishop usually confers this share in his pastoral responsibilities by explicit delegation, by a mandate. The mandate given to an organized group of laymen dedicates the group to an apostolate for the common good of a definite area or *milieu* of which they are representative. Since the common good consists for the most part of sound institutions, much of the activity of the people in Catholic Action will be devoted to the Christianization of institutions, or social habits. For efficient action, this usually requires specialization in Catholic Action.

The question of what the mandate is and what it adds to specify the lay apostolate is far from settled. Despite uncertainties as to the nature and necessity of the mandate, there is not much doubt about the distinction between Catholic Action and the lay apostolate, whether it is the mandate that makes all the difference or not. Most authorities on Catholic Action lay great stress on the mandate, though papal documents hardly refer to it all, and then only in vague terms. If it is the mandate which formally constitutes Catholic Action, it is difficult to see how there can be a

"theology of Catholic Action" without a consideration of that which formally constitutes Catholic Action. The theology of Catholic Action is not completed merely with a proof that there is such a thing as a lay apostolate, nor can it be assumed that because the laity enjoy a deputation from Confirmation they also participate in the apostolate of the hierarchy. A theology of Catholic Action must consider the apostolate of the hierarchy and how the laity share in it.

Neither Father Hesburh nor Father Voss treats the question of what the mandate adds over and above the lay apostolate. In his conclusion, Father Hesburgh writes: "Since the Church Militant is a visible society, organized under the sacred power and authority of the hierarchy, the lay apostolate requires an external mandate, over and above the inner consecration to the apostolate by the sacramental characters" (p. 187). This statement appears only in the conclusion. It is not discussed or proved in the body of the book. It is difficult to see the basis for it, and it seems to be contrary to facts. The lay apostolate has always existed in the Church, whereas the external mandate is a modern device. Merely because the Church is a visible society with an authoritive hierarchy is no proof that the lay apostolate requires an external mandate. Genuine lay apostolates can and have existed in the Church with the permission or even the mere toleration of the hierarchy. A mandate is more than this.

On the other hand, it is possible to over-emphasize the mandate. Some writers make everything depend upon it. But it can be questioned whether a mandate alone can make any organization to which it is given, Catholic Action. Those who hold that it can do so seem to be taking an extremely voluntaristic position and espousing a type of nominalism by identifying a being with its name. Merely calling an organization Catholic Action, or even giving it a mandate, will not make it Catholic Action unless it has the internal characteristics necessary for the essence of Catholic Action. Catholic Action is not purely a juridic creation. It requires certain internal qualifications. Furthermore, besides having the external mandate, it seems that an organization to be Catholic Action must have the social qualities which make it a realistic and functional answer to the problem of secularism. As Father Hesburgh points out, Catholic Action is devised as an answer to the problem of secularism. If this is so, it would seem that nothing is Catholic Action if it cannot meet the problem with reasonable efficiency, and it is Catholic Action insofar as it can. This does not mean that an organization in order to qualify as Catholic Action must be successful in meeting the problem of secularism. But it does mean that it *per se* has the internal qualifications and adequate social means. *Per accidens*, it may fail because of the enormity of the task or for other reasons; but it is the right answer in itself.

This fact of the requirements of Catholic Action from a social point of view (as the solution of the problem of secularism) should have some

bearing on the theology of Catholic Action, dogmatic and moral. It is unlikely that the theology of Catholic Action can be completely worked out except in function of the problem that Catholic Action is devised to meet. It seems, too, that the theology of Catholic Action will progress as Catholic Action itself develops. Father Hesburgh introduces his dissertation with a consideration of the problem of secularism and shows that it occasioned the papal teaching on Catholic Action. He justifies his treatment by pointing out that the papal documents are one of the *loci theologici* and so a legitimate source for a dogmatic study. It is unfortunate that he does not continue this method of treatment, but breaks off from it completely, proceeds to give a treatment of the sacramental characters, and never returns to his point of departure. The reader is left to wonder how all the development of the sacramental characters applies to the problem of secularism. Naturally, one would not expect a treatment of the technical and sociological aspects of Catholic Action in a theological study, but one could expect an indication of how the dogmatic truths under consideration are related to the problem which occasioned their study.

Perhaps it is still too soon to write the complete theology of Catholic Action. Theologians are just becoming aware of its vast implications. Significantly, there have been no serious attempts in recent years to make a complete synthesis of Catholic Action theory, even in Europe where thought on the subject is far advanced. This fact does not reflect a lack of interest, because there have been numerous excellent articles and monographs on various aspects of Catholic Action. But it does signify an increased realization of the profundity of the subject. The present attitude towards the theology of Catholic Action is illustrated by the action of a prominent theologian at Rome, author of a very scholarly book on Catholic Action which appeared some ten years ago. Recently, when asked to bring his book up to date for re-publication, he declined, saying that he now realizes the inadequacy of his first book and his inability to write the theology of Catholic Action at this stage of its development. He added that the theology of Catholic Action would not be merely deduced in an abstract way but that it would evolve and clarify with the progress of the living movements of Catholic Action.

Considerable work on various aspects of the theory of Catholic Action is now being done. Much more remains to be done before a synthesis will be possible. Research such as that done by Father Hesburgh on the sacramental characters is important and necessary. There should be similar studies on other topics connected with the theological basis of Catholic Action. Work of this kind will pave the way to the formulation of the complete theology of Catholic Action.

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BRIEF NOTICES

Der Italienische Humanismus. By Eugenio Garin. Berne: A. Francke, 1947. Pp. 295, with index. S. fr. 13.80.

The period of thought from the thirteenth century peaks of Scholastic thought to the time of Bacon and Descartes is not always carefully studied by philosophers. The Renaissance which this period includes is left largely to students of history, art, and literature; and except for the names of Scotus and Ockham, the transition from medieval to modern philosophy is often viewed as an abrupt break rather than the gradual sequence of ideas which it actually embodied. Philosophers of history, it is true, point to the Renaissance as a movement toward subjectivity and toward man's fellow creatures in this world. They signalize the aestheticism of the Renaissance and the effect of a few important people like Leonardo, Galileo, and perhaps Giordano Bruno. But despite the efforts of a few enterprising scholars, the full itinerary from medieval to modern times, at least in its philosophical aspects, remains to be mapped.

Der Italienische Humanismus is the study of various schools and various thinkers from the end of the fourteenth century to the beginning of the seventeenth. It is of a statistical character, attempting to draw no philosophical conclusions in the light of the subsequent systems that humanism helped to prompt but aiming more to present the thoughts of the vast number of Italian humanists from Petrarch to Campanella. In view of the surprisingly long parade of philosophers studied here, most of them obscure thinkers and not previously studied by modern scholarship, at least together, this work reflects a patient and arduous degree of research and provokes many more degrees of stimulation. It contains copious footnotes and an annotated bibliography for each chapter. There is also an index of names and dates of the men treated in the body.

The author has organized his book for the most part chronologically. To a great extent, as if to emphasize a certain logical movement that can be inductively discerned in history, this arrangement enables a broad division according to topics. Thus there are chapters on the origins of humanism; on the social and civil life which the early humanists preached in opposition to celibacy; on Platonism with its doctrines of aesthetic intuition and of voluntarism; on Aristotle and the problem of man's unity; on logic, rhetoric, and poetry which the humanists adopted as their organon; on morality which they adopted to a great extent as their end, even though confusing the good with the beautiful; and on experiment which came to be adopted as the means of studying nature naturally. There is a final chapter on the period from Bruno to Campanella which includes a study of the Renaissance and the Reformation.

Among the more prominent humanists studied are Marsilio Ficino and Pico della Mirandola. A host of others treated in this book are less well known. In the whole of the work, it is curious to note how much that now seems post-Cartesian and even twentieth-century was said and said explicitly by these Italian humanists. Some of the passages would make parts of Jeans, Dewey, Santayana, James, the existentialists, Einstein, Russell, Morris, Marx, Alexander, and Whitehead seem like plagiarisms. The naturalists would acknowledge the men of the Renaissance as their intellectual ancestors. What could be more Marxian than "man is born in order to be useful to men" (p. 64)? What could be more Jamesian or Blondellian than "*agere est intelligere*" (p. 62)?

From its origins, the Renaissance tended to lower men's sights from the search after eternal verities and to fix their attention on the here and now. The emphasis on social and political life, on patriotism, on aesthetic contemplation, on experiment, and on the logic of discovery—all consort in this humanistic aim, so that Descartes when he turned man inward upon himself plowed up a soil that was already prepared to receive and nurture his ideas. Even earlier and in Italy itself, Galileo with his empiricism in science and his nominalism in philosophy simply swept forward rather than created the idea that nature could only be interpreted by nature itself.

Empirical science thus solved a problem that beset the humanists. There was a danger which some of them saw and some of them felt, as its actual victims, that a vicious circle results when nature is studied in and for itself and that the only solution is a Plotinian mysticism, quite like the purely aesthetic contemplation which Santayana urges upon men. From this circle, empirical science seemed to rescue the later humananism. By the life-saving role that it thus seemed to play, it came to be regarded as the only approach to the real. The popularity of scientism was thus prepared before Leonardo and Galileo started their experiments. That preparation, philosophically sketched, was accomplished to a great extent by the men studied in this highly commendable book.

St. Thomas and the Greek Moralists. By Vernon J. Bourke. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1947. Pp. 53, with index. $1.50.

History of Philosophy and Philosophical Education. By Etienne Gilson. Marquette University Press, 1948. Pp. 49. $1.50.

Two of the traditionally annual Aquinas lectures were sponsored during 1947 by the Aristotelian Society of Marquette University. These two little books are the respective texts.

Professor Bourke makes out a case that St. Thomas, though obviously dominating his matter by his own superior insights, drew upon the ethics of Hellenic thought, especially upon Aristotle and the Stoics. He elucidates

how the genius of Aquinas elaborated on the Aristotelian notion of goodness in the light of man's ultimate end which revelation clarified. He shows further how the Thomistic notion of reason, while admitting in a broad sense the Stoic account of it, broadens the concept in a way that relates good acts to norms speculatively known and ultimately theocentric.

Thomistic moral philosophy is divided into three considerations: the inner structure of the moral act, psychologically analyzed into the parts played by intellect and will; the meaning of right reason; and the organization of moral philosophy in terms of the various virtues. Professor Bourke shows that the structure of human acts is analyzed according to a pattern from St. John Damascene who developed his thought from the ethics and psychology of Aristotle. With regard to the meaning of right reason, it is found that the intellectualism of Aristotle and the naturalism of the Stoics come together in the sublimating synthesis of St. Thomas. The pattern of organizing moral philosophy according to virtues and their "parts" is suggested in the *Nichomachean Ethics*, and is followed more or less by Andronicus, Macrobius, Seneca, Cicero, and Plotinus.

The material in this book is skillfully organized, and despite its brevity, it exhibits familiarity with a wide variety of sources. There is a section of footnotes at the end. As a matter of detail, it may be wondered whether Plato and the so-called *Platonici* so often cited by Aquinas did not play at least a mentionable part in his moral philosophy. Aquinas admits their thesis on the primacy of good in the order of intention. Also, and as a matter of even smaller detail, the contention that St. Thomas had no fluency in reading Greek, as Professor Bourke declares, is not universally admitted.

Professor Gilson's lecture is likewise an excellent and thought-provoking contribution. He distinguishes between studying philosophy by way of manuals which have a tendency to make the subject a matter of rote and a vital penetration in which one not merely studies philosophy but becomes a philosopher. He develops the Augustinian and Thomistic philosophy of teaching and learning and, in his usually clear way, he make a strong plea for greater emphasis in education on the history of philosophy as a study of living ideas. In these days of educational ferment when so many institutions are revamping their curricula to achieve a broader and better integration, Gilson's discussion of where philosophy actually exists and how it is related to individual philosophers cannot help being a timely contribution to American philosophy. He is apparently not satisfied with the idea that we should study what others have thought to know what to think ourselves. However, he does not state exactly how his principles differ from this opinion.

This essay can be read with profit by every philosopher. There is much in it for the teacher not only in directing his own personal thought but in transforming courses in the history of philosophy into a much livelier

status than many of them now occupy in the student's mind. The thesis which Gilson advocates does not fully develop the fact that the study of philosophy is a three- rather than two-termed relation, involving not only the present philosopher and past philosophies but the experience which both seek to interpret and to which both must conform. It is true that he adverts to the fact that philosophy lives only in the present. But philosophy, it would seem, evolves from that present as much as it does from the answers given in the past. Indeed, it is from the dynamism of our own experience with the answers that other philosophers would give to it that the personal philosophy which Gilson lauds is developed and enriched.

These two lectures are stimulating steps toward the type of philosophizing which Gilson envisions. They are entirely worthy of the high standards which the previous ten Aquinas lectures have set.

How Our Minds Work. By C. E. M. Joad. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1947. Pp. 116, with index. $2.75.

Contemporary psychology, through the influences of Behaviorism and Freudianism, has descended into a cellar that is mostly physiological, evolutionary, and materialist in character. In such a view, mind is simply matter peculiarly combined and pressured ever forward by its inward tensions. Basically mind thus becomes the sport of its material parts which are traced backward to their origins along roads that Watson called reflexes and that Freud termed evolutionary drives.

Against this philosophy of mind, Professor Joad takes forceful issue, combining his gifts for apt examples with his remarkable insights as a thinker and controversialist. The result is a highly effective statement of some of modern psychology's ignored and unsolved questions. There is, however, a great deal of mystery wrapped about Professor Joad's own solution to the problem of mind. This inadequacy is indicated on the opening page where mind is pictured as an hypothesis, and psychology as a system of theories rather than, like biology, physics, and chemistry, a statement of given and predictable facts. But the larger view of this work must advert to the wholesomeness of its attack on materialism and the wealth of examples which it provides for all those who accept the immanent view of life and the spiritual nature of man.

It is difficult to decide exactly how Dr. Joad solves the mind-body problem. He discusses it largely in Cartesian rather than hylomorphic strains, but near the end of his work he takes a much more holistic view than the Cartesian tradition would approve. In this climactic section of his work, faculty psychology is rejected in the interest of saving the psychophysical unity, and "reason" and "instinct" are related as a curving mirror which, on one side, looks convex and, on the other, concave. This is neither Descartes nor Leibniz speaking, but neither is it hylo-

morphism which insists that actions are *through* the faculties but *of* the supposit.

In the opening chapter, mind is portrayed as apparently an immaterial interpreter presiding over the chain of neurological reflexes in the body. Against the background of Darwinism, the typical modern view of mind is expounded—an epiphenomenon created by the material forces of a purely phenomenal universe. In the third chapter, the obvious difficulties of sensism and various forms of behaviorism are effectively lined up to bear their powerful testimony in favor of the immaterial in man. "Mind so conceived is an active, dynamic, synthesizing force; it goes out beyond the sensations provided by external stimuli and arranges them into patterns, and it seems to be capable on occasion of acting without the provocation of bodily stimuli to set it in motion." (p. 74.)

With this evidence for his self-styled "hypothesis" that mind exists, Professor Joad sets out to picture mind more as an activity than as a thing. He rejects McDougalls' view of man in terms of instincts and emotions, citing and defending Aristotle's thesis that desire has to do with the ends of action but that reason maps out the way to the willed destinations.

Mustering his forces against what Allers calls elementarism in psychology, Professor Joad makes his case for an apparently holistic rather than hylomorphic solution to his problem. He holds "that there are no *purely* cognitive, affective, or conative experiences." (p. 104.) Certainly an Aristotelian could retain his faculty psychology and agree with this analysis. Man is a unity, and all of his actions resonate throughout that unity. Yet there must be a difference somewhere between the cognitive, affective, and conative aspects of an experience, or the consciousness of their distinction would remain unexplained. So conceived, man is a unit operating through powers. The object is also a unit, seen according to its various aspects by the powers which the aspects specify.

There is a brief concluding chapter in criticism of the theory of the unconscious, the argument being that the distinction between the unconscious and the conscious is not in accordance with the unity of the human mind. Repressions, Professor Joad adds, can be better described in terms of neural patterns acquired through experience and poised for immediate action whenever the proper stimulus sets them off.

Strangely enough, Professor Joad's main difficulty seems to be not so much mind as body. Though insisting on the unity of mind, he constantly refers to the body as though it were the locus of separate neural phenomena that somehow interact with mind and follow it like the ship of the Platonic pilot. The real problem is not mind-body but soul and prime matter. In the final analysis, Professor Joad has stressed, he thinks, the unity of mind. But he does not account for mind's union, not as efficient but as formal cause, with the corporal part of man. The human

body is not a human body until it is suffused with an informing soul. As long as this fact is not taken into account, psychology will continue its mad and convulsive shifting from one theory to another without explaining the real compenetration of soul and matter as vegetative, animal, and even intellectual operations, in their origins, bring it forcefully to light.

Elements of Symbolic Logic. By HANS REICHENBACH. New York: Macmillan, 1947. Pp. 444, with index. $5.00.

Dr. Reichenbach, now professor of philosophy at the University of California at Los Angeles, presents this book on symbolic logic as the fruit of years of reflection on the subject, together with wide experience of teaching it in various countries and thus to various linguistic groups. He acknowledges his debt to Russell, Hilbert, and Carnap, reaffirming his allegiance to the so-called logical empiricist school which more or less accepts Russell's verdict that philosophy is logic and logic alone.

Dr. Reichenbach begins his treatment of the subject with the calculus of propositions and comes to the calculus of classes only after a treatment of propositional functions. This is more or less the order of Russell, but its validity is not universally admitted. Traditional logic, it is well known, begins with the term or class and studies the judgment or proposition in the second of its three sections. The reasoning behind this order is that classification must precede the combination of classes, just as matter has a natural (though not a temporal) priority over form. In their ordering of the subject, the mathematical logicians like Reichenbach and Russell are thus not faithful to their analytic method. In this respect, Lewis and Langford are more logical. Aiming to solve the problem, Russell is impelled to his theory of types in order to achieve a consistent presentation of his subject in terms of the priority of the propositional function. But the validity of this type theory, which is really earlier than Russell and is suggested by Frege, is now seriously questioned, and Professor Reichenbach, as will be seen below, does not deal with or even mention its principal adversary.

Logic in this book becomes the "analysis of language," and the instrument employed is the metalanguage. Analytically, this resort to n-metalanguages and even an infinity of them is satisfactory for the purposes of symbolic logic and in the domain of production rather than speculation where it truly and fruitfully applies. But mathematical logicians have the habit of avoiding the *Knotenpunkt* where the object language and the metalanguage come together as closely as matter and form. In speaking of the continuum, Aristotle said that it was infinitely divisible but never infinitely divided. A similar statement could be made of the continuum in logical classification. It is infinitely formalizable but never infinitely formalized. A decision between the ordinary two-valued logic and the three-

valued logic of Lucasiewicz and Tarski cannot be fully handled by either. One may well surmise that an n-valued or infinity-valued logic could also be hypothecated depending on ratios of probability.

Mathematical logic is a tool for thinking through problems of an empirical and productive character where the hylomorphic union must necessarily be ignored, given the so-called scientific method. But there is no such thing thing as pure logic any more than there is pure art. The mathematical logicians are in general not sufficiently aware of what classification realistically entails and of the dialectical rather than demonstrative instruments which defend its conclusions and communicate them. No treatment of correct thinking, and this book purports to be of such a type, can be adequate and fully useful unless it emphasises thinking as well as correctness. It must therefore include a discussion of abstraction as the basis of all human thought and the types of necessity which abstraction discloses to exist among things and among thoughts.

The original contributions of this book are chiefly in the analysis of conversational language. (Chapter VII.) Symbolic logic is highly useful for the understanding and improvement of grammar, though it is again limited by the fact that grammar is an art and not infinitely formalizable. On the score of completion, mention should also have been made, in this work, of rhetoric. The book is intended as a text, and if its readers are to be realistically educated by it, they should be aware of its limitations as well as of its value. They should be apprized as fully as possible of the way in which it fits in with the other activities of thought, speech, and communication.

Intuitionism, as advocated for example by Brouwer, gives a different version of mathematical thinking from that of the formalists like Hilbert and the logicists like Russell and Carnap. Russell, in the second edition (1938) of his *Principles of Mathematics* acknowledges without refutation that the intuitionists are a redoubtable opponent of his type theory. Intuitionism would challenge the validity of the structure such as Reichenbach has worked out, and for that reason, its arguments and method might well have been discussed and evaluated in a book like this.

This book is probably not suited for use on an elementary classroom level since it does not explain and develop the manipulation of symbolisms with sufficient example to enable the student to proceed on his own. For more advanced readers, it is a clear presentation of the subject, especially of the general directions behind it, and it is certainly recommended reading for scientists, grammarians, educators, psychologists, and all others interested in gaining empirical control over their subject matter. For a more philosophical viewpoint, however, recommendation must be tempered by the consideration that in all thinking the subject and the object have something from within that scholastics call natures and that abstraction alone can apprehend.

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